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Abstract 
We provide three new empirical perspectives on inequality in the context of economic 
development, one focusing on income inequality, and the remaining two on gender inequality. 
First, we jointly analyze the causal effects of geography, trade integration, and institutional quality 
on different income groups for developing and developed countries from 1983 to 2012. Favorable 
geographic conditions tend to discriminate strongly between income groups as low incomes 
benefit from equator distance whereas high incomes decline. Controlling for institutional quality 
and geography, trade integration has a negative income effect which increases in absolute size and 
significance for richer percentiles. Institutional quality strongly and positively affects all income 
groups, however, high income groups tend to profit relatively more than low income groups. Using 
different instrumental variable strategies, these findings remain robust for different specification 
tests and they are consistent over time. 
In our second perspective, we offer empirical evidence that early female marriage age 
significantly decreases female education with panel data from 1980 to 2010. Socio-cultural 
customs serve as an exogenous identification for female age at marriage, and we apply fixed effects 
and a quasi diff-in-diff specification to address endogeneity issues. We also show that effects of 
spousal age gaps between men and women significantly affect female relative to male education. 
Each additional year between husband and wife reduces the female secondary schooling 
completion rate by 10 percentage points, the time women spend at university by one month, and 
overall affects female education significantly more negatively than male education. We also 
document that marriage age and conventional measures of gender discrimination are no substitutes. 
Finally, we examine whether immigrants have brought the missing women phenomenon to 
Germany and Switzerland. Using a range of micro data since 1990, we find no systematic gender 
selection of foreigners collectively, but a group of Balkan, Chinese and Indian immigrants display 
comparatively high sex ratios at birth. Employing different estimation methods we consistently 
calculate around 1,500 missing girls in Germany (2003-2014) and Switzerland (1990-2014) 
combined from these immigrant groups. With household survey data we attempt to identify 
reasons for sex selection at birth in Germany, but find no robust association for any socio-economic 
variable employed. However, the sex of older siblings tends to matter, and again Balkan, Chinese 
and Indian immigrants increase the boy-birth likelihood whereas immigrants collectively do not. 
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I. Inequality and Economic Development:  
New Perspectives on Old Questions 
I. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Inequality is among the most widely discussed and researched themes in the world. And yet 
it is far from being brought under control, let alone subjugated. According to United Nations, even 
though the number of people living in extreme poverty has dropped by more than half since 1990, 
more than 75% of the global population now live in societies that have become more unequal since 
that year, and inequality has in fact never been higher since World War Two (UNDP, 2016). Many 
fear that these trends hamper, if not reverse, growth and economic development already achieved, 
and thus put at stake the welfare prospects of millions of people in the world. For both developing 
countries and advanced economies, managing inequality remains a key challenge in the 21st 
century. 
For those who aim to grasp and tackle this phenomenon, inequality represents not only a 
complex intellectual task but is also more prone for personal judgment than other fields of research 
and policy making. Analyses on the level of socio-economic equality easily lead to normative 
discussions on how egalitarian a society shall be (Rawls, 1999). Inequality hence represents a field 
of economic research at least as much as it represents an ethical and philosophical question. Ringen 
(2006, p. 1) defines inequality as referring “sometimes descriptively to any distribution of goods 
or bads that deviates from an equal distribution, and sometimes normatively to unequal 
distributions that represent a problem from an egalitarian point of view”. No matter which of these 
two aspects was in focus, mankind has pondered over inequality through millennia, and emphasis 
has rather been placed on advocating higher equality and more solidarity.  
Yet, if humans are so heterogeneous in nature, attitudes, abilities, and many more 
characteristics, what is it that makes the concept of achieving more equality so attractive and 
timeless? 1  Sen (1995, p. 2) points out that “the judgment and measurement of inequality is 
thoroughly dependent on the choice of variable”. Indeed, a broad notion exists that a set of 
fundamental dimensions shall be equal for every individual. Human rights are a nutshell term 
                                                 
1 We recognize that heterogeneity does not equal inequality, although the two dimensions may coincide in reality.  
Blau (1967) distinguishes between heterogeneity, which he defines as a horizontal differentiation among groups in 
terms of a nominal parameter, and inequality, which distributes social groups vertically in terms of a graduated 
parameter.  
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capturing this idea, but even those may be interpreted differently. Some posit equal access to and 
universal right for employment as first human right, others may advocate equal justice under law, 
and again others may demand that all people be equally happy.  
Economic research on inequality is similarly challenging. We find no agreement regarding 
what reference should be taken as “right” distribution to compare with observed inequalities, in 
particular with respect to income. Moreover, there is an increasing call for a more comprehensive 
perspective on living standards, which next to income should also include aspects such as 
education, health, individual freedom and more (Goodman, Johnson, & Webb, 1997; Sen, 1985b). 
Measuring all these individual aspects of life against a (somewhat arbitrary) benchmark adds 
substantial hurdles to the quest for managing inequality. Thus, in our attempt to contribute to 
inequality research meaningfully, we are confronted with the challenge of analyzing a highly 
complex, ill-defined, and interwoven array of questions that in addition tend to be emotionally 
charged. Economists cannot ignore these complex and challenging features of inequality research, 
but the hope is nonetheless that the insights presented in this dissertation prove to be meaningful 
by focusing on specific, well-defined aspects of this field. 
In this first chapter, we begin by contrasting some of the most important forms of inequality, 
and we motivate our choice to focus on income inequality and gender inequality. For the latter, we 
specifically examine educational gender inequality and gender inequality at birth. Hence, in this 
introduction we also reserve additional space for familiarizing the reader with these two aspects. 
Furthermore, we revisit the main ideas proposed in the literature for the relationship between 
inequality and economic development, from classical economics to the particular contribution of 
development economics and some of the most recent findings. We conclude this introductory 
chapter with an executive summary of all main results presented in this dissertation.    
I. 2. RESEARCH MOTIVATION  
Economic development and income inequality are strongly linked, which explains the high 
relevance of this relationship in economics. In ancient subsistence economies, nobody was rich or 
poor – there may have been hierarchical orders within a human tribe of hunters and gatherers, but 
the level of inequality in terms of wealth was negligible (Nolan & Lenski, 2004). Thus, income 
inequality tended to arise with economic development and growth. Indeed, income inequality 
refers to the gap between the rich and the poor, or more formally the “unequal distribution of 
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income and financial assets in the population” (Orton & Rowlingson, 2007, p.1). Both income and 
assets are variables that are fundamentally linked to the advent of organized economic activities 
(Smith, [1776] 1976). Hence, income inequality is a cornerstone of any inequality discussion in 
the economic discipline, arguably drawing most of the research attention. We, too, contribute with 
a new perspective to this field, as we discuss in depth the impact of fundamental development 
factors on different income groups in the second chapter. As we will outline below, the analysis 
helps answer the question if institutional quality, trade, and geographic conditions each rather 
increase or decrease income inequality in a country.    
In addition, however, we strive to go in this dissertation beyond the income dimension of 
inequality by providing additional perspectives. While a large literature concentrates on the income 
aspect, that approach does not capture all aspects of inequality in economics. Different forms of 
inequality are often interconnected (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011; Warwick-Booth, 2013), but 
exclusively considering inequality in monetary levels fails to grasp the phenomenon in larger 
scope. In other words, the unequal distribution of income, assets, and wealth, does not exhaustively 
describe the array of inequality variables that impact individual welfare. Additional facets of 
inequality exist, which may either have an impact via income inequality, or may affect an economy 
directly through entirely separate channels. As Neckerman (2004, p. 18) notes, “a wide range of 
social domains” need to be considered in addition to income inequality to reckon the full cost of 
inequality for an economy.   
These other forms of inequality are sometimes subsumed under the umbrella term social 
inequality, which Naidoo and Wills (2008) define as differences in resources, power and status 
within and between societies. In our own words, it is as a discrimination of individuals to access 
certain resources because of (socially defined) markers. Sernau (2013) lists race, class, and gender 
as the three most salient markers which societies tend to discriminate against, typically when it 
comes to questions like: What child features do parents wish for? Who is paid more for the job? 
Whom do we grant further education? These and many more situations are frequently discussed 
in the public discourse on unequal treatment and discrimination. Yet, such unequal treatment has 
in addition distinct economic implications, and therefore, chapters three and four are dedicated to 
the examination of such facets of inequality. We specifically tackle two aspects of gender 
inequality, namely educational gender inequality and prenatal gender discrimination. We offer new 
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perspectives by exploring causes as well as the actual extent of each of these gender inequality 
types, and will introduce the respective topics in further detail below. 
To underline the motivation for this research agenda, let us revisit what makes the economic 
discipline, and in particular development economists, worry so much about inequality. We briefly 
noted above that income inequality, i.e. the difference in how assets and income are distributed, 
could only develop with coordinated economic activities, which explains the scholarly interest 
throughout time. In recent decades, globalization effects and ever growing trade integration have 
reinforced debates on how increasing economic activities and inequality will affect each other in 
the 21st century (Berman, Bound, & Griliches, 1994; Jaumotte, Lall, & Papageorgiou, 2013; 
Krugman, 1995). Many consider the unprecedented migration waves as a symbol of unsustainable 
global inequalities, and then quickly blame unprecedented trade volumes, among others, as one of 
the root causes.  
Current controversies on trade liberalization agreements are also exemplifying. Among 
others, we witness heated debates about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), which for some “symbolizes the worst of global capitalism” (Dearden, 2016) and 
according to Oxfam would intensify inequality in developing countries (Sarmadi, 2015). But trade 
liberalization also faces strong headwind in developed countries, where more trade integration is 
often believed to harm middle and low income groups due to job relocation to low-wage countries. 
Trade policies can be quickly modified by government intervention. Hence the effects for the 
income distribution in a country from changes in national trade patterns carry an outstanding 
political relevance. In short, the impact of economic activities on inequality is mobilizing societies, 
and scientific inequality research may be a valuable ingredient for a more fact-based discourse in 
an otherwise often heavily normative discussion environment. In the next chapter we will therefore 
propose a new way of looking at the income distribution effects of trade, among other variables, 
to strengthen the empirical basis for related public policy discussions.  
Economic activities have an impact on inequality, but also the flipside matters (and tends to 
happen in parallel), i.e. the effects of inequality on economic welfare in a society. For the sake of 
simplification, we structure the literature dealing with the economic effects of inequality along 
three broad strands. The first major argument revolves around distortions of a functioning 
incentive scheme. In an ideal economic system, there should always be a reward, or pay-off, to the 
marginal input and resources of an individual, be it labor, human capital investments, or other 
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economic activities. However, such an efficient incentive system is distorted if individuals are 
rewarded not based on resources they put in, but because they are simply born in the “right” family, 
have the “right” sex or “right” skin color (Blanden, Gregg, & Machin, 2005). As simple example, 
a gifted girl may wonder at school “why try hard for good grades because even if I excel, university 
education is inaccessible for people with my background.” Indeed, this way of thinking will be 
highly relevant for our chapters on gender inequality. We point out already here the well-
established notion that resources are no longer allocated efficiently if people with “correct” social 
markers are selected instead of those who would be most apt or qualified. For instance, substantial 
restrictions of female access to the labor market massively hampers national labor productivity  
(Cain, 1986). Since an irrational economic pay-off that is simply based on luck of birth (Piketty, 
1995) stands opposite to a welfare-enhancing mechanism where skills and labor are optimally 
allocated, such inequality is harmful to an economy and thus societal welfare. Gender inequality 
may be interpreted as such an irrationality, and our work in chapters 3 and 4 aims to find out more 
on why such a suboptimal welfare scenario may exist, and if it could even be rational after all. 
However, also proponents of pronounced egalitarian economic thinking face criticism. The 
conventional approach in economics suggests that some level of inequality is again positive for a 
functioning incentive system (Aghion, Caroli, & Garcia-Penalos, 1999). As Mirrlees (1971) 
describes, rewarding individual agents with a constant wage independent of their performance 
would discourage additional efforts, or even the full exploitation of existing potential resources. 
This argument is often linked to the general economic underperformance of nations with radical 
left-wing or socialist economic policies.2 One contribution by Galor and Moav (2004) adds to the 
question on the “right” level of inequality. The authors develop an intertemporal theory on the 
effect of inequality on growth, in which the replacement of physical capital accumulation by 
human capital accumulation as the main source of economic growth changes the qualitative effect 
of inequality. As a nation advances economically, the advantages of unequal physical capital 
accumulation are gradually replaced by the advantages of more equally distributed human capital 
as the latter is increasingly required. Thus modern economies rather benefit from higher levels of 
equality, in particular regarding education. This provides a strong motivation for our work on 
                                                 
2 Some of the additional and frequently cited reasons on why inequality is good for growth include the higher marginal 
propensity of the rich than of the poor to save (Kaldor, 1961), and investment indivisibilities (Aghion et al., 1999), 
which require, in the absence of well-functioning markets, individual large concentration of capital to realize large-
scale investments.   
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educational inequality in chapter 3, where we provide a new perspective on what could be 
persisting forces against higher female education despite the negative welfare consequences as 
described.  
A second strand of literature finds evidence that inequality creates unhealthy volatility and 
has a negative effect on the socio-economic stability (Neckerman & Torche, 2007). Social 
solidarity, social cohesion and other factors that crucially influence successful interaction of 
individual economic agents in a society tend to be undermined by increasing inequality (among 
others, see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000; 
Gradstein, 2007). Benabou (1996) suggests that lowering the income of the median voter or middle 
class relative to the national average, i.e. greater inequality, increases the pressure for redistribution 
policies which, in turn, discourages investment. Barro (2000) notes how inequality of wealth and 
income acts as motivation for the poor to engage in crime, riots, and other disruptive activities. 
Zak and Knack (2001) link trust with inequality and growth by showing how low-trust countries, 
i.e. countries with less social cohesion and higher inequality, display lower growth rates.  
Finally, taking into account the development context of this dissertation, we need to consider 
the overarching theme of the relationship between inequality and poverty (Todaro & Smith, 2011). 
Economic development strives towards improvement of living standards in a society and towards 
eradication of poverty. As poverty is undoubtedly interconnected with – though not the same as – 
inequality, we need to examine how to best tackle inequality. Apart from less absolute human 
misery which in itself is desirable, less poverty through inequality reduction also entails 
macroeconomic aspects that are beneficial for development. Lower credit constraints are among 
the most important positive consequences, which otherwise prevent the poor from undertaking the 
efficient amount of investment (Benabou, 1996).  In a high inequality setting, individuals with 
comparatively low incomes cannot borrow money, e.g. to invest in their children’s education or to 
expand their business. Moreover, high inequality tends to depress the savings rate in a country, 
since the highest rate of marginal savings is typically found in the middle class (Bourguignon, 
1981; Gallo, 2002). If that population segment is marginalized between few rich and many poor, 
insufficient savings are generated that can be used for investments.  
This brief summary of the main pathways through which inequality and economic 
development are linked helps to recognize how various inequalities can each create substantial 
economic shockwaves. The picture is of course more complex, and we only touched upon the 
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major concepts in order to illustrate the relevance of inequality in the field of economics and to 
link the fundamental economic ideas to our subsequent work. Our motivation is then to offer three 
new perspectives on inequality, namely effects of fundamental growth determinants for income 
distribution, explanations for gender gaps in education, and economic analyses of biased sex ratios 
at birth.  
I. 3. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC THINKING ON INEQUALITY 
In order to situate our subsequent work in the context of the economic literature, we provide 
a brief and non-technical overview in this section. Over the last centuries many economists have 
incorporated inequality in their research agenda, but despite the vast amount of thinking and 
research conducted so far, discussions on the relationship between inequality and economic 
development are ongoing. As Bigsten (1983) notes, this appears logical since in many theories 
income distribution usually represents the final outcome element of the economic process, which 
is already in itself developed and interpreted very differently depending on the strand of literature. 
In addition, the overview is deliberately broad to be able to point the most important contributions 
that relate to our research topics. We have reserved separate focused literature reviews in each of 
the following chapters. 
Income Inequality 
Income inequality represents our research focus in chapter two. The gap between rich and 
poor received significant attention in classical economics, beginning with Adam Smith ([1776] 
1976) who famously noted that no society can be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable. However, he did not provide a distinct theory on what 
determines a distribution that creates poverty in a society. Malthus (1798) addressed inequality 
more explicitly, but took a pessimistic view on the growth-inequality nexus. He expected workers’ 
wages to remain at subsistence levels, which would increase inequality as average per capita 
incomes would in parallel increase with growth. For Ricardo, laws that regulate the distribution of 
income were of central importance (Gallo, 2002), and Marx ([1867] 2014) developed most of his 
contributions around exploitation and inequality, where for the first time he envisaged effects in 
the context of a modern industrial economy. George ([1879] 1960) regarded inequality as a main 
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cause of poverty and argued that more equal societies have greater abilities to cooperate, which 
would stimulate economic growth. 
Clark (1891) in return, one of the fathers of the neo-classical perspective, defended free 
markets, in which demand and supply determine the rent for capital and land as well as workers’ 
wages, resulting in a Pareto optimum. Consequently, the inequality of a nation was a somewhat 
objective and fair outcome of individual contributions. Obviously opposing Marxian thinking, the 
neo-classical or marginal productivity theory regarded all factors of production as creating value 
and as scarce in supply, so that the share of income received by individuals reflected the general 
pricing process in an economy. Later in Keynesian economics, the marginal propensity to save is 
seen as responsible for different income levels (Kurz, 1994).  All of those theories have in common 
a largely functional view on distribution, i.e. they are concerned with the determinants of income 
from three factors (labor, land and capital).  
A seminal contribution to inequality research has been made by Kuznets’ (1955) “inverted-
U” hypothesis. While according to the author himself it consists of “perhaps 5 percent empirical 
information and 95 percent speculation” (ibid, p. 26), it has formed a cornerstone of the literature. 
Kuznets argues that the concentration of savings in the higher income groups and the industrial 
structure of an economy determine its level of income inequality. As a consequence, in early 
phases of economic growth, i.e. during the development towards industrialization, the inequality 
gap widens. Then, on the further path to an advanced industrialized economy, inequality first 
flattens out before decreasing again – creating altogether the pattern of an inverted U.  
While a substantial literature further examined Kuznets’ proposed pattern in the aftermath 
(among others, Ahluwalia, Carter, & Chenery, 1979; Papanek & Kyn, 1986; Paukert, 1973), 
inequality research overall rather moved away from the frontline of economic interest throughout 
the rest of the 20th century.  But in recent decades the discipline experienced a strong revival, 
famously dubbed by Atkinson (1997) as “bringing income distribution in from the cold”. We 
believe two developments significantly contributed to this renewed interest. On the one hand, the 
reignited large public awareness of global inequalities, together with concerns regarding the effects 
of international economic integration, have called for new scientific contributions. For example, 
some theories relate inequality to the relative use of old versus more advanced technologies in 
different sectors, such that the relative ability of individuals to shift between sectors determine 
their income levels (Galor & Tsiddon, 1997; Helpman, 1997). 
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Secondly, only in the last decades has inequality research also been able to extensively 
incorporate empirical work based on improved data availability. For instance the Lorenz Curve, 
depicting the cumulative share of total income against the cumulative proportion of the population 
owning that income, and the widely used Gini coefficient which builds on the Lorenz curve 
distribution, are by now commonly used economic indicators. Employing these indicators with 
enhanced data from many world regions has significantly enriched the picture on different aspects 
of inequality. In this general spirit, this contribution has a heavy empirical focus as well, drawing 
all main findings and conclusions from econometric analyses. Given the various ongoing 
controversies of our discipline, we believe it is essential to have empirical results accompany the 
conceptual considerations.  
Indeed, using empirical findings economists concluded in the 1980s that, contrary to 
Kuznets’ theory, inequality in the most advanced economies had begun to rise again. Harrison and 
Bluestone (1988) call this the “great U-turn”, reversing previous trends of falling inequality in 
industrialized countries. Different arguments have been proposed to explain this phenomenon, 
such as increased female labor force participation (Thurow, 1987) or globalization effects 
(Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). Also Kuznets’ overall hypothesis was 
again repeatedly put under scrutiny using new data sets, yielding mixed results regarding the real 
existence of the “inverted-U” (see for example Barro, 2000, 2008; Deininger & Squire, 1998; Li, 
Squire, & Zou, 1998). 
Additional quantitative work provided new findings of inequality effects on growth, moving 
from anecdotal evidence of single countries to more systematic cross-country regressions. Among 
many studies, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Easterly (2007) find a negative effect of inequality 
for growth, but Barro (2000) finds no robust evidence for such a relationship. Better data 
availability also allowed for an updated view on the extent of inequality in the world. Bourguignon 
and Morrisson (2002) report global Gini coefficients over two centuries which display a steadily 
rising trend. Findings by Milanovic (2009; 2011) also suggest that the worldwide income 
inequality has been constantly increasing between 1820 and 2002. Quah (2002, p. 19), however, 
refutes what he calls “anti-globalization” claims based on a positive trend he observes over recent 
decades. He specifically finds that improvements in living standards due to aggregate economic 
growth outweigh negative counter-effects from national inequality divergence. Indeed, opinions 
on the state of global inequality in the world are far from a consensus, with Pritchett (1997) finding 
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a “big divergence” of incomes, whereas Sala-I-Martin (2006) concludes with a “convergence, 
period”.  
Recently, literature obtained fundamental new insights from analyzing top incomes 
(Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2003). The widely discussed book “Capital in the 21st 
century” (Piketty, 2014) not only represents a further great contribution to the field, it may also be 
the most visible proof of the dominant role of inequality research in current economics. In his 
work, Piketty emphasizes the distinction between capital and labor income, explaining why the 
rise in inequality has taken place due to the role of capital and its effective functioning in capitalist 
societies. Capital generally accumulates at a faster rate than economic growth occurs. Hence, 
Piketty argues that capital (and not labor income) tends to become more and more of an influential, 
even a dominating factor in wealth accumulation and concentration at the top. He proposes that 
capitalism on its own tends to produce a relatively high degree of inequality. While this could be 
witnessed in the 19th century and the decades preceding 1914, the major events of the first half of 
the twentieth century (including the two World Wars and the Great Depression) created economic 
shocks that destroyed large stocks of capital and thereby to some extent re-balanced the unequal 
distribution of wealth.  
However, as the underlying dynamics remained unchanged (i.e. capital returns surpass 
economic growth rates), the natural tendency of capital to accumulate resumed after World War 
Two, and even accelerated with privatization and tax breaks in the Western world in recent 
decades. According to the author, the majority of wealth nowadays comes via inheritance, with no 
meritocratic justification for the current wealth owner. Piketty considers this as a long-term threat 
for societal stability and the acceptance of democratic and capitalist regimes. Despite the 
controversies around his theories and suggested solutions, the strand of literature he represents 
remains among the most widely discussed at the moment.  
The brief literature review of income inequality research throughout time has shown the 
many facets of economics affected by this topic. As income inequality assumes such a large role 
both in inequality research and in economics overall, we aim to contribute to this literature as well 
in our dissertation. Specifically, chapter two examines the impact of fundamental development 
factors on different income groups. It adds an international empirical perspective by analyzing 
how determinants that are widely associated with economic development affect income inequality.  
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Gender Inequality 
Chapters three and four are set out to improve the understanding of socially induced 
inequality effects on economic development, i.e. we analyze the differential economic impact of 
individual heterogeneities. Both sections focus on arguably the most extensive form of inequality, 
namely inequality in gender, thus this paragraph provides some more background introduction. 
Half of the world’s population is female, so that by sheer size any form of discrimination against 
women has enormous distorting and negative effects on global economic development. McKinsey 
& Company (2015), a global consultancy, attempts to quantify the economic effects of gender 
inequality. It estimates a potential of up to 2.2 percentage points of incremental global annual 
growth if gender inequality could be fully eliminated. According to the study, women currently 
generate about 37 percent of global GDP, considerably less than what their share of the working 
population suggests is possible. In India and the Middle East the share even drops to less than 20 
percent. The global economy simply cannot operate at its full potential with constraints holding 
back such a large proportion of the world’s population.  
While this may sound trivial, it is perhaps surprising how briefly ago economists have 
adopted this notion and addressed the issue. Early economic research had simply considered 
women – just like children – as dependents of the male wage earners, which also reflected the 
traditional societal gender norms (Elson & Cagatay, 2000). Only when the role of women 
dramatically emancipated in the second half of the 20th century, literature also modified its 
perspective regarding gender roles and their economic potential. The link between economic 
development and gender received first major attention through the work of Boserup (1970). She 
did not merely depict females as mothers and responsible for the household, but emphasized the 
productive capabilities of women and the associated opportunities for economic development. 
Moreover, her hypothesis of a marginalization of women in the process of economic 
modernization triggered a voluminous research interest. A new discipline of feminist economics 
developed, which placed gender relations at the core of welfare and development research (see for 
example Elson, 1991; Elson, 1999; Benería, 1995; Cagatay & Ertürk, 2004).  
Furthermore, employing development economics has become essential for analyzing this 
topic, as this field is most apt to frame inequality discussions in a broader yet still in a distinct 
economic context. However, only in recent years the necessity for such an approach has been 
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increasingly recognized.3 As Atkinson (2011, p. 159) notes, the economic discipline “needs to take 
account of the alternatives to utilitarianism that have been advanced in the past half century, such 
as […] the concept of capabilities introduced by Sen”. Sen’s concept of income and wealth not 
representing ends in themselves but serving other individual purposes reaches back to Aristotle 
(Todaro & Smith, 2011).  
Sen (1999) postulates that development should pay close attention to enhancing the lives 
individuals lead and the freedoms they enjoy. This cannot be achieved by looking at income levels 
only. He describes how personal heterogeneities such as gender, age, or disabilities may cause a 
gap between available income levels and actual capabilities of an individual, i.e. the freedoms he 
or she has to choose over available resources (Sen, 1985a). In short, only an increase in capabilities 
creates real development for a nation. In case these capabilities are restricted, for instance because 
of gender discrimination in many parts of the world, we need to obtain a better understanding 
regarding the extent of such a phenomenon and its underlying causes in order to mitigate the 
negative development effects. This is precisely what we aim to do in chapters 3 and 4.  
In order to create a link back to “more traditional” economics, Cagatay, Elson, and Grown 
(1995) develop three propositions on the specifics of gender-aware economic research, which 
conventional approaches tend to overlook: First, economic institutions tend to bear and transmit 
gender biases. Second, the true cost and productivity of the labor force remains inaccurate as long 
as unpaid domestic, or “reproductive” labor is not included in economic analyses. This form of 
labor is typically performed by women, so that errors in economic research tend to be linked to 
unnoticed gender biases. Third, and most relevant for our research motivation, the authors reaffirm 
that gender relations have strong macroeconomic implications, i.e. they matter for the distribution 
of employment and income, and for overall development.  
In parallel, demands for policy adjustments were raised, for instance by Benería and Sen 
(1981), who call for strategies to tackle the negative effects for women from ill-health and 
overwork. Such propositions were taken up in the following decades by academia as well as 
international organizations such as the U.N., World Bank, and IMF (Benería, Berik, & Floro, 
2015). Finally, Galor (2009) associates a decline in gender inequality not only with higher 
                                                 
3 Among other, Naqvi (1996, p. 982) provides a strong plea for the raison d’être of development economics in stating 
that “the many contrary assertions […] do not diminish the subject’s (exclusive) claim to understanding the economic 
(and social) reality in the developing countries better than can be done with the help of, say, the neoclassical 
economics”. 
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economic development, but also with a more egalitarian distribution of income. He finds that lower 
female discrimination contributed in particular to the onset of the demographic transition, i.e. 
lower fertility rates, as well as to a rise in female labor force participation. These factors prove to 
be essential for reducing women’s economic marginalization and for narrowing the gender wage 
gap. Tzannatos (1999) concludes with similar results. Overall, the majority of studies suggests the 
importance of considering both the direct and indirect pathways through which gender inequality 
impacts growth and development (Kabeer & Natali, 2013). 
In chapters three and four of this dissertation, we look at gender inequality from an economic 
perspective, but we also incorporate sociocultural aspects. We consider such a more holistic 
approach to be the most suitable for our purposes, being most apt to understand what causes gender 
inequality in societies. As Todaro and Smith (2011, p. 8) note, “development economics, to a 
greater extent than traditional neoclassical economics or even political economy, must be 
concerned with the economic, cultural, and political requirements for effecting rapid […] 
transformations […] that will most efficiently bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest 
segments of their populations.” In the following, we outline the background and research 
motivation for our two specific dimensions of gender inequality, namely educational gender 
inequality and gender inequality at birth.   
Educational Gender Inequality  
It is well established in the literature that educational gender inequality and economic 
development are linked, i.e. this form of inequality has direct economic effects. Education plays a 
key role in development through its ability to absorb modern technology in a country and to 
develop the capacity for self-sustaining growth (Todaro & Smith, 2011). Moreover, education is 
an objective of development in itself, enabling social inclusion and enhancing individual freedoms 
(Sen, 1999). Thus education is a pivotal determinant for economic development, and consequently 
differences in the level of education among individuals, for instance an educational gap between 
males and females, have a strong direct impact. Education is essential for building human capital, 
i.e. for instilling productive investments in individuals. Mincer’s (1958) seminal article on the 
relationship between endowments of human capital and personal income distribution laid a basis 
on how inequality arises because of individual differences in human capital. Furthermore, 
investment in human capital has been increasingly recognized as important ingredient to economic 
 14 
 
development (Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006; Schultz, 1961; Sweetland, 
1996).  
Human capital enters also as distinct variable in the new growth theories, also referred to as 
“augmented Solow models” or “endogenous growth theories” (Ray, 1998).4 In these conceptual-
lizations, technological change is not exogenously given but endogenized (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 
1986, 1994). Equally important, returns to capital are not diminishing, but the capital/output ratio 
is still assumed to remain constant. This is possible since the new growth theories explicitly 
recognize human capital to be as important as physical capital. The amount of individual human 
capital, often proxied empirically by levels of education, is regarded as the relative availability of 
skilled labor. Put differently, nations with higher human capital are more skilled in production, 
they are able to operate sophisticated machinery and to improve methods of production, and they 
display overall higher innovation. An important empirical contribution by Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992) lends further support to endogenous growth theories. The authors examine human 
capital (measured by educational attainment), income, and growth in a cross-country setting, and 
find that when human capital is accounted for as well as physical capital, the Solow model is well 
suited for explaining incomes and growth across countries.  
Work by Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) confirms that human 
capital represents a fundamental source for growth, building on earlier ideas by Lipset (1960). We 
take up their considerations in a dedicated section in chapter 2 (p. 55) where we will examine in a 
refinement analysis how human capital impacts different income groups. Overall, theory and 
empirics that incorporate human capital as determinant for economic development have received 
strong support in the literature. In other words, a lack of education, restricted access to schooling, 
or forms of educational inequality have a direct negative effect on growth prospects. As gender 
gaps in education affect about half of the population, i.e. half of the potential labor force in a 
country, the negative impact from this form of gender inequality is particularly salient. Even more 
so, since the economic value of education has risen dramatically within the last decades 
(Neckerman, 2004).  
                                                 
4 These theories build on Solow’s (1957) propositions, especially the idea that technological progress causes long-run 
economic growth. However, the nature of this variable, also referred to as Solow residual, is reexamined. Neoclassical 
theory simply treats technological progress as exogenous or completely independent process, even though around 50 
percent of historical growth in industrialized nations are associated with that variable (Blanchard & Fischer, 1989). 
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A stream of literature has examined economic effects of educational gender inequality (see 
chapter 3 for a more detailed literature survey). Among others, Knowles, Lorgelly, and Owen 
(2002) augment the Solow model in the spirit of Mankiw et al. (1992) to incorporate female and 
male human capital separately. In doing so, they estimate the effect of these types of human capital 
and of the gender gap on incomes between 1960 and 1990. Their findings indicate a negative 
correlation between the size of the gap and income, i.e. lower levels of female education are 
associated with lower incomes, also when controlling for male educational attainment. One report 
estimates the economic cost to 65 low and middle income countries from educational gender gaps 
at USD 92 billion each year (Plan International, 2008). Further studies have been, among others, 
conducted by Dollar and Gatti (1999) Barro and Lee (1994), Klasen (2002), and Klasen and 
Lamanna (2009).  
In addition to the significant economic impact of educational inequality, a literature review  
by Kabeer and Natali (2013) also concludes that findings on gender inequality in education are 
more reliable than other measures of gender inequality, which is good news for our research. The 
authors argue that the positive impact of gender-equal levels of education on economic growth 
appears to be robust in a variety of econometric specifications, data, time periods and country 
groupings. Yet, they also report that studies vary with regard to what level of education matters 
empirically for economic development. Some papers consider only primary levels, while others 
scrutinize secondary schooling. In our work, we will consider different stages of education, namely 
measures of primary, secondary, and tertiary education in order to address these concerns.  
Our research contribution focuses on what actually causes educational gender inequality, a 
question that received substantially less attention in the literature. In fact, Bandiera and Natraj 
(2013), among others, call for a better understanding of the root causes of gender inequality. To 
our knowledge, economic contributions on the reasons of educational gaps between men and 
women are particularly scarce. In chapter 3 we seek to provide evidence that one root cause that 
has been neglected so far is marriage age. Marriage is a universal institution, which may also be 
analyzed from an economic perspective. In fact, the timing of marriage, i.e. the individual marriage 
age, can be related to a person’s level of education through economic rationale. As a consequence, 
we will argue that the female marriage age, and the age gap between husband and wife impacts 
the level of educational gender inequality.   
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Gender Inequality at Birth 
Gender inequality at birth broadly refers to an unnatural ratio of male to female births, due 
to a preference of parents to have a son rather than a daughter. The phenomenon can be observed 
in different regions of the world, and despite limited data availability, can also be traced back in 
history (UNFPA, 2012a). With the rise of modern medical examinations that allow gender 
detection before birth, it became much easier to implement the bias towards boys, which led to 
cases of enormous distortions in the gender ratios at birth. Specifically, sex-selective abortion is a 
rather recent yet alarming trend, in which parents decide to abort an embryo in case it is found to 
be female. Sen (1990) was the first in giving an estimate of the number of all women that are 
globally “missing” due to sex-selective abortion as well as excessive female death rates at later 
stages in life. He calculated around 100 million women who are not alive solely due to parental 
son preference. Later estimates concluded with a similar magnitude (Coale, 1991; Klasen, 1994, 
2002; UNFPA, 2012b). Apart from ethical concerns, these imbalances also lead to socio-economic 
distortions, affecting the marriage market and labor market outcomes (Angrist, 2002). 
The World Bank (2011) finds that out of the total number of missing women, about two-
fifths are never born, one-fifth goes missing in infancy and childhood, and the remaining two-
fifths do so between the ages of 15 and 59. Hence, gender inequality at birth, i.e. the children who 
are never born, comprise a substantial amount of the total excess female mortality, and we focus 
our research on this aspect, also referred to as prenatal gender inequality. Specifically, we examine 
whether immigrants from countries, which are known for prenatal gender inequality, “import” this 
phenomenon to their new environment. We analyze immigrant groups in Germany and 
Switzerland as two case studies. The question under examination becomes ever more relevant due 
to an increase in global migration, as well as the spread of technologies that allow parents to know 
a child’s sex before birth and consequently implement sex-selective practices relatively easily.  
While documenting the extent of prenatal gender inequality in a population and among 
different sub-groups is a worthwhile end in itself, understanding the rationale behind sex 
preference remains the real challenge to understand and potentially mitigate the dynamics. The 
specific contribution of economics lies in examining the incentives that may lead parents to exhibit 
son preference as rational choice. Qian (2008), among others, provides compelling evidence that 
economic conditions may have a causal effect on the extent of son preference. In other words, the 
low demand for girls has been interpreted as a rational response to economic constraints. Often 
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these constraints cannot be considered in isolation, but require a broader analysis of the 
socioeconomic and cultural factors that in turn affect household economics (UNFPA, 2012b, 
p. 31). Eswaran (2014) provides a comprehensive overview of the economics of gender bias in the 
sex composition of newborns.  
The most frequently advanced economic arguments on why parents may prefer a son over a 
daughter focus on the cost and benefit of raising boys and girls. In many of the migrants’ countries 
of origin, a boy provides future economic benefits, such as support of parents in their old age and 
possible receipt of a dowry upon marriage, and often continues to work in his parent’s household. 
A girl, in contrast, may represent a significant financial burden because of a dowry upon marriage 
(Das Gupta, 2000). Moreover, the daughter will move to the husband’s family, becoming 
responsible for the welfare of her husband’s parents rather than her own (Bhasin, 1993; Ebenstein, 
2014; Geeta, 2007; Sun, 2002). In such an economic setting, sons represent new (subordinate) 
members to a household while daughters, who ultimately join their husband’s family, are lost 
“investments” to their parents. This creates economic incentives for household heads who decide 
on resources to minimize the costs associated with children while maximizing their individual 
(parental) self-interest. Both may indeed be attained more optimally by engaging in sex selection 
before birth, i.e. by having sons instead of daughters. While this economic rationale may seem 
reasonable, the situation for migrants is more complex. When moving to a high income country 
such as Germany or Switzerland, these groups typically do not experience any longer the dynamics 
of their countries of origin, such as dowry payments or reliance on male children for old-age 
support.  Nonetheless, economic variables have been identified that may affect the extent of 
prenatal gender inequality among migrant groups (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond, Edlund, & Milligan, 
2013; a detailed overview is given at the end of section 2 in chapter 4). Combining these with 
additional key socio-cultural variables, we will in summary examine the differential effects of 
family income, education levels, health, and religiosity on the extent of sex selection practices. 
While for countries with distorted sex ratios at birth an economic rationale could already be 
documented, we hence contribute by examining whether there might also be economic reasons 
among migrants for engaging in prenatal sex selection. As migrants are exposed to a new and de 
facto exogenously given societal environment, we can also differentiate better between economic 
reasons for sex selection, and other socio-cultural reasons. In other words, our empirical strategy 
leads to better identification of the variables examined, which are otherwise rather difficult to 
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disentangle. We also document the overall extent of sex selection in Germany and Switzerland, 
leading to an estimate of the number of “missing women” at birth in the two countries.  
Further Forms of Inequality  
We emphasized that a significant part of our contribution lies in an inequality analysis that 
goes beyond the narrow perspective of inequality in income terms. Apart from gender inequality, 
economic contributions in this field also tend to focus on inequalities based on race and ethnicity 
(McCrate, 1999 provides a very good overview of the literature). Following Becker’s (1971) work 
on “The Economics of Discrimination” with a mostly neo-classical approach to race discrimination 
(Arrow, 1973), a shift towards investigating the phenomenon more broadly occurred. Reflections 
by Arrow (1998) recognize that “market-based explanations will tend to predict that racial 
discrimination will be eliminated. Since they are not, we must seek elsewhere for non-market 
factors influencing economic behavior”. Loury (1977) emphasizes the social relations between 
racial groups and the social setting in which economic activities take place, both of which 
traditional economics tends to overlook.  
In more recent empirical work, inequalities and tensions between ethnicities have been found 
to affect growth rates, implying that increasing societal fractionalization has negative effects for 
development (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003). In particular for 
sub-Saharan Africa there is some evidence that many of the factors associated with poor economic 
development, such as low education, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, and 
lack of infrastructure, can be empirically associated with ethnic fractionalization (Easterly & 
Levine, 1997). For Latin America, indigenous populations are performing significantly worse than 
other social groups on almost every measure of economic and social progress. In return, some of 
the most successful development stories in Asia come from societies which are highly 
homogeneous (Todaro & Smith, 2011). We adopt the notion that societal fractionalization matters 
for inequality in chapter 2, when we perform a robustness check on our main results to test if 
findings also hold when controlling for ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 
Further social markers that establish social inequality but are not based on physical traits 
such as race or ethnicity have been increasingly investigated as well. Among others, effects on 
economic development from inequalizing religious beliefs have been widely studied, in particular 
the Indian caste system (Banerjee & Knight, 1985; Deshpande, 2011; van de Walle & 
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Gunewardena, 2001).5 Jeffrey (2002), and Lanjouw and Stern (1991) report that higher poverty 
among the most discriminated casts is not only due to a lack of productive  assets,  but  also  stems 
from low  educational  standards  and a highly restricted job market access. Borooah, Diwakar, 
Mishra, Naik, and Sabharwal (2014) examine nearly 20,000 Indian households and attribute their 
position on the income distribution ladder as well as their poverty risk to a large extent to caste 
affiliation. Similarly, Kijima (2006) finds that there are ongoing high levels of inequality between 
castes, i.e. differences in human and physical capital, different returns to education and unequal 
opportunities for obtaining well-paid jobs. Religion plays also a major role in all of our empirical 
analyses, as we regularly test effects from religious variables on inequalities in both income and 
gender. This is important to avoid omitted variable bias and to ensure that the new perspectives 
we propose are valid.  
I. 4. NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY OF MAIN DISSERTATION FINDINGS 
As already noted at the beginning, this dissertation contains two distinct research foci, 
namely income inequality and gender inequality. The next chapter 2 covers income inequality, and 
explores how the fundamental development factors geographic conditions, trade integration and 
institutional quality affect different income groups. While related literature has come up with 
different fundamental development factors and intensely examined average growth and inequality, 
the effect of fundamental factors on different income groups has received relatively little attention. 
We add to this research a more refined perspective by analyzing income deciles, so that observed 
changes in overall inequality can be traced down further. A further contribution is the focus on 
variables that are widely recognized as most important determinants for economic development, 
i.e. we provide a more systematic picture of the impact of key growth regressors. Estimates are 
repeatedly conducted for several time periods and in various specifications to identify potential 
outliers and ensure robustness. 
We base our findings on a newly constructed dataset of income deciles for 138 countries 
over 30 years, which incorporates income distribution data from the latest World Income 
Inequality Database, and using the established instruments for trade integration and institutional 
                                                 
5 Some scholars question the negative role of the caste system at least in historical context. Bardhan  (1996) describes 
how caste-based mercantile associations and courts provided credible mechanisms of coordination and enforcement 
which facilitated trade and economic activities. 
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quality for causal interpretation, we find the following: geographic conditions seem to discriminate 
between income groups, which is evidenced in a consistent pattern of decreasing coefficients as 
we move from low to high income groups. The influence of favorable geographic conditions turns 
even negative once we passed the mean income group, indicating that the poor are affected most 
by equator proximity. However, geography also loses significance once institutions enter the 
equation simultaneously, hence the latter seem to be a “deeper” cause than geography. 
Trade integration has a negative but frequently insignificant effect on all income groups, and 
we tend to find that negative effects as well as the significant levels increase for higher income 
groups. Hence, trade seems to have an equalizing effect across income groups. Institutional quality  
is associated with systematic and large income gains for all groups at high statistical significance 
levels, but high income groups seem to benefit even more than the poor. Overall, results are 
consistent over time, and we observe that the model is relatively better in explaining lower 
incomes.  
Chapters 3 and 4 then each cover a distinct aspect of gender inequality. Chapter 3 addresses 
educational gender inequality, and discusses the causal effect of marriage age. It thereby adds to 
the literature which proposes that cultural customs and traditions may explain gender gaps in 
education, but which neglected international evidence on effects of age of marriage on educational 
achievements. We argue that the marriage age of women and the phenomenon of wives being on 
average younger than husbands impacts educational investments. This is because the earlier a 
woman gets married, the shorter her anticipated pay-off to educational investments such that 
educational investments are lower for younger marriage ages than for older marriage ages. We 
then provide empirical evidence that early female marriage age significantly decreases female 
education with cross-country panel data from 1980 to 2010. Socio-cultural customs serve as an 
exogenous identification for female age at marriage, i.e. our empirical contribution explicitly 
addresses the theory that causal links run from marriage age due to societal conventions to female 
education outcomes. Each year of marriage postponement for women is associated with a 3 
percentage points higher female completion rate in secondary schooling, and to about three weeks, 
or 13 percent longer female tertiary education. 
We also confirm that effects of spousal age gaps between men and women, i.e. the relative 
female marriage age, significantly affect female education relative to male education. We adopt 
this methodology because in case couples in a certain region habitually marry at comparatively 
 21 
 
younger ages than international average, one might draw incorrect conclusions from examining 
absolute age levels only. Each additional year between husband and wife reduces the female 
secondary schooling completion rate by 10 percentage points, the time women spend at university 
by one month, and overall affects female education significantly more negatively than male 
education.  
Further evidence rests on a quasi difference-in-difference strategy, which focuses on 
differences between women and men regarding marriage age and educational achievement, i.e. we 
specifically examine spousal age gaps and educational gaps. This approach helps to eliminate 
potential confounding factors that affect the level of educational achievements jointly for women 
and men as we focus only on the differences between the two sexes. We show that spousal age 
gaps affect female education significantly more negatively than male education. A number of 
robustness tests confirm our empirical strategy. In order to ensure our proposed link from female 
marriage age to female education is valid, we explicitly examine the impact of other “regular” 
gender discrimination variables. Results document that marriage age and conventional measures 
of gender discrimination do not act as substitutes, so that female marriage age affects educational 
achievements of women independently of existing levels of other gender discrimination in society. 
The second contribution to gender inequality, chapter 4, explores the extent of gender 
inequality at birth, i.e. biased sex ratios at birth, among migration groups in Germany and 
Switzerland. The research contributes to the economics of migration and gender, specifically it 
adds to the empirical literature of sex selection practices among immigrants for the first time a 
deeper explorative analysis of Balkan migrant groups that moved to Central Europe. It also adds 
to the literature quantifying excess female mortality rates, and employs for the first time wider 
individual-level data to examine which socio-economic variables might affect sex selection 
practices. We resort to three distinct micro data sources since 1990 to analyze the sex ratios at birth 
of different population groups, and to potentially identify underlying reasons for continued sex 
selection practices. 
Abortion data and birth registries provide no evidence for systematic gender selection at birth 
among foreigners collectively. Their average sex ratio at birth is slightly elevated compared to 
natives, but still within biologically normal ranges. However, immigrants from Balkan countries 
as well as China and India, which are all countries known for strong son preference, indeed display 
comparatively high sex ratios at birth. Yet we also note that there are substantial fluctuations, 
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depending on whether we inspect birth records in Switzerland or in Germany. Only in Germany 
we find that sex ratios between Balkan immigrants and natives (Germans) differ on a one percent 
significance level, i.e. the probability of a newborn being a son is significantly higher if the parents 
are from the Balkan region. Employing different estimation methods we consistently calculate 
around 1,500 missing girls in Germany (2003-2014) and Switzerland (1990-2014) combined from 
these selected Balkan and Asian immigrant groups.  
Further German-specific results indicate that sex ratios at birth do not vary much if the father 
is German or from the same country as the mother, and also the number of years the parents spent 
in Germany has no substantial differentiating effect. Swiss birth registries indicate a skewed ratio 
at statistically significant levels for all higher parity births among Chinese and Indians, whereas 
other migrants have no elevated sex ratio at higher parities, except spiking ratios observed at fourth 
parity among Balkan families.  Lastly, using household survey data we attempt to identify 
underlying reasons for sex selection practices in Germany, but find no robust associations for any 
socio-economic variable employed. We conclude from the findings that the gender of children of 
households in Germany is primarily determined by nature, i.e. through a random outcome, even 
for migrant sub-groups However, the sex of older siblings tends to matter, and again Balkan, 
Chinese and Indian immigrants increase the boy-birth likelihood whereas immigrants collectively 
do not.  
Finally, following the core chapters of this book, chapter 5 offers overarching concluding 
remarks. The subsequent three chapters are all self-contained and have their own introduction and 
appendix, thus all can be read independently. Each chapter also exists as a working paper version 
and may be retrieved online as stated in the bibliography. The working paper for chapter 2 has 
been presented at the 2015 Annual Conference of the German Economic Association (VfS), and 
the working paper for Chapter 3 at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice 
Society (EPCS) as well as the 2016 Annual Conference of the German Economic Association 
(VfS). Chapters 2 – 4 have all been also presented at the Graduate Research Seminars of the 
University of Bayreuth. 
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II. The Impact of Fundamental Development Factors on 
Different Income Groups: International Evidence* 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter jointly analyzes the causal effects of geography, trade integration, and 
institutional quality on different income groups for developing and developed countries from 1983 
to 2012. Favorable geographic conditions tend to discriminate strongly between income groups as 
low incomes benefit whereas high incomes decline. Controlling for institutional quality and 
geography, trade integration has a negative effect which increases in absolute size and significance 
for higher income groups. Institutional quality strongly and positively affects all income groups, 
however, high income groups tend to profit relatively more than low income groups. These 
findings are robust for different specification tests and they are consistent over time. 
 
II. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Geographic conditions, trade integration and institutional quality are frequently advanced as 
causal factors for economic development and growth (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 
2001; Diamond, 1997; Dollar & Kraay, 2004; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Rodrik, Subramanian, & 
Trebbi, 2004; Sachs, 2001). As differences in average income levels between developed and 
developing countries are enormous, the identification of fundamental drivers for economic 
development has received central attention in economic debates. At the same time, there are 
ongoing discussions on a widening of the income gap between the rich and the poor in economies 
worldwide. After Kuznets’ (1955) seminal work, a voluminous literature has emerged which 
analyzes the link between income inequality and growth (see e.g., Barro, 2000; Easterly, 2007; 
Milanovic, 2000). Looking at political debates, many fear that the rich may benefit 
disproportionally from a nation’s overall economic advancement. While the received literature has 
come up with different fundamental development factors and intensely explored average growth 
                                                 
*  A working paper of this chapter is circulating (Stimpfle & Stadelmann, 2015) and has been presented at the 
2015 Annual Conference of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) and at the Graduate 
Research Seminar of the University of Bayreuth. We cordially thank Sabrina Studer, Hartmut Egger and Benedikt 
Heid for helpful comments, which have been incorporated in this chapter. 
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and inequality, the effect of such fundamental factors on different income groups has received 
relatively little attention. This chapter aims to fill that gap.  
We analyze whether exogenous changes in geographic conditions, trade integration and 
institutional quality favor or disfavor specific income groups relatively more than others. Thereby, 
we advance the literature which studies the effects of fundamental factors of economic 
development on average incomes. Instead of analyzing whether we can attribute different average 
incomes across countries to differences in geographic conditions, trade and institutions, we 
examine whether and how these variables causally affect low and high income groups within 
countries.  
To analyze this question we take a deliberately detailed perspective that systematically looks 
at the effects of the fundamental factors established in the literature on different income groups 
over 30 years. We construct a dataset of income deciles for 138 countries which incorporates 
income distribution data from the latest World Income Inequality Database. We then apply the 
established empirical cross-country growth methodology on our dataset and we employ the 
development factors which are analyzed in the recent literature for our econometric analysis. In 
particular, we use the established instruments for trade integration and institutional quality to 
ensure that our results can be causally interpreted.   
The findings generally confirm the related literature results for average income levels. 
However, we find important differential effect of the variables on low versus high income groups. 
Geographic conditions seem to discriminate between income groups, which is evidenced in a 
consistent pattern of decreasing coefficients as we move from low to high income groups. The 
influence of favorable geographic conditions turns even negative once we passed the mean income 
group, indicating that the poor are affected most by equator proximity. This pattern of results is 
broadly consistent with views proposed by Sachs (2001). Trade integration has a negative but 
often insignificant effect on all income groups which is similar to the negative average impact 
shown by Rodrik et al. (2004). However, we tend to find that negative effects as well as significant 
levels increase for higher income groups. Hence, trade seems in fact to have an equalizing effect 
across income groups. Institutional quality is associated with systematic and large income gains 
for all groups at high statistical significance levels. However, the effect of good institutional 
quality displays an increasing coefficient so that high income groups seem to benefit more than 
the poor from institutional improvements. Overall, results are consistent over time, and we observe 
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that the model is relatively better in explaining lower incomes. We test the effect of additional 
control variables, discuss methodological concerns, and perform a number of validity tests. All 
robustness tests confirm the central results.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed literature 
review. We present the data and the estimation strategy in Section 3. Empirical estimation results 
for different income groups are presented in Section 4, and we perform refinement analyses and 
robustness tests in Section 5. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
II. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Development Factors and Overall Income Inequality Effects 
A number of papers in the development literature have looked at the effects of development 
factors on inequality within a country (for a literature survey in this field see also Benabou, 1996; 
Heshmati, 2006; Lopez, 2004). The influences of trade, sectorial composition of an economy, and 
public policies on income inequality are among the most thoroughly studied.  
On the effects of trade, Wade (2001) points out that there is somewhat of a theoretical 
economic dilemma: put simply, the neoclassical theory predicts convergence (equality) while the 
endogenous theory predicts divergence (inequality). 6  Fischer (2001) provides an alternative 
theoretical framework on how income distribution changes following trade liberalization. 
According to his theory, the type of the export good determines the effects of trade on inequality: 
In land-abundant countries, inequalities increase as a country opens up – in labor-abundant 
countries, the opposite happens. Yet another model by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) suggests that 
trade between advanced and developing countries could lead to higher inequality in both nations. 
The authors incorporate the notion that countries increasingly engage not only in final goods trade, 
but also in trade with intermediate goods. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) review a number of papers 
in this field since the 1980s and list theoretical considerations (such as trade in intermediate 
products, international flows of capital, trade-induced skilled biased technological change, short-
run factor immobility, and firm heterogeneity) that may explain why experiences of countries did 
                                                 
6 The neoclassical growth theory predicts that economies will converge in productivity and income levels because of 
higher capital mobility. However, the endogenous growth theory argues that diminishing returns to capital are offset 
by increasing returns to technological innovation in the developed countries. 
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not conform to conventional thinking of globalization effects. Their paper calls for a careful 
consideration of individual country circumstances when evaluating trade integration effects. 
Barro (2000, p. 27) similarly notes how effects of trade on inequality following standard 
trade theory differs from the real-world observations: “From the perspective of standard trade 
theory, the effect […] depends on factor endowments […] Greater international openness would 
raise inequality in rich countries and lower it in poor countries […] The standard theory seems to 
conflict with the concerns expressed in the ongoing popular debate about globalization. The 
general notion is that an expansion of international openness—including access to foreign 
technology and culture—will benefit most the domestic residents who are already well of.” His 
supporting data analysis suggests that there is indeed a positive relationship between trade and 
inequality, which is most pronounced in poor countries.  
A number of additional empirical studies have also attempted to shed more light on this 
debate. For a panel dataset over 28 years, Spilimbergo, Londoño, and Székely (1999) argue that 
trade openness has different effects on the wage distribution depending on the national 
endowments of production factors. Land and capital can be accumulated endlessly by an 
individual, whereas factors such as education have a natural upper limit of accumulation. This 
alone leads to different inequality levels of countries, independent of trade patterns, as each country 
has a different composition of endowments. The authors then examine effects when including trade 
openness and find that it reduces inequality in capital-abundant countries, but increases inequality 
in skill-abundant countries. Results by Alderson and Nielsen (2002) for advanced industrial 
countries indicate that trade openness is better suited to explain the longitudinal trend of increasing 
inequality than cross-sectional inequality differences among countries. For a regional study on 
Africa, Odedokun, and Round (2004) find that regional dummies, overall size of the government, 
and lack of skilled manpower are significant inequalizing variables. However, their results when 
testing effects of openness to trade on inequality are non-significant. The authors conclude that 
“the recent fear that increased globalization would aggravate the existing inequality is not 
supported by this evidence and neither is the standard prediction of trade theory” (ibid., p. 305). 
On the impact of sectorial composition on inequality, Ravallion and Datt (2002) analyze 
household surveys for 15 major states in India over a 30 year period and observe that higher non-
agricultural output reduces income inequality. They also find that rural growth is a stronger factor 
for reducing poverty than urban growth, and that initial development conditions largely explain 
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differences between states in poverty reduction. Lopez (2005), in contrast, finds for his sample of 
14 country case studies that inequality is mainly driven by the people employed in the non-
agricultural sector. Hence, when this sector does relatively better than other sectors in an economy, 
inequality tends to increase. When this sector underperforms (as it did during the 1980s when non-
agricultural growth was below agricultural growth), ceteris paribus inequality tends to decline 
despite overall growth. The low skills of the labor force employed in the agricultural sector, which 
are insufficient for upward sector mobility, are described as critical barrier in preventing rising 
inequality during economic upswings. A similar observation has already been made by Viner 
(1953). However, Acemoglu (2003) does not consider the argument on supply of skilled labor to 
be sufficient to explain observed inequality trends. Devroye and Freeman (2001) also report that 
skill inequality explains only a small fraction of the observed cross-country inequality differences.  
Easterly (2007) confirms that agricultural endowments predict inequality, building on similar 
arguments that have been brought forward by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000). These authors 
use as instrument the relative abundance of land suitable for wheat to that suitable for sugarcane 
to establish causality between different agricultural endowments and inequality: “In the Americas, 
the land endowments of Latin America lent themselves to commodities featuring economies of 
scale and the use of slave labor (sugar cane [as] premier example) and thus were historically 
associated with high inequality. In contrast, the endowments of North America lent themselves to 
commodities grown on family farms and thus promoted the growth of a large middle class” 
(Easterly, 2007, p. 757). In a related study, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) link income 
inequality to population density, labor endowment, and resulting colonization patterns by 
European powers. They argue that inequality increased in colonial areas that were densely 
populated, as the European colonizers and supporting local elites could exploit such existing 
structures more easily. 
The realm of public policy as determinant for inequality has received renewed attention. 
Adelman and Robinson (1989) note that, overall, one observes an inevitable initial deterioration 
in the distribution of income which reflects the uneven, disequilibrium nature of the first phase of 
the development process. Second, however, the persistence of this deterioration is a matter of 
policy choice. Milanovic (2000) provides evidence that inequality can be steered by social choice 
variables (social transfers and state sector employment), which decrease inequality on average by 
some 13 Gini points, or about one quarter of “given” inequality. He argues that the preference for 
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social equality is income-elastic so that social choice variables play a more prominent role as the 
nation gets wealthier.  Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) devote a major part of their attempt to 
explain income distribution to politics and historical episodes of the political economy. Loss of 
capital income due to political turmoil and wars, which leads to physical destruction as well as 
nationalization, and the levelling of earned incomes during warfare heavily impact the distribution 
of wealth in a society. Results by Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008) indicate that stronger labor 
market institutions are correlated with lower inequality, with the exception of the tax wedge that 
exhibits a positive correlation with the Gini coefficient.  
According to a study by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) on inequality in the world from 
1820-1992, a remarkable finding is that population growth rates do not seem to have a big impact 
on inequality dynamics. Barro (2000) finds mixed results for effects of education on inequality, 
but notes that taxation is generally equalizing: the Gini value is lower by roughly 0.05 when taking 
data of income after tax rather than gross income. Piketty (2001, 2003) highlights the role of 
taxation for his inequality studies on France, too. Li, Squire, & Zou (1998) draw on the 
argumentation of Bertola (1993) that the rich may have the resources to lobby for policies which 
are good for them but rather harmful to the rest of the economy, so that inequality is expected to 
persist. They test this hypothesis empirically and indeed find support in the data, using a measure 
of political freedom and initial secondary schooling as proxy variables. Furthermore, capital 
market imperfections and associated constraints of the poor to access credit are significant 
inequalizing determinants in their study, while higher union density and relative success of social-
democratic programs are correlated with lower inequality. 
Development Factors and Income Group-Specific Effects 
Being important contributions, most of the cited literature is, however, relatively mute on 
factors driving incomes of specific income groups in a country, so that changes in overall 
inequality cannot be traced down further. In contrast, few papers analyze the effect of fundamental 
factors for economic growth on different income percentiles within a country.7 Often such research 
focuses on the bottom income groups (for a literature review of pro-poor growth, see for example 
                                                 
7 Grossmann and Stadelmann (2013) contribute by examining the wage effec ts for specific income groups (80th and 
90th percentile) migrating from developing countries to advanced economies. This study, however, has a within-
country focus and disregards effects from international mobility.  
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Ravallion & Datt, 2002). White and Anderson (2000) report that growth associated with 
progressive distributional changes will have a greater impact in raising poor incomes than 
“general” growth which leaves distribution unchanged. Using data from 143 growth episodes they 
find that the effects from “general” growth generally dominate, but that redistributional strategies 
matter since for around every fourth case distribution can be shown to be equally important as 
growth for explaining income growth of the poor.  
Lundberg and Squire (2003) emphasize that changes in trade openness show strongly 
diverging effects on aggregate equality versus on the poor only: While aggregate inequality effects 
are small, the welfare of the poor is significantly negatively affected by trade, which suggests 
greater vulnerability of the bottom income groups. The authors’ estimates suggest that more trade 
is negatively associated with growth among the poorest 40 percent, but strongly and positively 
with growth among the middle 60 percent and richest 40 percent. Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou 
(2013), using a panel of 51 countries from 1981 to 2003, conclude that inequality is more affected 
by technological progress than globalization (which includes trade). Globalization effects tend to 
offset one another because trade integration is associated with a reduction in inequality, but foreign 
direct investment leads to an increase in inequality. A further break-down by income group reveals 
that trade growth is associated with higher incomes of the bottom four quintiles, but decreasing 
incomes of the richest quintile. In contrast, foreign direct investment and technological progress 
benefit mostly the rich.  
A study by Weil (2007) considers health as key determinant for reducing income inequality. 
He finds that eliminating health gaps would reduce the ratio of the 90th income percentile to the 
10th percentile by 12.7 percent of its initial value, with most of the impact taking place in the 
median/10th percentile ratio. While he concludes that health is an important determinant of income 
variation, he recognizes that “it is also much smaller than existing estimates derived from cross-
country regressions” (ibid, p. 1301). Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) study economic 
determinants that are particularly pro-rich. They find that periods of high economic growth, and 
financial development measured as the relative share of the banking and stock market sectors, 
benefit the top income bracket disproportionally. In contrast, government spending and openness 
to trade have no clear effects on the rich, with the latter even tilting towards a negative effect.  
A different stream of literature takes the stand that most of the variation in changes of bottom 
incomes can be attributed to the growth rate of average incomes. Dollar and Kraay (2002) focus 
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on the effects for the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution, applying the regressors 
openness to international trade, macroeconomic stability, moderate size of government, financial 
development, and strong property rights and rule of law. They do not find a systematic relationship 
between any of these variables and the poorest quintile and conclude that the poor benefit equi-
proportionately from growth determinants like all other income groups. Bruno, Ravallion, and 
Squire (1998) report similar findings as they summarize that distributional changes of income are 
generally uncorrelated with economic growth, i.e. growth has no systematic impact on inequality. 
Since distribution does not alter, growth will reduce absolute poverty. Quah (2001) also documents 
that improvements in income levels from general growth prevail over any deterioration due to 
increases in inequality. Work by Kray (2006) and Dollar, Kleineberg, and Kraay (2014) echoes 
these findings. The latter find, through a Bayesian Model Averaging, that there is little empirical 
evidence that any of their 13 growth variables8 are robustly correlated with the income share of 
the bottom 40 percent. In conclusion, they underscore the pivotal role of rapid growth in average 
incomes because thereby the poor benefit most as well. 
However, Balakrishnan, Steinberg, and Syed (2013) report deviating findings when applying 
the same methodology to only Asian and Latin American countries, but instrumenting the 
dependent income variable.9 In a rare research specification which analyzes both poor and rich 
income groups, they find that the bottom quintile participated less than proportional in average 
income growth while the top quintile participated over-proportionally. The authors also emphasize 
significant differences across regions. Overall, education, industry employment, and financial 
inclusion reforms appear as pro-poor and inclusive growth variables. On the other hand, financial 
openness seems to be negative for the bottom income brackets. Ravallion (2007) takes general 
issue with this strand of research, since the finding of relative inequality remaining unchanged 
with growth is perfectly consistent with large increases in absolute income disparities. Hence, 
                                                 
8 These are a measure of financial development (M2 as percentage of GDP), the Sachs-Warner indicator of trade 
openness, the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness, the inflation rate, the general government budget balance, life 
expectancy, population growth, Freedom House measure of civil liberties and political rights, the frequency of 
revolutions, a dummy variable indicating whether the country was party to a civil or international war in a given year, 
primary school enrollment rates, a measure of educational inequality, and the share of agricul ture in GDP. 
9 Specifically, they use lags of real per capita income as measured in the Penn World Tables (PWT) to instrument the 
(household-survey-based) average income variable. The authors argue that “the lagged variables help correct for 
endogeneity bias by identifying the component of income that is predetermined, and the PWT measure of income 
corrects for measurement error by identifying the component of income as measured by the household survey that is 
also consistent with this secondary measure of income” (Balakrishnan et al, 2013, p.9). 
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measuring relative income distribution shares may be a deceiving exercise overall. In addition, he 
points at considerable measurement errors that are likely in the context of such research. 
Dollar, Kleineberg, and Kraay (2016) re-visit and update their research in a dataset spanning 
121 countries and four decades. They re-confirm the essential outcome that variation of the 
incomes of the bottom 20 percent and bottom 40 percent of the population are not significantly 
different from the variations in average incomes. Specifically, “a standard variance decomposition 
indicates that 61 percent (77 percent) of the cross-country variation in growth in incomes of the 
poorest 20 percent (40 percent) is due to growth in average incomes.” (ibid., p.69). Moreover, none 
of their country-level variables that are typically associated with economic growth display 
significant correlation with income growth of the poor. This pattern is robust over time, leading to 
the authors’ summary of being unable to identify evidence of “pro-poor” growth determinants. 
The differential analysis of growth variable effects on poor and rich uses a different angle 
for examining the growth-inequality nexus. While there has already been valuable work in this 
field, the literature review identified a set of interesting research gaps. So far, there has not been a 
detailed global effort to systematically analyze the effect of fundamental growth factors on both 
the rich and the poor. Most of the empirical work presents itself as rather scattered, with key growth 
regressors and/or income groups missing, and with explanatory variables employed that make it 
difficult to identify a common consensus. In addition, there is limited knowledge on whether the 
role of development factors changes for specific income groups over time. Effects have been 
mostly estimated for only one point in time, and hence, results are susceptible to time-variant 
effects.  
In this chapter, we offer a detailed perspective on all key income percentiles to determine 
how growth variables affect different parts of society, from the lowest 20% to the highest 10% of 
the income distribution. Cross-section estimates are also repeatedly conducted for several time 
periods to address potential outliers, and in addition we employ a panel dataset. This research 
design recognizes the need to go beyond a narrow view definition of development, measured 
through average incomes only. It incorporates the aspect that certain development factors may be 
considered preferable if they favor the poor, or at least lead to higher incomes throughout all parts 
of society. Related literature tends to issue policy recommendations which are based on empirical 
evidence for solely average incomes. However, inclusive growth is only possible if we can confirm 
that income growth accrues in particular to the lower-income groups in society.  Unprecedented 
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migration in search for better economic prospects reflects that many are excluded from an overall 
growing world economy. Yet, the debate on this topic tends to be occupied by popular speculation 
rather than scientific insights. We provide new empirical evidence and thereby help design more 
targeted policy recommendations. 
II. 3. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
Data 
We construct income deciles for 138 countries 10  by combining information on average 
national income per capita reported by the Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 
2015) with the most recent data on income dispersion from the UNU-WIDER (2014a) database. 
The literature on cross-country growth regressions warns of pitfalls in “just merging” data from 
different sources (Atkinson & Piketty, 2007). We follow the argumentation of Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) who point at the pragmatic advantages of incorporating per capita GDP data for income 
distribution data, namely better data availability and enhanced comparability with existing 
literature. Therefore, for the average income level measurement, we apply the real GDP per capita 
data at current PPPs from the Penn World Tables. Sala-i-Martin (2006) also advocates such an 
approach of merging national account (Penn World Tables) and survey (UNU-Wider) inequality 
data. Roine et al. (2009) base their income measurement on personal income tax returns (for a 
similar methodology see also Piketty & Saez, 2003; Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011). Individual 
income tax data would be valuable in order to construct income deciles for this research effort. 
However, even such data may suffer from tax avoidance and evasion (Atkinson & Piketty, 2007; 
Davies, Shorrocks, Sandstrom, & Wolff, 2007; Leigh, 2007) and, more importantly, data are not 
available for a sufficiently large number of countries, in particular less-developed countries.  
The UNU-WIDER database on income dispersion by the United Nations University builds 
on previous work by Deininger and Squire (1996). The revision WIID3b used here contains data 
for developed, developing, and transition countries. It represents an updated and enhanced level of 
data availability with the latest observations now reaching the year 2012 (UNU-WIDER 2014b). 
It also responds to earlier criticism regarding quality and consistency (Atkinson & Brandolini, 
                                                 
10 As many of these 138 countries have only selected data entries over the entire timespan examined, no time period 
sample has all 138 countries included simultaneously. The maximum sample size is 117. 
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2001, 2009), for example by closely following the recommendations of the Canberra Group (2001) 
on international standards for income data. The break-down of the UNU-WIDER income 
distribution data is generally limited to the decile level. As the heterogeneity of the top decile has 
frequently been pointed out (Atkinson et al., 2011; Roine et al., 2009), data on the top one percent 
or top five percent would have potentially provided additional valuable insight. However, as the 
focus here is to examine the macro-effect of development factors across various income groups 
from poor to rich in lieu of an exclusive top income study, we regard the given dataset as 
sufficient.11  
A set of five-year timespans will be the subject of analysis. If there is at least one data point 
available per timespan and income bracket under examination, the respective country is included 
in the dataset. No data points are constructed if they are not available. In case of several data points 
per period, we apply a simple average of the years with available data. A detailed overview of the 
countries which form the respective sample per time period can be found in the appendix (see table 
2.34). If there were several sources for the same single year and country available in the UNU-
Wider database, we used the one with the most data points across all percentiles to enter the 
average calculation for the respective time period. Then, for calculating the dependent variable 
Income Di (income of a population decile D for country i), we follow Dollar and Kraay (2002) and 
multiply the average national income per capita yavgi with the given decile share Di divided by 
respective decile d: 
(2.1) Income Di = (Di/d) •  yavgi  
At the country level, we attempt to explain income levels with three variables. GEO i, 
TRADEi, and INSTi are respectively country measures for geography, trade integration, and 
institutions. This core regression specification is closely aligned with the choice of variables by 
Rodrik et al. (2004) who employ these three fundamental development factors, which they refer 
to as the “three strands of thought [that] stand out” (p. 132) for determining whether economic 
development takes place.12 The three explanatory variables hence represent development factors 
which are widely regarded as most fundamental for development (see for example Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2002; Barro, 1991; Diamond, 1997; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Gallup, 
                                                 
11 We nonetheless tackle top incomes separately in the robustness section later in this study. 
12 Rodrik et al. (2004) call them “deeper determinants” as opposed to the term “fundamental development factors”  
used in this context, but these are both equivalent concepts. 
 34 
 
Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999; Hall & Jones, 1999; Sachs, 2001; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer, & Miller, 2004). 
The concrete choice of variables to measure each fundamental factor is based on the 
acceptance in the literature as well as the level of data availability for our specific set of countries. 
Institutional quality is measured by World Bank data on “Rule of Law” which reflects perceptions 
of confidence in rules of the society, including quality of contract enforcement and property rights. 
This measure can take values from -2.5 (weakest institutions) to +2.5 (strongest institutions) 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 2002). We instrument this endogenous variable by Hall and 
Jones’ (1999) fraction of the population speaking English and other European languages.13 Rodrik 
et al. (2004) proceed with a very similar methodology by using the Hall and Jones language data 
as instrument for institutions in order to expand their sample.  
Trade integration is measured by the combined share of exports and imports of national GDP, 
using World Bank data and taking logs.14 The variable is instrumented by Frankel and Romer’s 
(1999) constructed trade shares, an established method to tackle endogeneity issues (Dollar & 
Kraay, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Grossmann & Stadelmann, 2013). The authors compute 
predicted values of bilateral trade based on geographical features, and allocate these bilateral trade 
flow coefficients also for country pairs which are not included in their original sample. There has 
been criticism as to the weakness of their instrument and a call for more explicit geography controls 
(Noguer & Siscart, 2005). Thus, we separately account for the variable geography in our regression 
equations. Geography is expressed through “distance from equator” in our base specification, but 
we will also include alternative geography variables as robustness tests.  
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables per period of examination.15 
Improvements in data availability are reflected in an increasing sample size over time, from 56 
countries in the 1985 set (measured as average of 1983-1987) to 117 countries in the 2005 set 
(measured as 2003-2007). The average real GDP per capita income in our sample has risen by 64 
percent (from $5,454 to $8,968) between 1985 and 2010, which corresponds to a compound annual 
growth rate of 2.0 percent. This falls somewhat short of the actual reported global per capita 
                                                 
13 These language data were originally used by the authors to construct an aggregate social infrastructure index.  
14 Here we also closely follow Frankel and Romer (1999) who use the current price, local currency trade-GDP ratio 
reported in the Penn World Table, although there are other methods proposed. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), for example, 
provide a theoretical reasoning for PPP-adjusted trade ratio as a measure of trade openness.  
15 Detailed variable sources and descriptions are given in table 2.33 in the appendix 
 35 
 
income growth of 2.9 percent p.a. during that period (World Bank, 2014). This is due to the limited 
data availability in early periods which biases our first samples towards higher income countries. 
Indeed, the 56 countries’ average income level is about twice the average global income for 1985. 
This higher jump-off point leads to a smaller subsequent growth rate until 2010, where the annual 
per capita income of our gradually increased sample and the actual global income levels converge 
at around $9,000 in PPP terms.  
A granular view of the sample data reveals that, over the 25 years, the bottom 20 percent of 
the income distribution have actually grown disproportionally by 2.7 percent per annum, while the 
wealthiest ten percent saw their incomes increase by only 1.8 percent per annum. Mere income 
level dynamics hence suggest a converging trend, albeit at a slow pace. In absolute numbers, in 
2010 the average global top 10 percent income of $26,140 was still nearly ten times the $2,788 
reported for the bottom 20 percent; in 1985, this top-to-bottom ratio had even been close to twelve. 
For the regressors, we can observe a reduction of institutional quality over the timeframe by 16 
percent, whereas the sample’s average geographic dispersion remained constant.  Trade volumes 
have seen a sizeable hike over the years, growing at almost two percent annually for our dataset. 
 
  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptives
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Sample size 56 71 107 97 117 91
Log Income First Quintile 7.27 7.15 7.08 7.26 7.42 7.93
(1.32) (1.56) (1.52) (1.52) (1.5) (1.42)
Log Income Median 8.28 8.16 8.10 8.25 8.33 8.83
(1.22) (1.36) (1.35) (1.37) (1.43) (1.34)
Log Income Average Population 8.60 8.51 8.46 8.58 8.63 9.10
(1.08) (1.21) (1.21) (1.27) (1.35) (1.25)
Log Income Top Quintile 9.44 9.37 9.35 9.43 9.47 9.89
(0.98) (1.10) (1.12) (1.20) (1.28) (1.18)
Log Income Top Decile 9.72 9.67 9.65 9.71 9.74 10.1
(0.94) (1.06) (1.08) (1.18) (1.27) (1.15)
Geography (GEO_disteq) 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.35
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Log Trade Openness (LN_Trade_WB) 3.92 3.98 4.14 4.22 4.35 4.37
(0.60) (0.51) (0.53) (0.51) (0.52) (0.55)
Institutions (Inst_Rule_of_Law) 0.39 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.22
(0.98) (1.01) (0.95) (0.98) (1.00) (1.04)
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Identification and Estimation Strategy 
The first step of the estimation procedure is to analyze a series of regressions in which the 
logs of income deciles are linked to fundamental development factors. Then we inspect the 
respective variable coefficients and their variation depending on the income group examined. The 
basic econometric model is as follows: 
(2.2)  ln [ Income D𝑖 ] = µ + α GEOi+ β TRADEi + γ INSTi + εi 
We address the challenge of measuring the variables institutions and trade as exogenous 
regressors through a two-stage least squares estimation approach. Here, we resort to the well-
established instrumental variables (IV) as introduced before (amongst others see Alcala & 
Ciccone, 2004; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004).16 
In the first-stage, institutions INSTi and trade integration TRADEi are regressed on all 
exogenous variables and instruments, which yields:  
(2.3)  INSTi = θ + σ LANGi + π CONSTRAi + ω GEOi + εINSTi, 
(2.4)         TRADEi = λ+ ϕ LANGi + ξ CONSTRAi + ν GEOi + εTRADEi, 
where LANGi refers to language data of Hall and Jones (1999), and CONSTRAi to constructed 
trade shares by Frankel and Romer (1999). Consequently, the estimated slope coefficients capture 
the partial correlations between the set of regressors and the different income groups and can be 
causally interpreted. We analyze the average GDP per capita, the bottom 20 percent, the median, 
the top 20 percent, and the top ten percent of the income distribution per country. This allows an 
understanding of dynamics along the entire distribution. For example, let us assume that the 
variable trade integration has a positive coefficient for the bottom 20 percent, but a negative 
coefficient for the top ten percent. The coefficient sign of the average GDP per capita would then 
help us understand the overall “mean” effect of the trade variable for a country. 
We run the regression on a set of different 5-year timespan averages, i.e. in order to put the 
findings on a broader basis we aim to identify robust patterns independent of a potential economic 
cycle. This represents a step beyond single cross-section analyses conducted in the past, as there 
is only selected literature using panel data in this field of research (Irwin & Terviö, 2002; Dollar 
et al., 2014). We start with the 5-year average around 1985 (1983-1987) as this represents the 
                                                 
16 There is a literature which discusses shortcomings of these standard instruments (amongst others, see Eberhardt and 
Teal, 2011; Deaton, 2010; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013). We will deal with some of the major issues when analyzing the 
robustness of our results.  
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earliest sensible data set available. We repeat estimates analogously from 1988-1992, 1993-1997, 
1998-2002, 2003-2007, and finally 2008-2012.  
The regressor GEOi as well as the instrumental variables LANG i and CONSTRAi remain 
constant over the various periods. While trade shares on the basis of Frankel and Romer’s (1999) 
methodology could also be constructed for other time periods than their original base year 1985, 
there are a number of reasons to refrain from doing so. First, the constructed trade shares are 
calculated using geographical variables which remain generally constant, in particular over our 
limited timeframe of 30 years. Hence, there will be very little data variation when re-creating trade 
shares for other years. Second, this rational consideration is underpinned by empirical work from 
Feyrer (2009), who introduces a dynamic instrument for trade on the basis of Frankel and Romer. 
His results are a close confirmation of the original instrument, so Frankel and Romer’s constructed 
variable is quite robust over time. Third, Rodrik et al. (2004) also decide to keep trade shares as a 
constant instrumental variable with the original 1985 values, even when using them to estimate 
1995 GDP per capita values. Hence, rationale, empirics, and recognized literature point us towards 
using fixed values for CONSTRAi. For all except the first period of our data set, the 1985 values 
are consequently lags which may be even considered preferable from an exogeneity perspective. 
INSTi and TRADE i, in contrast, will be dynamically adjusted to the respective period.  
We examine samples with the respectively largest number of country data available per time 
period, which results in larger sample sizes as we move towards the present. Unfortunately, a 
number of countries from the former Eastern bloc are not included. This is due to missing income 
distribution data as well as territorial re-organizations which affect comparability over time. 
Nonetheless, the larger countries in that region such as Russia, Poland or Romania can be included 
in the analysis. 
II. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Baseline Results 
We start with simple correlations to investigate in how far our input variables and the 
different income levels move together. Figure 2.1 presents the respective scatter plots for 2005. A 
first look at the data reveals that geography (distance from equator) correlates with ca. 0.7 with 
income, and displays higher correlation for the poor vis-à-vis the rich. Trade on the other hand 
shows a rather weak correlation, which only somewhat increases over the years from roughly 0.2 
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to 0.3, and without an income-related pattern. Finally, institutional quality is highly correlated to 
incomes, roughly at 0.8. We also observe a slight but persistent correlation pattern across income 
levels, with higher coefficients for the poor than for the rich. In summary, income of the poor 
correlates more strongly with geography and institutions than income of the rich. Trade plays a 
secondary role among the fundamental factors, and has no distinct correlation dynamics across 
income groups. 
Next, we look at the way the relationships between variables are mirrored in a simple OLS 
regression of equation (2.2).  Results are summarized in table 2.2 across income levels, 
exemplified again for 2005. First evidence (without taking account of causality issues) generally 
confirms the literature’s findings (in particular Rodrik et al., 2004) with regards to the sign and 
significance levels of variables. These hold also true for most of the income distribution, with 
exceptions identified at the top end. Therein, geography tends to lose its significance and the 
coefficient is on average only one third of its value for the bottom quintile. We also observe a 
modest decline of the coefficient size for institutions as we go from poor to rich. In general, the 
coefficient pattern follows a linear trend so that inspection of top and bottom income groups allows 
to also draw conclusions about median and average. In other words, we find no peculiarities around 
the middle income groups that require additional interpretation.  
Incomes of the poor can be more precisely estimated with the variables at hand than incomes 
of the rich, as reflected in a decreasing R-square from poor to rich. Results are qualitatively similar 
also for the other time periods, but point estimates for trade integration are never precise.17 
Altogether, countries more distant from the equator and stronger institutions are likely to have 
higher incomes, but trade effects are rather inconclusive. Geography generally displays high 
significance, except for selected time periods when both looking at top income groups and 
simultaneously controlling for institutions. Institutions in return are always significant at the one 
percent level and sharply increase the overall regression fit. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Trade displays relatively large standard errors which lead to non-significant coefficients. The coefficient sign is 
consistently positive only from the year 2000 onwards. An overview of all OLS results across time periods is given 
in the appendix (see table 2.32). 
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Figure 2.1: Linear correlations between log real GDP 2005 per capita for different income groups, and 
fundamental development factors (First Quintile for (a)-(c); Median for (d)-(f); Average Population for (g)-(i)). 
Linear prediction line and correlation coefficient r included. 
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Figure 2.1 continued: Linear correlations between log real GDP 2005 per capita 
for different income groups, and fundamental development factors (Top 
Quintile for (j)-(l); Top Decile for (m)-(o)). Linear prediction line and 
correlation coefficient r included. 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of income: Base specification, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.
2005: 
Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Geography 5.60 5.39 3.02 5.15 4.94 2.63 4.68 4.49 2.24 4.15 3.98 1.80 3.93 3.75 1.56
(GEO) (0.46)*** (0.51)*** (0.49)*** (0.46)*** (0.50)*** (0.47)*** (0.45)*** (0.49)*** (0.46)*** (0.45)*** (0.49)*** (0.46)*** (0.45)*** (0.49)*** (0.46)***
Trade 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.33 0.15 0.30 0.12 0.31 0.12
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.15) (0.27) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15)
Institutions 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.76
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
RMSE 1.01 1.00 0.75 1.01 1.00 0.77 0.99 0.98 0.76 0.99 0.98 0.78 1.01 1.00 0.80
R-Square 0.54 0.55 0.75 0.50 0.51 0.71 0.46 0.47 0.68 0.40 0.41 0.63 0.37 0.38 0.60
First Quintile Median Average Population Top Quintile Top Decile
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP in 2005, PPP basis. There are five samples for which the regressions are run: (i) columns (1)-(3) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (ii) columns (4)-(6) regress the median income; (iii) 
columns (7)-(9) refer to the average per capita GDP; (iv) columns (10)-(12) regress the top 20% income group; and (v) columns (13)-(15) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which 
is measured as the absolute value of latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP; and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index. See the Appendix for more 
detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Instrumental Variables 
As outlined before, reverse causality, omitted variable bias and measurement error may 
influence the OLS method inaccurately, i.e. endogeneity issues would violate OLS consistency. 
Hence, we proceed to two-stage least squares (IV) regressions with the established instrumental 
variables described in equations (2.3) and (2.4). After the OLS table showed the step-wise marginal 
effects of the individual fundamental development factors, results in table 2.3 are now presented 
directly with all variables included, but split along the six time periods.18 We add to the summary 
of findings a note of caution. Due to the analysis across several time periods and extensive data 
results, our emphasis lies in discussing the broad, robust trends. In other words, we do not address 
all outliers, since these are in fact the time-specific deviations we try to attenuate through the 
analysis of more than one period. In addition, the first two time periods suffer from limited sample 
size and related potential bias. They are useful in extending the overall time period of investigation, 
and their findings are in line with later, more robust samples so that we see a quite stable pattern 
over 30 years. Still, the initial periods should be interpreted with caution.  
Distance from the equator (geography) displays the most forceful dynamics across income 
groups in the IV specification. We see a uniform pattern of decreasing coefficients as we go from 
poor to rich; generally geography turns even negative once we passed the mean income. For 2005, 
for example, ceteris paribus each latitude degree further away from the equator corresponds to an 
expected 2.3 percent higher (log) income for the bottom quintile, while the top decile is basically 
unaffected. However, the variable is generally insignificant, with some exceptions for the first 
quintile. Hence, for large parts of the population, geography has little importance, which in our 
specification could be interpreted as institutions being the “deeper” cause and “trumping” 
geography as argued by Rodrik et al. (2004), and similarly by Acemoglu et al. (2001).  
Trade, now instrumented with Frankel and Romer’s constructed trade shares, shows two 
interesting features despite its limited explanatory power for the model. Trade consistently enters 
the equation with a minus, suggesting a negative effect of trade integration for income levels. This 
pattern is again reported analogously in Rodrik et al. (2004). Secondly, the coefficient increases in 
                                                 
18 We do not adjust the standard errors in the IV-estimations by using the Delta method as described in Frankel and 
Romer to account for the generated variable constructed trade. Wooldridge (2002, p. 116-117) suggests that such an 
approach is justified in the case of generated regressors, but not necessarily for generated instruments. See also Frankel 
and Rose (2002) or Ondrich, Richardson, and Zhang (2006) who apply the same conceptual framework, but do not 
adjust the standard errors. 
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size and also in significance as we move towards the rich. This implies that an open economy seems 
to be more harmful for the rich than for the poor. Roine et al. (2009) report similar findings. 
Although trade coefficients here are not always significant, the pattern consistency may allow an 
interpretation. Trade rather leads to an equalization of income levels, as the poor are affected 
relatively less than the rich. It is our only fundamental variable that displays such an income 
convergence effect within a country. Potential reasons could be the removal of barriers to entry and 
consequently higher competition in a more open economy for hitherto monopoly-like or imperfect 
market structures.  
Finally, the employment of Hall and Jones’ language data, which constitute our instrument 
for institutional quality, demonstrates that institutions matter. Institutions display high significance 
for all incomes, together with an increasing coefficient from bottom to top. The effect on top 
income groups is on average 20 percent higher than for the poor. Furthermore, while not reported 
in the output table, there are again strong effects on the other variables once institutions enter the 
equation, as also seen in the OLS case. Specifically, the size of the geography coefficient drops 
while its significance vanishes, and trade consistently switches signs to negative when institutions 
are added. In line with OLS estimates, the R-square decreases substantially for the rich income 
groups. For the bottom quintile, the model is able to explain around 70 percent of variation. For 
the rich incomes, this value halves on average, and for one period the R-square is even close to 
zero for the richest decile. A plausible interpretation is that the variables employed have a much 
less determining impact for the rich, where omitted, i.e. individual factors play a gradually larger 
role. 
We proceed to a set of tests for probing the validity of the model. The Pagan Hall test suggests 
that heteroskedasticity is present in selected periods, which leads us to always apply robust standard 
errors. The test for endogeneity, which is an adjusted version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, 
yields mixed results regarding the necessity of an instrumental variable from a purely statistical 
perspective. Generally, endogeneity seems to be an issue, though the first income quintile displays 
a significant necessity for instrumentation only once, whereas the rich incomes have an opposite 
pattern. We also report Hansen’s J tests of overidentifying restrictions under the null hypothesis 
that, roughly speaking, the instruments are valid. The results hint at a weakness of the model since 
in some time periods the p-values are barely insignificant and, hence, suggest potential issues of 
the instruments employed. 
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Table 2.3: Determinants of income: Instrumental variable estimates
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
Geography 0.08 -1.06 -1.54 -2.11 -2.30
(GEO) (1.28) (1.30) (1.33) (1.45) (1.48)
Trade -0.24 -0.28 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
Institutions 1.23 1.48 1.42 1.39 1.35
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.28)*** (0.29)*** (0.30)*** (0.33)*** (0.34)***
R-Square 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.41 0.34
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.51 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.50 0.21 0.33 0.43 0.51
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
Geography 1.57 -0.63 -1.47 -2.60 -2.88
(GEO) (1.81) (2.19) (2.22) (2.43) (2.48)
Trade -0.48 -0.47 -0.41 -0.41 -0.40
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38)
Institutions 1.30 1.59 1.59 1.67 1.65
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.40)*** (0.48)*** (0.49)*** (0.54)*** (0.55)***
R-Square 0.68 0.55 0.44 0.23 0.15
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.70 0.47 0.33 0.28 0.26
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.18 0.02 0.01 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
Geography 1.99 0.88 0.09 -0.71 -1.04
(GEO) (0.73)*** (0.85) (0.88) (0.97) (1.00)
Trade -0.37 -0.46 -0.47 -0.52 -0.53
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.28) (0.28)* (0.27)* (0.28)* (0.29)*
Institutions 1.29 1.42 1.43 1.47 1.48
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.28)***
R-Square 0.65 0.57 0.50 0.34 0.26
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.13 0.77 0.71 0.67 0.69
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.28 0.09 0.02 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.31
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Table 2.3 continued: Determinants of income: Instrumental variable estimates
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 84 84 84 84 84
Geography 0.55 -1.59 -2.61 -3.83 -4.27
(GEO) (1.71) (2.17) (2.34) (2.61) (2.72)
Trade -0.35 -0.65 -0.79 -0.96 -1.00
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.36) (0.42) (0.44)* (0.48)** (0.50)**
Institutions 1.61 1.98 2.09 2.24 2.30
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.43)*** (0.54)*** (0.58)*** (0.65)*** (0.68)***
R-Square 0.69 0.48 0.34 0.11 0.01
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.50
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.20 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.23 0.56 0.61 0.69 0.68
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117
Geography 2.03 1.39 0.94 0.41 0.12
(GEO) (0.78)*** (0.86)* (0.89) (0.94) (0.96)
Trade -0.39 -0.61 -0.70 -0.82 -0.84
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.28) (0.30)** (0.31)** (0.33)*** (0.34)***
Institutions 1.25 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.41
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.28)***
R-Square 0.68 0.57 0.50 0.39 0.34
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.54 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.20
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.04 0.01 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
Geography 2.04 1.20 0.66 -0.01 -0.25
(GEO) (0.64)*** (0.67)* (0.68) (0.72) (0.74)
Trade -0.15 -0.32 -0.39 -0.48 -0.51
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)* (0.24)** (0.24)**
Institutions 1.00 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.17
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.16)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)***
R-Square 0.70 0.63 0.58 0.48 0.44
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.59 0.11 0.04 0.01 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) 
refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income 
group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as the absolute value 
of latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and 
Romer (1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). 
See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The Pagan Hall tests heteroskedasticity for instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
under the null of homoskedasticity. The endogeneity test is based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, but adjusted here for heteroskedasticity. The 
Hansen Test follows the standard methodology. 
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We discuss the underlying reasons for these results now in greater detail as we turn to the 
first-stage regressions, reported in table 2.4. While estimates for both instrumented variables 
indicate a reasonable R-square, the first stage model fit for institutions is always better than for 
trade. This is mainly due to several input variables that significantly affect institutions in addition 
to the instrumental variables employed. The actual instrument, based on Hall and Jones’ language 
data, is consistently significant for institutional quality.19 However, constructed trade shares are 
also significant for institutions, and so is geography. This pattern confirms observations reported 
by Rodrik et al. (2004). Our first-stage estimate for trade displays a reasonable R-square of roughly 
0.5. In the equation, constructed trade shares prevail as key variable, with significance on the one 
percent level throughout all time intervals. While the other variables have occasionally a significant 
influence on a nation’s trade share as well, only constructed trade shares show a robust pattern over 
time, thus confirming the validity of the instrument. This leads to a major conclusion: though the 
instrument for a nation’s trade integration proves to be highly significant, trade shares display no 
positive effect on income levels in the second stage of our model. This makes the outcome even 
more robust: trade integration does rather not increase a nation’s prosperity (it even harms top 
incomes), but likely leads to income convergence. 
Let us now revisit the validity of the IV model. For this, we test for underidentification and 
for weak instruments. We employ the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test using the rank-based rk 
statistic from Kleibergen and Paap (2006), where significant values indicate valid identification, 
i.e. the excluded instruments are relevant.20 Results indicate that the aggregate model is always 
identified. In addition, the granular identification check for each instrument via the method 
described by Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 217-218) yields positive results. Both trade and 
institutions are identified on significant levels. In the next step, we go one step deeper and analyze 
via two methods whether strong or weak identification is present. First, we report the first-stage F-
statistics and contrast them to the “rule of thumb” values suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
                                                 
19 Depending on the time period, this ranges from the one percent significance level to the ten percent significance 
level. Thereby, either the component fraction of the population speaking English as mother tongue, or the second 
component fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe as mother tongue: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish; or both components are significant 
20 A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identi fied. The rk statistic,   
 also distributed as chi-squared with (L1-K1+1) degrees of freedom, can be seen as a generalization of these  
 tests to the case of non-independently and -identically distributed errors. This approach follows the diagnostics  
 suggested by Bazzi and Clemens (2013). 
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Table 2.4: First stage results of two-stages least square estimates
Dependent variable = 
 Trade Institu-
tions 
Trade Institu-
tions 
Trade Institu-
tions 
Trade Institu-
tions 
Trade Institu-
tions 
Trade Institu-
tions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample size 56 56 71 71 107 107 84 84 117 117 91 91
Geography 0.01 3.49 -0.13 3.73 0.51 2.99 0.41 3.82 0.44 2.79 0.29 2.94
(GEO) (0.28) (0.41)*** (0.21) (0.39)*** (0.21)** (0.37)*** (0.22)* (0.32)*** (0.20)** (0.37)*** (0.25) (0.44)***
Constructed Trade 0.55 0.18 0.49 0.16 0.42 0.24 0.40 0.23 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.41
(Trade_FR_ROM) (0.07)*** (0.10)* (0.06)*** (0.12) (0.05)*** (0.09)*** (0.06)*** (0.09)** (0.06)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.11)***
Pop. speaking English 0.43 0.90 0.34 0.66 0.25 0.45 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.88 0.11 1.19
(Eng_Lang) (0.16)*** (0.34)*** (0.15)** (0.41)* (0.17) (0.37) (0.19) (0.32) (0.16) (0.51)* (0.14) (0.37)***
Pop. speaking other European languages -0.20 0.20 -0.13 0.32 -0.18 0.65 -0.14 0.43 -0.14 0.58 -0.23 0.49
(EUR_Lang) (0.12)* (0.21) (0.11) (0.18)* (0.11)* (0.17)*** (0.10) (0.16)*** (0.08)* (0.18)*** (0.10)** (0.20)**
First-stage F-test 21.8 3.5 26.1 2.43 27.4 9.27 16.8 4.36 20.7 8.8 25.6 12.6
Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (p-value) <0.001 0.01 <0.001 0.03 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.01 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic  
   Stock-Yogo critical values 10%
   Stock-Yogo critical values 25%
R-Square 0.60 0.70 0.54 0.66 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.67 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.57
<0.001
12.25
13.43
5.45
0.01
3.43
<0.001
6.39
0.04
2.36
<0.001
8.13
0.04
3.49
1985 1990 1995 2000 20102005
Notes: The dependent variable is the Rule of Law Index (Inst_rule_of_law) for even columns, and trade (LN_TRADE_WB) as share of imports and exports over nominal GDP for uneven columns. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which 
is measured as the absolute value of latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) constructed trade, the instrument for trade obtained from Frankel and Romer; (iii) the proportion of the population of a country that speaks English (Eng_Lang); and (iv) the proportion of 
the population of a country that speaks any Western European Language (EUR_Lang). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level, respectively. Angrist and Pischke (2009) propose a conditional first-stage F-statistic for the case of multiple endogenous variables under the null that the equation is under-identified.The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the 
structural equation is underidentified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). The first-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics is the generalization from Cragg and Donald (1993) to non-independently and -identically distributed errors. Below, we report the critical values 
from Stock and Yogo (2005) under the null of weak instruments, i.e. the rejection rate of r (here given as 10 percent and 25 percent) that may be tolerated if the true rejection rate should be 5%. Although critical values do not exist for the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic, we follow the literature suggested in Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and applied in Bazzi and Clemens (2013), and use the Stock and Yogo critical values as point of comparison.
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The F-statistics display no issues for trade, but the picture looks different for institutions. 
Here, only in half of the periods analyzed the F-statistic is close to or above the critical value of 
ten. This ties back to the problematic values of Hansen’s J-test regarding the model validity, which 
can now be pinpointed to institutions. However, we regard this mostly an issue of finite sample 
bias as more recent time periods with larger samples yield valid results.  
In addition, we probe for the strength of the instruments with the diagnostic developed by 
Stock and Yogo (2005). For this purpose, we calculate the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistics which is compared to Stock and Yogo’s critical values. 21  Under the null of weak 
instruments, the test statistic is based on the rejection rate r (here given as 10 percent and 25 
percent) that may be tolerated if the true rejection rate should be 5 percent. Weak instruments are 
hence defined as instruments that will lead to a rejection rate of r when the true rejection rate is 5 
percent. Results indicate that we can never reject the null of a rejection rate above 10 percent, but 
can do so for the less strict threshold of 25 percent.22 Overall, the equations are always identified, 
but weak instruments, specifically for institutions, are an issue in some of the time periods. We 
therefore focus the results discussion on the more robust time periods, even though all time period 
estimations – independent of weakness or strength of the IV specification – have similar outcomes. 
Besides, the close alignment with standard literature supports our methodological approach. 
Finally, we pick the 2005 period and two countries, Austria and Bangladesh, to understand 
if the IV estimates are also economically meaningful when examining the bottom quintile and the 
top decile. In terms of institutional quality, Austria (1.89) ranks considerably higher than 
Bangladesh (-0.94) for the given time period. In the model, this alone translates into an income 
difference between the poorest 20 percent in both countries of the factor 34 (log difference increase 
by 254 percent). The fact that Austria is located 25 degrees of latitude further away from the 
equator additionally increases the income of its bottom quintile by two thirds (0.5 log difference) 
compared to the respective Bangladeshi group. Lastly, the trade share of GDP in Bangladesh is at 
around 80 percent of what Austria reports. Hence, we would expect a 30 percent reduction of 
Austrian relative to Bangladeshi incomes for our group. Multiplying effects of the three 
                                                 
21  Note that Cragg-Donald or Anderson LM tests cannot be used for neither under- nor weak identification as   
 they are only valid under the assumption of independent and identical distribution.  
22  Critical values have not been tabulated for the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic which we employ here due to   
 heteroskedasticity concerns. Nonetheless, we follow the literature and apply the critical values for the Cragg- 
 Donald statistic to the Kleibergen-Paap values (see Bazzi & Clemens, 2013; Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman,  
 2007). 
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development factors, our model would calculate an income gap of the factor 40 between the two 
countries (log difference of 3.7). The actual income difference for the bottom quintile amounts to 
a factor of 45, respectively a log difference of 3.8.  
For the richest 10 percent, most of the expected income difference between the two countries 
is attributed to institutions. This is due to the vanishing role of geography in the specification 
together with a negative, but in absolute figures small effect of trade. The model predicts a 25-fold 
difference between the two country’s richest groups based on the three variables; the actual income 
gap amounts to roughly 18 times. A short simulation reveals the overwhelming power of 
institutions. If geographic and trade variables of Bangladesh were kept constant, but the 
institutional quality raised to the level of Austria, the estimated Bangladeshi bottom quintile 
income would increase to $20,000 – higher than the actual income reported for the Austrian bottom 
quintile. The model suggests that the richest decile would increase its income level even by a factor 
of 50 to almost $400,000. Actual average income levels reported for Bangladesh during that time 
period contrast sharply with $1,200.  
II. 5. REFINEMENTS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Refinement Analyses 
In figure 2.2, we show confidence intervals to illustrate the differences between variable 
coefficients per income group, exemplified for 2005.23 Given the criticism of a strict interpretation 
of significance tests and the question whether the different income groups can be treated as 
independent samples, we opt for a graphical interpretation. Also, in order to enable better 
comparison of interval sizes we standardize the regression variables. 24  We see the weaker 
dynamics between rich and poor incomes for the variables trade and institutions reflected in the 
graph. Still, there is a distinct positive, and hence income-equalizing trend for trade as we move 
from top to bottom incomes, whereas effects of institutions are quite stable throughout all income 
groups. In contrast, geography shows the described strong movement, such that the point estimate 
for the bottom quintile lies outside of both the 99 percent and 95 percent confidence interval of the 
top decile. Geographic conditions treat poor and rich strikingly different.  
                                                 
23 The same illustration for all time periods can be found in figure 2.3 in the appendix.  
24 We perform a regular z-score standardization of variables by taking for each variable the difference between 
individual values and the mean, and then dividing by the standard deviation. 
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Let us then have a closer look at the underlying dynamics of the change in R-square 
depending on the regressor. We already noted that trade adds nearly no explanatory power to the 
overall model, whereas geography and institutions drive up the R-square. In order to understand 
the stand-alone explanatory power of institutions, which is dominating both OLS and IV estimates, 
we run alternative specifications where this variable enters first, followed by either trade or 
geography.25 Results are presented in table 2.5. The weak impact of trade is indeed reflected in 
this analysis. The marginal effect of geography on the R-squared is positive, but with a clear 
income group-dependent pattern. The more we move towards the rich, the less of the income 
variation can be explained via geographical conditions.  
 
                                                 
25 Hereby, neither trade nor institutions are instrumented since we are interested more in how much of the data 
variation can be explained by the fundamental development factors. 
Trade
Institutions
Geography
Figure 2.2: Confidence intervals for 2005 per standardized variable of the fundamental development factors (trade, 
institutions, and geography), each broken down to the respective income group. Coefficients are labeled with their 
estimated (standardized) coefficients. 
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While not reported in the table, institutions alone also have a larger explanatory power than 
geography in a single regressor specification. For the first quintile the R-square difference is 0.1; 
the top decile shows a 0.2 higher R-square when we only regress institutions instead of only 
geography. The latter outcome again reflects that the richer people are, the less geography matters. 
Yet, the sign of the estimated effects, the relative size effects between the development factors, 
and the coefficient dynamics between income groups are consistent.  
Additional Controls 
We begin our additional robustness tests by probing the reported impact of institutional 
quality. The need for instrumenting the regressor “institutions” is undisputed. Yet, we are aware 
that our instrument (based on Hall and Jones, 1999) might impact a country’s income not only via 
Fundamental 
development 
factor
Institutions ΔR-
squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade 0.25 1.16 <0.01
(0.16) (0.08)***
Geography 3.07 0.83 0.10
(0.51)*** (0.10)***
Trade 0.25 1.10 0.01
(0.15)* (0.07)***
Geography 2.68 0.81 0.09
(0.49)*** (0.09)***
Trade 0.21 1.03 0.01
(0.14) (0.07)***
Geography 2.28 0.79 0.07
(0.47)*** (0.09)***
Trade 0.17 0.96 <0.01
(0.14) (0.07)***
Geography 1.84 0.76 0.05
(0.46)*** (0.08)***
Trade 0.17 0.93 <0.01
(0.15) (0.07)***
Geography 1.60 0.77 0.04
(0.47)*** (0.08)***
Top Decile
Table 2.5: Marginal effect of institutions and other fundamental 
development factors 
Quintile 1
Median
Average Population
Top Quintile
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP in 2005, PPP basis. The table reports estimates of 
equation (1) when only two regressors are included simultaneously: institutions and either trade or 
geography, as indicated in the second column. The last column shows the increase in the adjusted R-
Squared when a fundamental development factor is included in addition to institutions. See the 
Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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institutions, but also via other channels such as specific trade patterns caused by a common 
language with other countries. To address this concern, we employ settler mortality data as 
alternative instrument for institutions, which has been proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001). While 
methodologically widely recognized, the data availability of settler mortality poses constraints on 
our sample size. We have to cut down significantly Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) original database of 
81 countries, since for many countries there are no data available on income distribution. In return, 
no settler mortality data exist for most industrialized countries. Specifically  European countries, 
which represent a significant share of our sample, cannot be assigned values or “borrow” from 
neighboring countries. China would also be missing, which is difficult to justify given its enormous 
impact on shifts in global trade and income levels over the last 30 years. The settler mortality 
instrument has furthermore been criticized by Albouy (2012), who lists that 36 countries are 
assigned mortality rates from other countries, often based on mistaken or conflicting evidence. He 
concludes that once these cases are controlled for, the instrumental variable estimates become 
unreliable, and the overall model lacks robustness.   
Nevertheless, conducting a robustness check with this alternative instrument does not change 
the picture (see appendix, tables 2.8 and 2.9). Geography continues to indicate that, relatively 
speaking, the richer incomes are worse off the further away from the equator they are.  Trade also 
behaves similarly to the core specification, although larger data variation leads to even less precise 
point estimates. Institutions remain the only highly significant variable and are assigned larger 
coefficients with this instrument than with Hall and Jones’ language data. Overall, poor R-squared 
values for the second stage estimates in combination with weak first-stage results, and the small 
sample size (only 2005 has more than 50 countries in the sample) represent validity concerns for 
this estimation alternative. Thus, while confirming the core specification, we choose to keep 
language data as preferred instrumental approach.  
We also take a closer look at the regressor “geography”. While it broadly represents the idea 
that not all areas of the world have equal natural characteristics, scholars advocate distinct 
mechanisms how these natural differences affect income levels. The variable in our core 
specification (distance from the equator) may be regarded as an overarching proxy which could 
overlook the specific underlying mechanisms. Therefore, we apply two alternative geography 
variables to test if they drive estimates in a different direction. First, we employ “mean temperature 
per country” as regressor, which represents different climatic conditions (for an economic growth 
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discussion see for example Diamond, 1997; Montesquieu, [1748] 1989; Sachs, 2001). Results 
confirm the original geography estimates very closely (see tables 2.10 and 2.11 in the appendix). 
For rich incomes, having warmer average temperatures is somewhat beneficial (i.e. being close to 
the equator), whereas for the poor effects are negative. Trade and institutions also behave 
analogously to the original specification.  
The second alternative for geography we apply is the prevalence of malaria, which tests if 
disease burdens can explain income levels (Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs, 2000). Our robustness 
test supports this hypothesis (see appendix, tables 2.12 and 2.13). Geography in this specification 
is now always significant (in contrast to the base specification), but negative effects of malaria are 
continuously greater as we go from rich to poor. This is similar to previous findings in a sense that 
rich income groups seem to be unaffected by hot, tropical climate conditions close to the equator. 
Trade shows very little change vis-à-vis the original specification (trade is positive for the poor, 
but rather negative for the rich), and institutions remain consistently highly significant, albeit with 
lower coefficients than before. The overall model has a better explanatory power, so it seems that 
diseases are the more important underlying variable driving geography than temperature levels. 
In a further step, we include two additional controls which have both been identified as 
important factors for development and income levels: cultural influences and health conditions. 
For culture, we test on the one hand whether colonial history impacts the results. Adding a 
European colony dummy does not have a consistently significant effect (see tables 2.14 and 2.15 
in the appendix). All other fundamental factors are robust in terms of relative changes across 
income groups and significance levels. If anything, the colony dummy somehow helps estimate 
the trade variable more precisely so that its already discussed pattern turns significant for more 
estimates. However, this does not go at the expense of institutions or geography whose results 
remain fully robust. Next, we employ the ethno-linguistic fractionalization indicator by Alesina et 
al. (2003) as alternative cultural variable. This control variable leaves also no sizeable impact (see 
tables 2.16 and 2.17 in the appendix). Institutions, trade, and geography continue to behave the 
same way as in the original core specification. Similar to the colonial dummy, we also see no 
positive changes in the R-square that would suggest keeping either variable.  
For measuring health conditions, we take the life expectancy at birth in 1970 as control 
variable (see tables 2.18 and 2.19 in the appendix). Entering this variable creates some turmoil in 
the estimates. With few exceptions health is always highly significant, and displays a tendency for 
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a decreasing coefficient as we go from poor to rich. Although the relative patterns for geography, 
trade, and institutions persist, the latter is no longer persistently significant at the 1 percent level. 
Still, overall broad robustness remains. The improved R-square for the second stage when 
including health is opposed to fragile first stage results in such a specification. In particular the 
very weak first stage F-statistics which lie below our original specification cast doubt on the 
validity of the overall results. Therefore, we do not adjust our core model despite recognizing the 
valuable role of health. 
We also test the robustness of the model when controlling for the 20-year lags of national 
per capita incomes, recognizing that including this variable is quite problematic due to endogeneity 
concerns: historical income levels will affect current trade patterns as well as today’s institutional 
quality, while historical incomes have been influenced in return by past levels of institutional 
quality and trade integration. As we cannot resolve this methodological issue, we interpret 
estimates highly cautiously and focus on whether our usual coefficient dynamics across income 
groups still hold. This is indeed the case for geography and trade, whose dynamics qualitatively 
persist (see appendix, tables 2.20 and 2.21). Institutional quality, however, is rendered insignificant 
and displays no longer a clear pattern between poor and rich. We attribute this finding mainly to 
described endogeneity problems which affect especially this variable. Its first stage results are also 
very poor and suggest substantial bias, so that we abstain from drawing strong conclusions. Lagged 
income itself has unsurprisingly a strong effect on today’s income at all levels, but we observe no 
distinct trend between income groups. 
Finally, we control for the general income inequality in a country through the GINI index 
(tables 2.22 and 2.23 in the appendix). We run this check to find out whether our three core 
variables might affect income groups differently depending on how unequal the overall income 
distribution is. In other words, this analysis tackles omitted variable bias in yet another dimension 
to ensure that our core estimates are clear of general inequality patterns in a country. Inspection of 
results indicates that a control for overall income inequality curbs the coefficient movements 
between income groups considerably. The GINI Index seems to absorb most of the between-
income group variance, as the variable itself displays a consistent sign switch from bottom to top 
incomes. Consequently, favorable geographic conditions still tend to be relatively more positive 
for the poor than for the rich, but we no longer observe forceful coefficient dynamics including 
sign switch. The negative effect for trade integration also persists, but we no longer see a clear 
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pattern between income groups. The same holds true for institutional quality, which remains highly 
significant, but rather flat. Clearly our control mitigates previously documented effects between 
income groups.  
However, we remain skeptical regarding the econometric validity of this specification. 
National income inequality, similar to lagged income levels (our previous robustness check) 
cannot be treated as exogenously given. Rather, it is impacted by our (exogenous) fundamental 
development factors geography, trade integration, and institutional quality, as well as by our 
outcome variable itself. Consequently, correlation with the error term and resulting simultaneous 
equations bias seem highly probable. Often significant Hansen J-test statistics furthermore point 
at identification issues. We therefore believe that an income inequality control, if not explicitly 
exogenous, cannot be defended methodologically in our empirical approach. The estimates 
nonetheless suggest that inclusion leaves core results robust, but curbs the previously documented 
forceful coefficient dynamics. 
The Role of Human Capital 
So far we collected evidence for institutions as a likely key variable for income growth, thus 
following a number of “institutional advocates” (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Knack and Keefer, 
1995; Mauro, 1995). However, a second strand of literature posits that a third variable, namely 
human capital, plays a key role in this relationship. Findings by Glaeser et al. (2004) indicate that 
human capital is a more basic source for growth than institutions. Specifically referring to the 
settler mortality instrument applied by Acemoglu et al. (2001) to measure institutions, the authors 
argue that the colonists brought human capital in addition to their knowledge of how to build good 
institutions. Hence, human capital led to enhanced institutions, which subsequently spurred 
economic growth. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) also conclude that human capital underlies good 
institutions. The discussion reflects that the interaction and the way causality runs between human 
capital, institutional quality, and growth represent important aspects of economic development. 
Therefore, let us take a closer look at human capital in the context of our research specification. 
In general, human capital plays a prominent role in a number of models of endogenous 
growth (Barro, 1991; Romer, 1990; for an extensive review, see also Savvides & Stengos, 2008). 
While from a theoretical, and perhaps also from an intuitive point of view one could expect a 
positive income effect from human capital, empirical findings have been rather mixed. A number 
of papers attribute a positive impact (Barro, 1991; Glaeser et al., 2004; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
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Mincer, 1974; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). Yet, there is also counterevidence that reports 
insignificant or even negative effects, often by using an alternative definition of human capital or 
by applying a different measurement (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Krueger & Lindahl, 2001; 
Pritchett, 2001; Wolf, 2002). In this context, causality issues have been an ongoing methodological 
concern (Griliches, 1977). Countries that grow faster have the resources to invest in schools and 
education so that growth could cause higher human capital.  
More recent causality analyses by Hanushek and Woessmann (2011, 2012), however, lend 
support to human capital causing economic growth, not vice versa. The literature for measuring 
the effects of human capital on different income groups is inconclusive, too (for a survey, see 
Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985). Ram (1984, 1989) finds no significant effects of schooling 
on changes in income distribution. Dollar et al. (2013) conclude similarly when looking at the 
bottom 20 and 40 percent income groups. De Gregorio and Lee (2002), on the other hand, report 
that educational factors play some role in altering the overall income distribution.  
To assess human capital effects in our empirical framework, we extend now our core 
specification by this variable. We measure it via primary school enrolment rates, where values for 
each time period are instrumented with lagged enrolment rates (average of 1970-1979) to address 
endogeneity issues. School enrolment rates may be criticized as unit of measurement, since they 
equal human capital with knowledge acquired in school, and also assume that one year of schooling 
covers the same amount of learning everywhere. However, alternative measures would shrink the 
sample size significantly, while generally no variable we are aware of is able to perfectly capture 
all facets of human capital. 
Results indicate that human capital plays a highly significant role in explaining income levels 
(see appendix, tables 2.24 and 2.25). The point estimates are generally very precise, but a pattern 
along income groups is not discernible. Until 2000, top incomes have lower coefficients assigned 
than bottom incomes, but this trend reverses for the three following time periods. Human capital 
does not alter the overall picture of the original specification though. Distance from the equator 
remains clearly more positive for the poor than for the rich. All geography coefficients increase in 
direct comparison to the core specification by about 1.5, so that the relative benefit of top incomes 
from a tropical environment is damped. Trade integration keeps the generally negative income 
effect which increases in size and significance as we move towards the rich. As an interesting 
outlier, the first quintile tends to display positive values in this specification. This re-confirms our 
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earlier interpretation that the poor do not suffer from a more open economy. Finally, institutions 
remain highly significant and show the known pattern of increasing coefficients as we move 
towards the rich. However, the coefficients in the original specification are on average one third 
larger than observed here, so that human capital has a sizeable reductive effect.  
Altogether we find no clear evidence that human capital is the more basic source of growth 
than institutions as argued by Glaeser et al. (2004). Two points speak against such a conclusion. 
First, institutions appear as more robust than human capital in the second stage of our model, as 
they consistently display highly significant point estimates. Human capital sometimes lacks 
significance, for example in our last period of 2010 or for some of the top deciles. Secondly, our 
first stage results show that human capital has a significant effect on institutions only in half of the 
periods, and even then it is never the strongest predictor.26 Clearly human capital matters for 
development throughout all income groups, but we remain skeptical in going as far as calling it 
more fundamental than institutions.  
Robustness of the Outcome Variable 
We now turn to a robustness discussion of the dependent variable. For this purpose, we add 
a control variable, and we also take alternative outcome variables based on the Occupational 
Wages Worldwide (OWW) database as well as the World Top Incomes Database (WTID). 
Ciccone and Jarociński (2010) find that international income data play a highly sensitive role for 
growth regressions. In general, different sources and methods applied per country affect the data 
quality (for an extensive discussion of this issue, see Atkinson & Brandolini 2001, 2009) and may 
affect the validity of the results.  
The survey data forming the UNU-WIDER database of income distribution that we regularly 
use are accompanied by a set of cautionary notes from the authors regarding data quality. 
Industrialized countries, for example, typically measure income distribution with reference to 
income, not consumption, and so does Latin America. In contrast, Asian and African surveys 
usually collect consumption data to measure income dispersion (UNU-Wider 2014b). While the 
database attempts to collect and harmonize both forms of income measurement, we nonetheless 
add regional dummy control variables to our original specification to check for regional biases 
                                                 
26 In 1985, 1990, and 1995, where human capital is a significant predictor for institutions on a 5%-level, geography 
and/or the actual instrument for institutions, namely Hall and Jones’ (1999) language data, matter more. 
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(see appendix, tables 2.26 and 2.27). 27 This also ties back to Balakrishnan et al. (2013) who report 
major regional differences in their regression model. 
Sub-Saharan Africa appears as the only region that influences different income groups 
significantly. While institutions also remain highly significant, their coefficient pattern across 
income groups is now fluctuating depending on the period and hence inconclusive. The usual 
pattern for geography (the richer, the more beneficial to live close to the equator) is also no longer 
as clearly visible. Finally, the regional dummies seem to paralyze the trade variable which barely 
moves away from zero. While this does not provide direct evidence that data inconsistencies affect 
our core results, regional control variables do have a sizeable effect on the results.   
We perform a second check on the dependent variable by applying an alternative dataset that 
is based on individual data. This is to tackle two potential issues of the income distribution data 
used so far. On the one hand, our usual dataset is newly constructed out of two variables, which 
individually might not have been designed for such a purpose, thus biasing the results. On the other 
hand, we only used macro data, as the dependent variable is based on aggregate national level data. 
Now we employ the most recent Occupational Wages Worldwide (OWW) data to address these 
two concerns simultaneously.28 OWW data contain individual wage levels for various occupations 
per country from poor to rich, and can consequently serve as proxy for the income levels of 
different groups. Based on the wage data distribution averaging the years 2003-2007 (i.e., our time 
period 2005), we calculate the respective national deciles and regress them on geography, trade 
integration, and institutional quality.  
Results for 2005 broadly confirm our earlier findings (see tables 2.28 and 2.29 in the 
appendix). Geography displays the regular switch from positive to negative coefficients as we go 
from poor to rich. Trade continues to play a quite unimportant role in terms of significance levels 
and absolute size of coefficients. The latter are, however, not always negative as seen in our regular 
specification. Institutions also keep their high significance for all incomes, which is in line with 
earlier findings. Yet, the coefficient pattern across income groups is not as clear as seen before. 
                                                 
27 The definition of world regions is built on the classification of the World Bank, but slightly adjusted to reflect 
sample specifics. The resulting six regions we use are Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and 
Central Asia, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South-East Asia and Pacific. 
28 Another potential alternative source would be the World Bank PovcalNet database. Although an extensive dataset, 
it takes again a macro perspective, and is less used for percentile data analysis across the entire distribution of income, 
i.e. beyond the bottom end. Dykstra, Dykstra, and Sandefur (2014) also warn that estimates of the densities near the 
bottom and top tails of the distribution could be quite unreliable, while no attempt has been made by the Bank’s staff 
to validate the tool for such purposes. 
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Overall, the OWW specification reaffirms that the model is better suited for explaining incomes 
of the poor than of the rich. 
Our third alternative specification for the outcome variable resorts to the World Top Incomes 
Database (WTID) by Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2015). Their database has been a 
source for a number of significant contributions to the literature on income inequality, in particular 
for top income groups (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014). Income shares here are calculated 
exclusively based on tax statistics, which differs from related databases such as the UNU-WIDER. 
These alternative data may hence serve to replicate previous results and cross-check their 
robustness. Unfortunately, we can directly compare only one of our five income groups (top decile) 
as the WTID focuses exclusively on top incomes. However, the data also allow us to newly include 
the top 1% as additional income group, so that we may extend our usual break-down of income 
levels.  
We estimate effects of the three core explanatory variables on top 10% and top 1% incomes 
for our usual six time periods individually, and we also estimate a panel. For a digestible summary, 
in table 2.6 we only document two cross-sections and the panel, but the other four cross-sections 
are qualitatively identical. The cross-sections may suffer from finite sample bias due to the limited 
number of countries in the WTID, but nevertheless, the findings strongly reaffirm previous results. 
This is not surprising given the extreme similarity of the two data sets, which show for the available 
countries a correlation between 0.95 and 0.98 for the top decile. All regressors show the same 
pattern for top incomes as before: proximity to the equator is positive, trade integration negative, 
and institutional quality positive.  
Significance levels of the WTID estimates are also similar to the UNU-Wider estimates, but 
the absolute coefficient size tends to be a bit lower. Still, we observe that within the WTID, effects 
for the top 1% income group are always larger in absolute size than for the top 10% income group. 
This reconfirms and extends our previously observed pattern from the UNU-Wider estimates such 
that, as we move from poor to rich, all regressors follow a distinct linear trend. Specifically, 
proximity to the equator becomes more positive, trade integration more negative, and institutional 
quality more positive. The WTID results show that this continuous trend is non-reversing and also 
holds true for the very high income groups. 
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Table 2.6: Determinants of income for high income groups: Specifications using World Top Incomes Database (WTID)
Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
Top Decile 
(UNU-
Wider)
Top Decile 
(WTID)
Top 1%  
(WTID)
Top Decile 
(UNU-
Wider)
Top Decile 
(WTID)
Top 1%  
(WTID)
Top Decile 
(UNU-
Wider)
Top Decile 
(WTID)
Top 1%  
(WTID)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 107 16 19 117 18 20 192 144 103
Geography -1.04 -2.29 -10.54 0.12 -0.06 -1.41 -3.83 -1.15 -3.13
(GEO) (1.00) (1.15)** (7.79) (0.96) (0.88) (1.14) (1.85)** (0.88) (1.90)*
Trade -0.53 -0.17 -0.87 -0.84 -0.23 -0.46 -0.30 -0.21 -0.37
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.29)* (0.17) (0.66) (0.34)*** (0.20) (0.31) (0.24) (0.16) (0.30)
Institutions 1.48 1.42 3.18 1.41 0.92 1.07 1.52 1.12 1.69
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.28)*** (0.32)*** (1.93)* (0.28)*** (0.24)*** (0.39)*** (0.41)*** (0.31)*** (0.61)***
R-Squared 0.26 0.83 n/a 0.34 0.62 0.45 n/a n/a n/a
1995 2005 Panel 1985-2010
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. For each specification, there are three alternative dependent variables on which the independent variables are regressed: columns 
(1), (4), and (7) take the usual data from the UNU-Wider, and can be found analogously in other output tables. Columns (2), (5), and (8) show effects for the top decile of the World Top 
Incomes Database, and columns (3), (6), and (9) show the top one percent of the World Top Incomes Database. Columns (1) to (6) are cross-section linear 2SLS models, whereas columns (7) to 
(9) uses the "system GMM", based on Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from 
equator; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP; and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index . See the Appendix for more detailed variable
definitions and sources ). "n/a" for R-squared denotes negative values, respectively "not applicable" in the GMM panel estimations. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Robustness of Overall Model 
After having discussed the robustness of the left and right hand side of the regression 
equation, we address here potential weaknesses related to our overall econometric approach. The 
sample size might be considered insufficient for some of the time periods analyzed. Indeed, only 
two out of the six periods contain more than 100 countries, while two other periods contain less 
than 75. This, however, is an inherent limitation to most cross-country regressions that cover 
several decades. In addition, accompanying tests indicate that finite sample bias is no major issue 
as outlined earlier. 
With the exception of one refinement in table 2.6, the identification strategy taken until here 
has exclusively resorted to a linear IV model, estimating the effects on our six time periods 
individually. We now adjust these two methodological features more systematically to probe the 
effect on our estimates. For this purpose, we employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator and transform the six individual time periods into one panel data set. While this has the 
downside of substantially reducing the sample size, it can exploit the time series feature of the 
dataset. The overall model specification then follows Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and is also referred to as “system GMM”.29 It is designed for panels that may contain 
fixed as well as idiosyncratic errors which are heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across 
individual cases (Roodman, 2009). We run the model in two variations, where the first option 
employs our usual instrumental variables, while the second uses as instruments all available lags 
of the regressors themselves in levels. Each option is applied on three alternative panel sets with 
increasing sample size, namely 1985-2010 (32 countries), 1990-2010 (43 countries), and 1995-
2010 (55 countries).  
Results for the first option are given in table 2.7. The GMM estimator closely confirms the 
findings of our linear model. Geography displays its usual pattern as richer income groups 
increasingly benefit from equator proximity, and we see the sign switch in two of the three panels. 
Trade integration has a negative effect which increases in absolute size and significance for higher 
income groups. The core findings for institutions, namely strongly positive effects that increase as 
we go from bottom to top, are also reflected in the results.  However, the Arellano-Bond test for 
                                                 
29 Note that a closely related model based on Arellano-Bond (1991), also known as “difference GMM”, is 
inappropriate in this context since differencing strictly eliminates the (fixed) geography variable. 
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autocorrelation of order two points at potential endogeneity problems, especially for higher income 
groups.  
When using lags of the regressors as instruments in our GMM option two, we can only 
confirm the relative coefficient movements per fundamental development variable across income 
groups. However, the overall model appears less robust (see appendix, table 2.30). Significance 
levels vary, and the absolute coefficient values appear less meaningful. In addition, the 
autocorrelation test of order one suggests that the lags are not as strong in explaining the 
contemporaneous variables as the first GMM option shown here. Hence, we prefer our model with 
explicit instrumental variables, although both GMM specifications broadly confirm the relative 
coefficient dynamics from our previous cross-section estimates. 
We then address the concern that pooling together income groups from countries that 
otherwise show large differences might affect our estimates. For instance, our sample for 2005 
contains the bottom income quintile of Norway and Ethiopia. In absolute terms though, Norway’s 
poorest 20% earn 100 times more than the respective Ethiopian income group, and even 20 times 
more than the Ethiopian top quintile. We hypothesize that the coefficient dynamics of the three 
core fundamental factors impact all economies similarly. Nevertheless, we split the countries in a 
low-income and high-income sub-sample to create a more homogenous income level per sample.30 
Due to the reduced sample size, we limit our analysis to the cross-sections of 1995, 2005, as well 
as a panel analysis of 1990 to 2010 (see table 2.31 in the appendix). Results indicate that our 
previous findings also hold in these sub-samples. Compared to low-income countries the model 
appears to be relatively better suited for high-income countries, and the panel estimates seem most 
reliable as they contain most data points. The sample containing the upper income half behaves 
very closely to the full sample, and displays similarly high explanatory power and significance 
levels. Interestingly, trade is now not always negative but, similar to geography, switches signs as 
we move from poor to rich. 
A further discussion point pertains to conflicting priorities regarding the number of 
explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions. While too many variables result in 
fragile results due to the naturally limited sample size, too few variables attract criticism for being  
                                                 
30 We also experimented with a split in three or more sub-samples. However, due to the resulting highly limited sample 
size, estimates become biased and can no longer be meaningfully interpreted.  
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1985-2010 (6 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 32 32 32 32 32
Geography -0.29 -1.86 -2.58 -3.58 -3.83
(GEO) (1.57) (1.67) (1.70) (1.83)** (1.85)**
Trade 0.12 -0.08 -0.15 -0.26 -0.30
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24)
Institutions 1.22 1.43 1.46 1.53 1.52
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.32)*** (0.36)*** (0.37)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)***
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.30 0.28
1990-2010 (5 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 43 43 43 43 43
Geography 2.14 0.49 -0.24 -1.18 -1.44
(GEO) (1.36) (1.64) (1.77) (1.98) (2.02)
Trade -0.14 -0.34 -0.45 -0.59 -0.64
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.26) (0.28) (0.31) (0.34)* (0.35)*
Institutions 0.88 1.10 1.14 1.21 1.21
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.31)*** (0.38)*** (0.41)*** (0.47)*** (0.48)***
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.94 0.01 <0.001 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.40 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.21
1995-2010 (4 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 55 55 55 55 55
Geography 1.23 -0.37 -1.08 -2.01 -2.36
(GEO) (1.53) (1.83) (1.89) (2.07) (2.14)
Trade -0.26 -0.48 -0.56 -0.70 -0.75
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.34) (0.35)* (0.37)* (0.39)**
Institutions 1.24 1.47 1.49 1.57 1.60
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.37)*** (0.44)*** (0.45)*** (0.49)*** (0.51)***
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.86
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.17
Table 2.7: Determinants of income: Dynamic panel-data estimation, one step system GMM
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. For each specification, there are five samples for which the two-step dynamic 
panel-data estimations are run: (1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita 
GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. Three panel specifications are analyzed: 1985-2010 
(six time periods), 1990-2010 (five time periods), and 1995-2010 (four time periods). The model used, known as "system GMM", is based on 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as 
distance from equator; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer 
(1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). 
See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources.  Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and is applied to the 
differenced residuals. The Hansen Test for over-identifying restrictions follows the standard methodology. 
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“randomly” selected, and for yielding findings that are non-robust to variable selection (Levine & 
Renelt, 1992). Ciccone and Jarociński (2010) report that a Bayesian model averaging also offers 
little help. While it allows for a larger number of regressors, the results are very sensitive to minor 
measurement errors. This dilemma hence remains so far unsolved and a valid point of criticism 
which also applies to this work.  
We decide to follow standard literature by employing a parsimonious model which includes 
the variables considered most fundamental for development. The complex causalities and 
interdependencies of “only” three variables already require careful analyses and interpretations, in 
particular when examining if their impact differs depending on income groups. Since economic 
development will never be fully explainable with econometric modeling, a limited set of variables 
at least allows to get the fundamentals right. The choice of instruments included in the model 
follows the most widely accepted variables, recognizing that a final consensus on the “right” 
instruments for trade or institutions is yet to be reached.   
Moreover, cross-country growth regressions per se are subject to substantial criticism, which 
both refers to methodological issues and comparability of data (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001; 
Solow, 1986; Mankiw, Phelps, & Romer, 1995). Proponents of randomized experiments (Banerjee 
& Duflo, 2009) and country-specific “growth diagnostics” (Hausmann, Rodrik, & Velasco, 2006) 
even tend to regard cross-country growth regressions as generally uninformative. This ongoing 
controversy has been fueled by additional recent criticism. Eberhardt and Teal (2011) list as 
common pitfalls cross-section correlation or dependence, which standard empirical models do not 
take into account, as well as non-stationarity of at least some of the data. Acemoglu (2010) 
condemns the widespread use of instruments without theory, and Deaton (2010, p.425) argues 
similarly that there is “a good deal of misunderstanding in the literature about the use of 
instrumental variables”, and is skeptical whether instruments actually contribute to more 
credibility in applied econometrics. In particular, Deaton points at the key difference of an 
instrument being exogenous or merely external, and at the fact that the commonly observed 
heterogeneity is not a technical problem but a serious symptom of some deeper economic reason. 
However, his call for an even stronger link of empirics to theoretical mechanisms is difficult to 
implement here. There is little theoretical guidance on expected income group-specific economic 
effects, but by using instruments that have passed the most rigorous reviews and reflect a clear 
underlying theoretical model, we are confident to minimize instrument “misunderstandings”.  
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Bazzi and Clemens (2013) criticize the simultaneous use of instruments for several 
endogenous variables. We recognize this point, and indeed singular elements of the constructed 
trade instrument, such as population, are also “recycled” for other instruments. This would violate 
the exclusion restriction in case the other studies can argue convincingly that in their context the 
instrumental variable is more valid. We believe the sound theoretical background of the gravity 
model together with the high observed correlation and explanatory power of constructed trade 
shares for actual trade nevertheless justifies the continued use of the instrument.31 Also, Bazzi and 
Clemens acknowledge that “new users of [an] instrument bear the burden of showing that other 
important findings using that instrument do not invalidate its use in the new case” (2013, p. 181): 
an advantage for the established instruments used in this research. Finally, the authors recommend 
the extensive use of tests for probing validity of the respective specification. We incorporated this 
advice through a broad set of tests accompanying the empirical results. With this battery of 
statistical evidence, we hope to report valid and robust results. After all, the main contribution of 
this work lies less in its methodological innovativeness; but rather in a careful application of 
established empirical standards for exploring whether fundamental development factors impact 
income groups differently.  
II. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While there exists a large literature which aims to identify causal factors for economic 
development and which analyzes the link between growth and inequality, this literature is 
relatively mute on how development factors affect different income groups within developing and 
developed countries. Thus, there remains substantial ambiguity pertaining to whether different 
development factors, that change average income levels, actually reach all strata of society equally. 
It could well be that only specific income groups benefit, respectively suffer, from certain 
geographic conditions, from changes in trade integration or from institutional improvements. This 
chapter shed new light on how geography, trade and institutions causally affect different income 
deciles. Thereby, we offered an answer to the question whether the established fundamental 
development factors in the literature affect lower income groups differently than higher income 
                                                 
31 These statistical findings are reported in the original paper by Frankel and Romer (1999), but can be also confirmed 
in this research as demonstrated before.  
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groups. Based on the recognized econometric methodology, we analyzed a newly constructed 
dataset of 138 countries.  
The systematic analysis of five income groups over six time periods, covering in total 30 
years, yields a number of interesting results: Favorable geographic conditions show an important 
difference between poor and rich. We observe a consistent pattern of decreasing coefficients, and 
geography turns even negative for high income groups. The point estimates for the top incomes lie 
outside the 95 percent confidence interval of the poorest income in most cases. However, the 
results for geography are usually not statistically significant. In an alternative specification where 
geography is measured by the prevalence of malaria, the same pattern holds, but the point estimates 
turn statistically significant. Similar to Rodrik et al. (2004), we observe a negative effect of trade 
integration for all income levels, but rich incomes display higher absolute coefficient values and 
significance levels than poor incomes. We interpret this as an equalizing effect of trade different 
income levels within a country. Institutional quality, on the other hand, affects all income groups 
positively and at high significance levels, but the coefficient for high incomes is approximately 20 
percent higher than the coefficient for low incomes. Coefficient trends move evenly across income 
groups so that results for median and average income groups are close to a linear interpolation of 
top and bottom incomes. Our results are consistent over time but the explanatory power of the 
empirical analysis increases for lower incomes.  
We corroborated the findings through a large number of robustness tests. These indicate that 
world regions, lagged income values and overall inequality in a country have a sizeable effect, 
though the latter two suffer from likely endogeneity issues. The control variables health and human 
capital, the latter instrumented with lags, also enter significantly, but none of the controls alter the 
described relative effects of the fundamental development factors. Specifically, results do not 
suggest that human capital is a more basic source for growth than institutions. We also documented 
the model’s overall validity through a set of additional econometric tests. The transformation of 
our econometric findings into what might be called “pro-poor” or “inclusive development policies” 
is a formidable challenge to which this study might only serve as a reference. Nevertheless, the 
evidence for the adverse role of geographic conditions for the poor in the form of a disproportional 
disease burden, the equalizing effect of trade, and the relatively higher influence of institutional 
quality on high income groups may serve as fresh input for development policy discussions and 
further research. 
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Appendix Table 2.8: Determinants of income: Specifications using settler mortality instrument
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 30 30 30 30 30
Geography -2.64 -1.78 -1.71 -1.77 -1.68
(GEO) (2.12) (1.77) (1.60) (1.61) (1.55)
Trade -0.21 -0.09 0.03 0.11 0.13
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.43) (0.43)
Institutions 1.63 1.46 1.30 1.20 1.10
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.49)*** (0.36)*** (0.31)*** (0.30)*** (0.30)***
R-Square 0.19 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.23
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.74 0.82 0.44 0.28 0.22
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.11
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 43 43 43 43 43
Geography -4.77 -5.69 -5.68 -6.07 -6.17
(GEO) (3.86) (3.89) (3.70) (3.77) (3.78)*
Trade -0.18 0.07 0.20 0.31 0.35
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.62) (0.63) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62)
Institutions 2.74 2.76 2.57 2.51 2.47
(Inst_rule_of_law) (1.02)*** (1.01)*** (0.96)*** (0.98)*** (0.98)***
R-Square <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.82
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 49 49 49 49 49
Geography -9.28 -8.01 -7.21 -7.25 -7.07
(GEO) (6.19) (4.89)* (4.06)* (3.83)* (3.65)**
Trade -0.20 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.05
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.98) (0.81) (0.69) (0.66) (0.63)
Institutions 3.86 3.42 3.08 2.98 2.87
(Inst_rule_of_law) (1.61)** (1.26)*** (1.03)*** (0.97)*** (0.92)***
R-Square <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.57 0.76 0.90 0.93 0.93
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
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Appendix Table 2.8 continued: Determinants of income: Specifications using settler mortality instrument
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 48 48 48 48 48
Geography -3.27 -4.76 -5.65 -6.52 -7.25
(GEO) (4.52) (4.99) (5.18) (5.44) (5.72)
Trade -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.22
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.54) (0.61) (0.65) (0.70) (0.74)
Institutions 2.62 2.86 2.99 3.14 3.30
(Inst_rule_of_law) (1.28)** (1.40)** (1.46)** (1.54)** (1.63)**
R-Square <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.87
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 55 55 55 55 55
Geography -2.68 -3.47 -3.82 -4.08 -4.17
(GEO) (2.30) (2.71) (2.91) (3.10) (3.18)
Trade -0.48 -0.61 -0.68 -0.74 -0.74
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.48) (0.54) (0.58) (0.62) (0.63)
Institutions 2.12 2.35 2.44 2.48 2.50
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.60)*** (0.70)*** (0.76)*** (0.81)*** (0.83)***
R-Square 0.17 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.71 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.74
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 41 41 41 41 41
Geography -3.18 -4.43 -4.95 -5.43 -5.57
(GEO) (3.10) (3.41) (3.58) (3.79) (3.87)
Trade -0.63 -0.71 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.57) (0.66) (0.70) (0.74) (0.77)
Institutions 1.91 2.22 2.31 2.37 2.39
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.65)*** (0.76)*** (0.82)*** (0.90)*** (0.93)***
R-Square 0.09 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.67
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) 
refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income 
group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as the absolute 
value of latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following 
Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented with settler 
mortality rates following Acemoglu et al. (2001). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.The Pagan Hall tests of 
heteroskedasticity for instrumental variables (IV) estimation under the null of homoskedasticity. The endogeneity test is based on the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, but adjusted here for heteroskedasticity. 
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Appendix Table 2.10: Determinants of income: Specifications, using alternative geography variable Mean Temperature
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 54 54 54 54 54
Geography -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(Mean Temperature) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02
Trade -0.24 -0.27 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Institutions 0.80 1.02 0.93 0.86 0.81
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.17)*** (0.16) (0.16)*** (0.16)***
R-Square 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.56 0.50
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 67 67 67 67 67
Geography -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
(Mean Temperature) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade -0.38 -0.32 -0.26 -0.25 -0.24
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30)
Institutions 1.16 1.32 1.27 1.28 1.25
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.32)*** (0.33)*** (0.32)*** (0.34)*** (0.34)***
R-Square 0.72 0.68 0.61 0.47 0.41
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.08 0.01 0.01 <0.001 <0.001
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 86 86 86 86 86
Geography -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
(Mean Temperature) (0.02)** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade -0.47 -0.42 -0.38 -0.37 -0.36
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.28)* (0.28) (0.28) (0.31) (0.33)
Institutions 1.23 1.45 1.48 1.55 1.56
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.26)*** (0.33)*** (0.37)*** (0.42)*** (0.44)***
R-Square 0.69 0.65 0.57 0.38 0.29
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
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Appendix Table 2.10 continued: Determinants of income: Specifications, using geography variable Mean Temperature
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 76 76 76 76 76
Geography 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.11
(Mean Temperature) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Trade -0.29 -0.67 -0.88 -1.11 -1.17
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.41) (0.51) (0.55)* (0.60)* (0.63)*
Institutions 1.74 2.12 2.19 2.32 2.33
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.41)*** (0.58)*** (0.65)*** (0.74)*** (0.78)***
R-Square 0.69 0.46 0.30 0.01 <0.001
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.27
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
Geography -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(Mean Temperature) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade -0.26 -0.48 -0.60 -0.75 -0.78
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.31) (0.33)* (0.37)** (0.38)**
Institutions 1.44 1.54 1.54 1.56 1.55
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.28) (0.34)*** (0.38)*** (0.43)*** (0.44)**
R-Square 0.69 0.59 0.53 0.41 0.36
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of First Quintile Median
Average 
Population Top Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 69 69 69 69 69
Geography -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(Mean Temperature) (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Trade -0.15 -0.31 -0.37 -0.46 -0.49
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)* (0.22)** (0.23)**
Institutions 0.89 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.07
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.19)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.21)*** (0.23)***
R-Square 0.74 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.51
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) refer to the bottom 20% 
income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. 
The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured via the Mean Temperature (CID Harvard University, 2002) ; (ii) trade, the log share of imports
and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which 
is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.12: Determinants of income: Specifications, using alternative geography variable Malaria
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
Geography -0.75 -0.74 -0.72 -0.67 -0.63
(Malaria) (0.41)* (0.38)** (0.34)** (0.33)** (0.33)*
Trade -0.10 -0.21 -0.19 -0.23 -0.23
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Institutions 0.98 1.07 0.93 0.83 0.77
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.16)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)***
R-Square 0.62 0.71 0.69 0.61 0.56
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
Geography -1.84 -1.46 -1.13 -0.90 -0.82
(Malaria) (0.40)*** (0.32)*** (0.31)*** (0.34)*** (0.34)**
Trade -0.08 -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 -0.20
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Institutions 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.74
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.14)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)***
R-Square 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.61
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.20 0.83 0.30 0.07 0.04
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
Geography -1.79 -1.48 -1.14 -0.89 -0.75
(Malaria) (0.42)*** (0.31)*** (0.29)*** (0.34)*** (0.38)**
Trade 0.08 -0.12 -0.23 -0.38 -0.43
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22)* (0.25)*
Institutions 0.66 0.84 0.94 1.04 1.08
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.30)** (0.17)*** (0.16)*** (0.23)*** (0.28)***
R-Square 0.67 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.55
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.60 0.89 0.48 0.29 0.24
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Appendix Table 2.12 continued: Determinants of income: Specifications, using  geography variable Malaria
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 84 84 84 84 84
Geography -1.35 -1.13 -1.03 -0.92 -0.96
(Malaria) (0.59)** (0.37)*** (0.40)*** (0.54)* (0.56)*
Trade 0.25 -0.14 -0.29 -0.49 -0.50
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.40) (0.24) (0.26) (0.36) (0.37)
Institutions 0.93 1.12 1.11 1.14 1.10
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.44)** (0.20)*** (0.25)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)***
R-Square 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.68 0.65
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.43 0.98 0.55 0.29 0.22
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117
Geography -1.38 -1.48 -1.46 -1.41 -1.37
(Malaria) (0.26)*** (0.25)*** (0.25)*** (0.25)*** (0.26)***
Trade 0.02 -0.18 -0.28 -0.41 -0.45
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)** (0.20)**
Institutions 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.93
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.14)*** (0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.14)*** (0.15)***
R-Square 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.69
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.54 0.88 0.56 0.31 0.21
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Population
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
Geography -1.82 -1.76 -1.65 -1.50 -1.42
(Malaria) (0.29)*** (0.28)*** (0.28)*** (0.30)*** (0.32)***
Trade 0.27 0.02 -0.10 -0.26 -0.32
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)* (0.17)*
Institutions 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.78 0.79
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.13)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)***
R-Square 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.69
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.62 0.98 0.65 0.29 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) refer 
to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and 
(5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured via the Malaria Index 1994 by
Gallup and Sachs (1994); (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer 
(1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the 
Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.14: Determinants of income: Control variable European Colony
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
European Colony -0.32 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 0.07
(EUR_colony) (0.34) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Geography -0.82 -1.31 -1.61 -1.97 -2.05
(GEO) (1.54) (1.40) 1.35 (1.37) (1.38)
Trade -0.35 -0.31 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Institutions 1.34 1.51 1.42 1.37 1.32
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.30)*** (0.28)*** (0.28)*** (0.30)*** (0.30)***
R-Square 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.42 0.36
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
European Colony -0.58 -0.43 -0.31 -0.20 -0.15
(EUR_colony) (0.29)** (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33)
Geography -0.29 -1.97 -2.39 -3.15 -3.27
(GEO) (1.96) (2.12) (2.04) (2.14) (2.14)
Trade -0.69 -0.62 -0.51 -0.47 -0.45
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.41)* (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44)
Institutions 1.52 1.75 1.69 1.72 1.69
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.44)*** (0.49)*** (0.48)*** (0.50)*** (0.51)***
R-Square 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.19 0.12
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
European Colony -0.54 -0.38 -0.23 -0.10 -0.07
(EUR_colony) (0.28)** (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Geography 0.54 -0.14 -0.52 -0.97 -1.21
(GEO) (1.07) (1.11) (1.10) (1.14) (1.16)
Trade -0.48 -0.53 -0.51 -0.54 -0.54
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.31)* (0.29)* (0.30)* (0.30)*
Institutions 1.44 1.52 1.49 1.49 1.49
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.28)***
R-Square 0.62 0.53 0.47 0.32 0.25
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.33
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Appendix Table 2.14 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable European Colony 
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 84 84 84 84 84
European Colony -0.62 -0.45 -0.28 -0.10 -0.06
(EUR_colony) (0.30)** (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.41)
Geography -1.28 -2.93 -3.43 -4.12 -4.40
(GEO) (1.86) (2.24) (2.31) (2.49)* (2.59)*
Trade -0.55 -0.80 -0.88 -0.99 -1.02
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.49) (0.46)* (0.47)* (0.51)** (0.52)**
Institutions 1.81 2.13 2.18 2.27 2.32
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.46)*** (0.56)*** (0.58)*** (0.63)*** (0.65)***
R-Square 0.64 0.41 0.29 0.08 0.01
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.61 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.70
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117
European Colony -0.93 -0.94 -0.70 -0.58 -0.54
(EUR_colony) (0.29)*** (0.32)*** (0.32)** (0.34)* (0.34)
Geography -0.27 -0.70 -0.80 -1.04 -1.23
(GEO) (1.22) (1.34) (1.35) (1.41) (1.42)
Trade -0.76 -0.94 -0.98 -1.05 -1.05
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.33)** (0.37)*** (0.38)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)***
Institutions 1.49 1.57 1.55 1.54 1.56
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.31)*** (0.31)*** (0.33)*** (0.33)***
R-Square 0.60 0.46 0.39 0.27 0.23
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.13
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
European Colony -0.55 -0.52 -0.45 -0.40 -0.36
(EUR_colony) (0.36) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Geography 0.76 -0.01 -0.39 -0.93 -1.08
(GEO) (1.10) (1.07) (1.02) (1.04) (1.04)
Trade -0.36 -0.52 -0.56 -0.63 -0.65
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.26) (0.27)* (0.28)** (0.29)** (0.30)**
Institutions 1.12 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.25
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.15)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.20)*** (0.21)***
R-Square 0.68 0.59 0.54 0.43 0.39
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: 
(1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% 
income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) European Colony, which is a dummy variable whether a 
country has been colonized by a European country (ii) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (iii) 
trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) 
Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the 
Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.16: Determinants of income: Control variable ethnolinguistic fractionalization
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.12 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.22
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.42) (0.39) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38)
Geography 0.26 -0.70 -1.14 -1.67 -1.85
(GEO) (1.14) (1.14) (1.18) (1.29) (1.32)
Trade -0.23 -0.27 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Institutions 1.17 1.42 1.35 1.32 1.28
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.26)*** (0.27)*** (0.29)*** (0.30)***
R-Square 0.61 0.62 0.56 0.45 0.38
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.80 -0.56 -0.33 -0.19 -0.13
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.39)** (0.40) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45)
Geography 1.16 -0.92 -1.63 -2.69 -2.94
(GEO) (1.71) (2.08) (2.15) (2.38) (2.43)
Trade -0.42 -0.43 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.38)
Institutions 1.24 1.55 1.56 1.65 1.64
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.37)*** (0.46)*** (0.48)*** (0.54)*** (0.55)***
R-Square 0.71 0.58 0.46 0.24 0.16
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.55 -0.38 -0.29 -0.18 -0.17
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.35) (0.37) (0.40) (0.45) (0.48)
Geography 1.89 0.85 0.08 -0.68 -1.02
(GEO) (0.64)*** (0.76) (0.80) (0.89) (0.92)
Trade -0.33 -0.42 -0.43 -0.50 -0.51
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)* (0.28)* (0.28)*
Institutions 1.18 1.33 1.36 1.41 1.42
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.28)*** (0.29)***
R-Square 0.67 0.61 0.54 0.38 0.30
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.32
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Appendix Table 2.16 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable ethnolinguistic fractionalization
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 84 84 84 84 84
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.77 -0.93 -0.87 -0.90 -0.93
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.42)* (0.47)** (0.50)* (0.56) (0.58)
Geography 0.30 -1.87 -2.87 -4.09 -4.54
(GEO) (1.70) (2.07) (2.22) (2.48)* (2.59)*
Trade -0.30 -0.58 -0.72 -0.89 -0.93
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40)* (0.43) (0.45)**
Institutions 1.50 1.84 1.96 2.12 2.17
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.39)*** (0.49)*** (0.54)*** (0.60)*** (0.63)***
R-Square 0.73 0.56 0.43 0.22 0.12
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.43 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.90
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.30 -0.42 -0.48 -0.52 -0.61
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42)
Geography 1.97 1.30 0.83 0.29 -0.02
(GEO) (0.73)*** (0.80)* (0.81) (0.85) (0.86)
Trade -0.36 -0.57 -0.66 -0.77 -0.79
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27) (0.29)** (0.30)** (0.32)*** (0.32)**
Institutions 1.19 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.31
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.28)***
R-Square 0.69 0.60 0.55 0.44 0.41
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.80 -0.72 -0.60 -0.49 -0.43
(Ethnoling_frac) (0.38)** (0.36)** (0.37)* (0.40) (0.41)
Geography 1.90 1.09 0.58 -0.06 -0.28
(GEO) (0.60)*** (0.61)* (0.61) (0.65) (0.67)
Trade -0.11 -0.28 -0.35 -0.45 -0.48
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)* (0.23)** (0.23)**
Institutions 0.88 1.00 1.03 1.08 1.09
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.16)*** (0.18)*** (0.19)***
R-Square 0.73 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.48
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which IV regressions are run per time period: (1) refer to 
the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and (5) 
regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization following Alesina et al. (2003) (ii) GEO, the variable for 
geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (iii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented 
following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following 
Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** 
,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.18: Determinants of income: Control variable health 
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
Health 4.29 3.57 3.43 3.35 3.34
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (1.35)*** (0.99)*** (0.89)*** (0.90)*** (0.92)***
Geography 1.40 0.57 0.29 -0.08 -0.19
(GEO) (1.09) (0.77) (0.77) (0.81) (0.82)
Trade -0.07 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Institutions 0.25 0.53 0.44 0.38 0.32
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.39) (0.26)** (0.24)* (0.24)* (0.24)
R-Square 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.72
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
Health 3.71 3.07 2.57 2.23 2.12
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (0.76)*** (0.66)*** (0.76)*** (0.92)** (0.97)**
Geography 3.17 1.00 0.08 -1.05 -1.32
(GEO) (1.17)*** (0.92) (1.02) (1.30) (1.37)
Trade -0.17 -0.22 -0.20 -0.23 -0.23
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21)
Institutions 0.24 0.64 0.75 0.88 0.89
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.37) (0.28)** (0.32)** (0.40)** (0.42)**
R-Square 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.68 0.63
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.85 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.08
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
Health 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (0.35) (0.28) (0.23) (0.19) (0.18)
Geography 1.98 0.87 0.08 -0.71 -1.05
(GEO) (0.73)*** (0.83) (0.87) (0.94) (0.97)
Trade -0.37 -0.45 -0.45 -0.50 -0.51
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)* (0.28)* (0.28)*
Institutions 1.29 1.40 1.41 1.44 1.45
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.23)*** (0.24)*** (0.26)*** (0.27)***
R-Square 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.36 0.29
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.27 0.31
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Appendix Table 2.18 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable health
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 83 83 83 83 83
Health 2.22 2.03 1.87 1.79 1.63
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (0.83)*** (1.11)* (1.24) (1.46) (1.63)
Geography 1.73 -0.48 -1.57 -2.81 -3.32
(GEO) (1.38) (1.75) (2.01) (2.41) (2.67)
Trade -0.01 -0.34 -0.49 -0.67 -0.74
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.28) (0.33) (0.36) (0.41)* (0.44)*
Institutions 0.87 1.30 1.45 1.63 1.75
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.47)* (0.61)** (0.70)** (0.84)** (0.94)*
R-Square 0.84 0.76 0.67 0.50 0.38
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.13 0.33 0.45 0.60 0.60
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 116 116 116 116 116
Health 2.97 3.30 3.26 3.23 3.10
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (0.39)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)*** (0.44)*** (0.48)***
Geography 1.21 0.50 0.07 -0.45 -0.69
(GEO) (0.48)*** (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.53)
Trade 0.03 -0.14 -0.24 -0.37 -0.40
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)** (0.19)**
Institutions 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.86
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.14)*** (0.16)*** (0.18)***
R-Square 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.72
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.52 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.10
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 90 90 90 90 90
Health 3.37 3.52 3.37 3.26 3.23
(LN_Health_lifeexp) (0.55)*** (0.53)*** (0.52)*** (0.54)*** (0.55)***
Geography 1.13 0.26 -0.23 -0.86 -1.09
(GEO) (0.46)*** (0.42) (0.41) (0.43)** (0.45)**
Trade 0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.21 -0.24
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
Institutions 0.53 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.72
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.12)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)***
R-Square 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.76
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.58 0.40 0.27 0.22 0.23
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: 
(1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% 
income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) Health measured as life expectancy at birth in 1970 (number 
of years) and taken from the World Bank Development Indicators; (ii) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from 
equator; (iii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) 
Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix 
for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.20: Determinants of income: Control variable lagged income 
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 54 54 54 54 54
20-year lagged income 1.03 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.75
(LN_Income_Lag) (0.24)*** (0.15)*** (0.14) (0.15)*** (0.16)***
Geography 2.44 1.51 1.23 0.91 0.82
(GEO) (1.37)* (0.75)** (0.71)* (0.73) (0.74)
Trade 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Institutions -0.27 0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.07
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.44) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
R-Square 0.76 0.89 0.87 0.80 0.76
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.42 0.97 0.35 0.13 0.10
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 68 68 68 68 68
20-year lagged income 0.98 1.16 1.18 1.26 1.28
(LN_Income_Lag) (0.39)*** (0.33)*** (0.30)*** (0.32)*** (0.33)***
Geography 5.09 3.87 3.02 2.39 2.20
(GEO) (2.52)** (2.05)* (1.76)* (1.72) (1.73)
Trade -0.27 -0.19 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Institutions -0.49 -0.60 -0.62 -0.74 -0.80
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.87) (0.73) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65)
R-Square 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.64
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.99 0.71 0.72 0.56 0.57
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
20-year lagged income 1.70 1.07 0.70 0.34 0.16
(LN_Income_Lag) (1.23) (0.58)* (0.43) (0.61) (0.76)
Geography 7.91 3.13 0.42 -2.42 -3.69
(GEO) (7.50) (3.37) (2.55) (3.90) (4.88)
Trade -0.05 -0.16 -0.19 -0.26 -0.28
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.40) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24) (0.29)
Institutions -1.78 -0.29 0.49 1.30 1.68
(Inst_rule_of_law) (2.84) (1.30) (0.99) (1.45) (1.80)
R-Square 0.32 0.77 0.83 0.64 0.44
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.62 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.28
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Appendix Table 2.20 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable lagged income  
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 81 81 81 81 81
20-year lagged income 1.23 0.83 0.75 0.60 0.57
(LN_Income_Lag) (0.82) (0.30)*** (0.36)** (0.61) (0.66)
Geography 5.91 1.17 -0.30 -2.47 -2.96
(GEO) (5.76) (2.00) (2.58) (4.46) (4.83)
Trade 0.50 -0.02 -0.18 -0.41 -0.46
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.66) (0.25) (0.31) (0.51) (0.55)
Institutions -1.13 0.31 0.59 1.14 1.24
(Inst_rule_of_law) (2.32) (0.82) (1.03) (1.77) (1.91)
R-Square 0.70 0.93 0.91 0.77 0.70
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.96 0.86 0.76 0.79 0.73
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 100 100 100 100 100
20-year lagged income 0.87 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00
(LN_Income_Lag) (0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.13)*** (0.14)***
Geography 1.68 1.26 0.93 0.44 0.37
(GEO) (0.74)** (0.72)* (0.94) (0.83) (0.87)
Trade 0.05 -0.08 -0.15 -0.25 -0.26
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)*
Institutions 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.04
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.33)
R-Square 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.85
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.28 0.80 0.89 0.56 0.49
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 51 51 51 51 51
20-year lagged income 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.04
(LN_Income_Lag) (0.12)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Geography 2.13 0.85 0.36 -0.36 -0.52
(GEO) (0.97)** (0.59) (0.50) (0.51) (0.55)
Trade 0.24 0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.12
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Institutions -0.22 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.29) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
R-Square 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.92
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.63 0.94 0.38 0.10 0.09
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: 
(1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% 
income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) a 20-year lag of the national income per capita in PPPs, taken 
from the Penn World Tables; (ii) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (iii) trade, the log share of 
imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), 
taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable 
definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.22: Determinants of income: Control variable GINI index
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 36 36 36 36 36
GINI Index 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(Gini) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)**
Geography 0.25 -0.48 -0.66 -0.90 -0.99
(GEO) (1.13) (1.16) (1.12) (1.13) (1.13)
Trade -0.48 -0.36 -0.26 -0.20 -0.18
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Institutions 1.16 1.46 1.38 1.35 1.30
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.21)*** (0.25)*** (0.25)*** (0.26)*** (0.27)***
R-Square 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.23
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 47 47 47 47 47
GINI Index -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
(Gini) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)***
Geography 2.03 1.43 1.42 1.21 1.20
(GEO) (1.47) (1.62) (1.53) (1.57) (1.57)
Trade -0.58 -0.55 -0.51 -0.52 -0.52
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.36)* (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Institutions 1.20 1.31 1.19 1.14 1.08
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.36)*** (0.41)*** (0.39)*** (0.41)*** (0.41)***
R-Square 0.61 0.48 0.42 0.33 0.31
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.22
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 75 75 75 75 75
GINI Index -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
(Gini) (0.01)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)**
Geography 1.02 0.88 0.68 0.51 0.30
(GEO) (0.95) (1.02) (1.02) (1.06) (1.10)
Trade -0.38 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 -0.40
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Institutions 1.71 1.78 1.73 1.70 1.70
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.39)*** (0.39)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)*** (0.43)***
R-Square 0.41 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.05
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.26 0.28
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Appendix Table 2.22 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable GINI index
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 58 58 58 58 58
GINI Index -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
(Gini) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Geography 1.06 0.93 1.19 1.24 1.46
(GEO) (1.80) (1.94) (1.77) (1.75) (1.65)
Trade -0.71 -0.69 -0.67 -0.66 -0.59
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.49) (0.51) (0.46) (0.44) (0.42)
Institutions 1.69 1.75 1.58 1.50 1.43
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.62)*** (0.64)*** (0.58)*** (0.56)*** (0.52)***
R-Square 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.37
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.16 0.32 0.43 0.56 0.55
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
GINI Index -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
(Gini) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Geography 1.92 2.04 2.16 2.18 2.11
(GEO) (0.82)** (0.87) (0.81)*** (0.80)*** (0.79)***
Trade -0.50 -0.63 -0.61 -0.64 -0.62
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.33) (0.35)* (0.33)* (0.32)** (0.31)**
Institutions 1.27 1.29 1.24 1.20 1.20
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.20)*** (0.21)*** (0.20)*** (0.19)*** (0.19)***
R-Square 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.55
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 86 86 86 86 86
GINI Index -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04
(Gini) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)
Geography 2.59 2.31 2.27 2.07 2.04
(GEO) (0.94)*** (0.94)*** (0.87)*** (0.87)** (0.88)**
Trade -0.19 -0.32 -0.30 -0.32 -0.33
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Institutions 0.94 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.93
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.16)*** (0.16)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)***
R-Square 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.64 0.62
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: 
(1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% 
income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) the GINI index, taken from the World Bank; (ii) GEO, the 
variable for geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (iii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is 
instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is 
instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors 
are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.24: Determinants of income: Control variable human capital
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 55 55 55 55 55
School enrolment rate 1985 2.90 1.80 1.32 1.11 1.04
(HC_schoolenr_85) (0.90)*** (0.51)*** (0.52)*** (0.62)* (0.66)
Geography 1.03 0.17 -0.18 -0.63 -0.78
(GEO) (1.23) (0.91) (0.85) (0.89) (0.90)
Trade 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Institutions 0.84 1.08 1.01 0.97 0.92
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.31)*** (0.23)*** (0.21)*** (0.21)*** (0.21)***
R-Square 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.54
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.59 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 69 69 69 69 69
School enrolment rate 1990 1.49 1.28 1.14 1.04 1.01
(HC_schoolenr_90) (0.49)*** (0.40)*** (0.37)*** (0.39)*** (0.40)***
Geography 3.05 0.85 -0.04 -1.17 -1.45
(GEO) (1.21)*** (1.41) (1.47) (1.71) (1.76)
Trade -0.11 -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
Institutions 0.76 1.08 1.11 1.20 1.19
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.31)*** (0.33)*** (0.35)*** (0.40)*** (0.41)***
R-Square 0.78 0.73 0.66 0.51 0.45
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.58 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.10
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 89 89 89 89 89
School enrolment rate 1995 1.98 1.54 1.23 1.06 0.97
(HC_schoolenr_95) (0.51)*** (0.43)*** (0.37)*** (0.39)*** (0.40)**
Geography 2.43 0.53 -0.59 -1.72 -2.19
(GEO) (1.10)** (1.14) (1.28) (1.50) (1.60)
Trade 0.13 -0.07 -0.17 -0.26 -0.29
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.29)
Institutions 0.76 1.15 1.30 1.45 1.51
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.31)*** (0.31)*** (0.34)*** (0.40)*** (0.43)***
R-Square 0.74 0.71 0.62 0.45 0.35
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.28 0.25 0.36 0.51 0.54
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Appendix Table 2.24 continued: Determinants of income: Control variable human capital
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 79 79 79 79 79
School enrolment rate 2000 2.40 2.84 2.80 2.98 3.00
(HC_schoolenr_00) (0.68)*** (0.64)*** (0.73)*** (0.87)*** (0.95)***
Geography 2.44 0.64 -0.34 -1.37 -1.74
(GEO) (1.55) (1.74) (1.87) (2.08) (2.20)
Trade 0.04 -0.22 -0.35 -0.48 -0.52
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.35)
Institutions 0.98 1.24 1.34 1.43 1.47
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.41)** (0.46)*** (0.49)*** (0.55)*** (0.59)***
R-Square 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.53 0.46
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.70 0.88 0.91 0.83 0.89
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 98 98 98 98 98
School enrolment rate 2005 3.85 4.73 4.94 5.20 5.19
(HC_schoolenr_05) (1.01)*** (1.17)*** (1.20)*** (1.27)*** (1.29)***
Geography 2.45 1.68 1.22 0.62 0.40
(GEO) (1.26)** (1.38) (1.42) (1.51) (1.53)
Trade -0.33 -0.53 -0.61 -0.71 -0.73
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.29) (0.31)* (0.31)** (0.32)** (0.33)**
Institutions 1.12 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.27
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.31)*** (0.34)*** (0.36)*** (0.38)*** (0.39)***
R-Square 0.65 0.53 0.47 0.36 0.32
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.70 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.43
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 72 72 72 72 72
School enrolment rate 2010 9.08 10.61 10.99 11.50 11.63
(HC_schoolenr_10) (5.02)* (5.64)* (5.73)* (5.88)** (5.88)**
Geography 3.10 2.09 1.50 0.71 0.46
(GEO) (1.21)*** (1.34) (1.39) (1.47) (1.50)
Trade 0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.17
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.31) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38)
Institutions 0.87 1.02 1.04 1.10 1.11
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.30)*** (0.30)*** (0.32)*** (0.33)***
R-Square 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.55
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) 
refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income 
group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) Human Capital measured as 5-year average around the given time 
period, and instrumented by average primary school enrolment rates 1970-79. Data are in logs and taken from the  UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics; (ii) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (iii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to 
national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (iv) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law 
Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust 
Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 2.26: Determinants of income: Regional dummy control variables 
1985 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 56 56 56 56 56
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.10 -1.87 -1.42 -1.11 -0.96
(Subsah_AFR) (0.65)*** (0.51)*** (0.47)*** (0.46)** (0.45)**
Middle East and North Africa -0.35 -0.56 -0.44 -0.33 -0.27
(MEast_NAfr) (0.42) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
Europe and Central Asia 0.31 -0.18 -0.16 -0.21 -0.19
(Eur_Asia) (0.27) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
North America
(NorthAm)
Latin America -0.53 -0.56 -0.31 -0.12 -0.04
(LatAM) (0.50) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.97 -1.34 -1.24 -1.22 -1.19
(SE_Asia) (0.39)*** (0.34)*** (0.33)*** (0.33)*** (0.34)***
Geography -2.20 -1.94 -1.97 -2.04 -2.12
(GEO) (1.19)* (1.02)* (0.99)** (0.99)** (0.98)**
Trade -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Institutions 1.06 1.17 1.13 1.11 1.08
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.21)*** (0.20)*** (0.20)*** (0.21)***
R-Square 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.69
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.71 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.32
1990 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 71 71 71 71 71
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.25 -1.88 -1.46 -1.13 -0.97
(Subsah_AFR) (0.37)*** (0.33)*** (0.32)*** (0.34)*** (0.36)***
Middle East and North Africa -0.86 -0.89 -0.81 -0.69 -0.63
(MEast_NAfr) (0.30)*** (0.31)*** (0.30)*** (0.31)** (0.31)**
Europe and Central Asia 0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.16
(Eur_Asia) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
North America
(NorthAm)
Latin America -0.80 -0.52 -0.29 -0.03 0.08
(LatAM) (0.29)*** (0.31)* (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.81 -0.97 -0.90 -0.84 -0.78
(SE_Asia) (0.26)*** (0.27)*** (0.26)*** (0.26)*** (0.26)***
Geography 0.86 0.10 -0.16 -0.58 -0.65
(GEO) (0.93) (0.91) (0.92) (0.98) (1.01)
Trade -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24)
Institutions 0.68 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.90
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.20)*** (0.21)*** (0.22)*** (0.23)*** (0.24)***
R-Square 0.87 0.85 0.80 0.71 0.67
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.31 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.32
1995 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 107 107 107 107 107
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.36 -1.05 -0.80 -0.65 -0.59
(Subsah_AFR) (0.31)*** (0.30)*** (0.29)*** (0.31)** (0.31)*
Middle East and North Africa
(MEast_NAfr)
Europe and Central Asia 0.46 0.40 0.30 0.19 0.19
(Eur_Asia) (0.22)** (0.24)* (0.24) (0.25) (0.26)
North America 0.43 0.57 0.51 0.46 0.48
(NorthAm) (0.25)* (0.28)** (0.29)* (0.32) (0.33)
Latin America -0.22 0.12 0.31 0.47 0.55
(LatAM) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)* (0.27)**
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.09 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.14
(SE_Asia) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Geography 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.18 0.06
(GEO) (0.77) (0.68) (0.65) (0.67) (0.67)
Trade 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Institutions 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.76
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.11)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)***
R-Square 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.71 0.68
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.11 0.35 0.80 0.62 0.50
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Appendix Table 2.26 continued: Determinants of income: Regional dummy control variables 
2000 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 84 84 84 84 84
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.50 -1.32 -1.12 -0.96 -0.85
(Subsah_AFR) (0.27)*** (0.28)*** (0.30)*** (0.37)*** (0.40)**
Middle East and North Africa
(MEast_NAfr)
Europe and Central Asia 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.28
(Eur_Asia) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.36) (0.38)
North America -0.10 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.44
(NorthAm) (0.46) (0.44) (0.41) (0.43) (0.44)
Latin America -0.58 -0.11 0.16 0.42 0.57
(LatAM) (0.25)** (0.26) (0.28) (0.34) (0.37)
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.49 -0.48 -0.40 -0.32 -0.28
(SE_Asia) (0.24)** (0.28)* (0.30) (0.36) (0.39)
Geography -0.15 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.17
(GEO) (0.90) (0.78) (0.78) (0.84) (0.83)
Trade -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Institutions 1.10 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.79
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.27)*** (0.23)*** (0.21)*** (0.21)*** (0.20)***
R-Square 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.78
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.43 0.83 0.97 0.74 0.85
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 117 117 117 117 117
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.53 -1.45 -1.29 -1.18 -1.12
(Subsah_AFR) (0.27)*** (0.28)*** (0.29)*** (0.30)*** (0.30)***
Middle East and North Africa
(MEast_NAfr)
Europe and Central Asia 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.17
(Eur_Asia) (0.29) (0.29)* (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
North America 0.01 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.33
(NorthAm) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
Latin America -0.44 -0.04 0.17 0.37 0.46
(LatAM) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)*
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.59 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.26
(SE_Asia) (0.30)** (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Geography -0.40 -0.41 -0.22 -0.16 -0.07
(GEO) (0.70) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69) (0.69)
Trade -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Institutions 0.96 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.81
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.12)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)***
R-Square 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.76
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.29 0.30
2010 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 91 91 91 91 91
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.29 -1.86 -1.73 -1.76 -1.79
(Subsah_AFR) (0.35)*** (0.34)*** (0.38)*** (0.42)*** (0.44)***
Middle East and North Africa 0.01 -0.81 -0.89 -1.09 -1.20
(MEast_NAfr) (0.27) (0.23)*** (0.21)*** (0.20)*** (0.19)***
Europe and Central Asia 0.79 0.24 0.12 -0.08 -0.16
(Eur_Asia) (0.22)*** (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13)
North America
(NorthAm)
Latin America 0.06 -0.30 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19
(LatAM) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
South-East Asia and Pacific -0.02 -0.59 -0.60 -0.73 -0.78
(SE_Asia) (0.31) (0.29)** (0.27)** (0.26)*** (0.26)***
Geography 0.18 -0.25 -0.31 -0.56 -0.65
(GEO) (0.68) (0.66) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64)
Trade -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Institutions 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.70
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)***
R-Square 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.76
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.48 0.32 0.25 0.18 0.16
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: 
(1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% 
income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are:  Regional dummies for (i) Sub-saharan Africa, (ii) for Middle 
East and North Africa, (iii) for Europe and Central Asia, (iv) for North America, (v) for Latin America and the Carribean, (vi) for South-
East Asia and the Pacific incl. Oceania, (vii) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as distance from equator; (viii) trade, the 
log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and Romer (1999); and (ix) Institutions 
(Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones (1999). See the Appendix for more 
detailed variable definitions and sources. Missing value indicates that variable was dropped due to collinearity. Robust Standard Errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
 97 
 
 A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 T
a
b
le
 2
.2
7
: 
F
ir
st
 s
ta
g
e
 e
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f 
tw
o
-s
ta
g
e
s 
le
a
st
 s
q
u
a
re
 e
st
im
a
te
s 
u
si
n
g
 R
e
g
io
n
a
l 
D
u
m
m
y
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
 =
 

T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
T
ra
d
e
In
st
it
u
-
ti
o
n
s 
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
S
a
m
p
le
 s
iz
e
5
6
5
6
7
1
7
1
1
0
7
1
0
7
8
4
8
4
1
1
7
1
1
7
9
1
9
1
S
u
b
-S
a
h
a
ra
n
 A
fr
ic
a
0
.3
3
-0
.4
1
-0
.1
9
-0
.3
9
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
6
0
.0
7
0
.1
6
0
.0
1
0
.6
1
-0
.3
6
-0
.0
9
(S
u
b
sa
h
_
A
F
R
)
(0
.3
9
)
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.1
6
)
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.3
0
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.2
9
)*
*
(0
.3
0
)
(0
.5
2
)
M
id
d
le
 E
a
st
 a
n
d
 N
o
rt
h
 A
fr
ic
a
-0
.1
7
-0
.4
8
-0
.2
3
-0
.5
2
-0
.4
9
-0
.4
0
(M
E
a
st
_
N
A
fr
)
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.4
6
)
(0
.3
3
)
(0
.4
4
)
(0
.2
7
)*
(0
.5
2
)
E
u
ro
p
e
 a
n
d
 C
e
n
tr
a
l 
A
si
a
-0
.2
4
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
6
0
.2
6
-0
.3
4
0
.1
9
0
.4
5
0
.2
0
0
.1
5
-0
.1
4
-0
.5
7
(E
u
r_
A
si
a
)
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.3
9
)
(0
.1
4
)*
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.3
3
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.4
0
)
N
o
rt
h
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
0
.3
7
0
.3
8
0
.2
8
1
.1
5
0
.2
7
0
.9
4
(N
o
rt
h
A
m
)
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.4
2
)
(0
.4
9
)*
*
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.5
1
)*
L
a
ti
n
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
0
.2
2
-0
.8
0
0
.0
4
-0
.9
5
0
.5
0
-0
.7
3
0
.2
2
-0
.1
1
0
.3
5
-0
.2
9
-0
.0
3
-0
.8
4
(L
a
tA
M
)
(0
.3
6
)
(0
.3
8
)*
*
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.3
9
)*
*
(0
.1
7
)*
*
*
(0
.3
1
)*
*
(0
.1
7
)
(0
.3
5
)
(0
.1
4
)*
*
*
(0
.3
3
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.5
0
)*
S
o
u
th
-E
a
st
 A
si
a
 a
n
d
 P
a
c
if
ic
0
.1
3
0
.0
7
-0
.0
3
0
.2
2
0
.2
0
0
.3
6
0
.3
3
0
.4
5
0
.3
1
1
.1
6
-0
.0
8
0
.2
1
(S
E
_
A
si
a
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.3
8
)
(0
.1
5
)
(0
.2
9
)
(0
.1
9
)*
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.3
4
)*
*
*
(0
.2
7
)
(0
.4
6
)
G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
y
 
0
.9
1
2
.7
8
-0
.0
2
3
.1
3
0
.2
8
3
.1
5
0
.3
1
3
.0
0
0
.2
9
3
.4
6
0
.1
7
3
.6
1
(G
E
O
)
(0
.6
0
)
(0
.7
0
)*
*
*
(0
.4
9
)
(0
.6
1
)*
*
*
(0
.4
7
)
(0
.6
9
)*
*
*
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.6
6
)*
*
*
(0
.4
6
)
(0
.6
7
)*
*
*
(0
.4
9
)
(0
.8
6
)*
*
*
C
o
n
st
ru
c
te
d
 T
ra
d
e
0
.5
8
0
.2
4
0
.5
2
0
.2
7
0
.4
4
0
.3
4
0
.4
3
0
.2
9
0
.4
4
0
.4
9
0
.4
7
0
.4
9
(T
ra
d
e
_
F
R
_
R
O
M
)
(0
.0
9
)*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)*
*
(0
.0
8
)*
*
*
(0
.1
2
)*
*
(0
.0
5
)*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)*
*
*
(0
.0
6
)*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)*
*
*
P
o
p
. 
sp
e
a
k
in
g
 E
n
g
li
sh
0
.3
9
0
.3
6
0
.3
8
0
.1
0
0
.4
2
-0
.1
6
0
.2
1
-0
.2
1
0
.1
4
0
.0
5
0
.1
5
0
.5
7
(E
n
g
_
L
a
n
g
)
(0
.2
0
)*
*
(0
.3
5
)
(0
.1
6
)*
*
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.1
5
)*
*
*
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
0
)
(0
.1
4
)
(0
.3
2
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.2
6
)*
*
P
o
p
. 
sp
e
a
k
in
g
 o
th
e
r 
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
s
-0
.2
3
0
.6
7
-0
.2
7
0
.9
0
-0
.5
3
1
.2
7
-0
.1
8
0
.6
7
-0
.3
2
1
.3
3
-0
.3
7
1
.1
2
(E
U
R
_
L
a
n
g
)
(0
.1
8
)
(0
.1
7
)*
*
*
(0
.1
4
)*
(0
.2
0
)*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)*
*
*
(0
.1
8
)*
*
*
(0
.1
1
)*
(0
.2
2
)*
*
*
(0
.0
9
)*
*
*
(0
.1
6
)*
*
*
(0
.1
0
)*
*
*
(0
.1
6
)*
*
*
F
ir
st
-s
ta
g
e
 F
-t
e
st
1
7
.5
7
.7
1
9
.5
8
.5
3
1
.0
2
4
.8
1
8
.7
5
.0
2
1
.9
3
8
.7
2
4
.2
3
1
.0
A
n
g
ri
st
-P
is
c
h
k
e
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
(p
-v
a
lu
e
)
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
<
0
.0
0
1
K
le
ib
e
rg
e
n
-P
a
a
p
 L
M
 t
e
st
 (
p
-v
a
lu
e
)
K
le
ib
e
rg
e
n
-P
a
a
p
 W
a
ld
 r
k
 F
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
  
  
 S
to
c
k
-Y
o
g
o
 c
ri
ti
c
a
l 
v
a
lu
e
s 
1
0
%
  
 S
to
c
k
-Y
o
g
o
 c
ri
ti
c
a
l 
v
a
lu
e
s 
2
5
%
R
-S
q
u
a
re
0
.6
4
0
.7
6
0
.5
6
0
.7
4
0
.4
7
0
.5
8
0
.4
5
0
.7
1
0
.4
4
0
.6
3
0
.5
2
0
.6
4
1
3
.4
3
5
.4
5
6
.9
4
7
.9
2
2
3
.0
3
2
.8
9
2
4
.3
2
3
.2
<
0
.0
0
1
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
3
<
0
.0
0
1
N
o
te
s:
 T
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 i
s
th
e 
R
u
le
 o
f 
L
aw
 I
n
d
ex
 (
In
st
_
ru
le
_
o
f_
la
w
) 
fo
r 
ev
en
 c
o
lu
m
n
s,
 a
n
d
 t
ra
d
e 
(L
N
_
T
R
A
D
E
_
W
B
) 
as
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
im
p
o
rt
s 
an
d
 e
xp
o
rt
s 
o
v
er
 n
o
m
in
al
G
D
P
 f
o
r 
u
n
ev
en
 c
o
lu
m
n
s.
 T
h
e 
re
gr
es
so
rs
 a
re
: 
R
eg
io
n
al
 d
u
m
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
(i
) 
S
u
b
-s
ah
ar
an
 
A
fr
ic
a,
 (
ii)
 f
o
r 
M
id
d
le
 E
as
t 
an
d
 N
o
rt
h
 A
fr
ic
a,
 (
iii
) 
fo
r 
E
u
ro
p
e 
an
d
 C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a,
 (
iv
) 
fo
r 
N
o
rt
h
 A
m
er
ic
a,
 (
v
) 
fo
r 
L
at
in
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d
 t
h
e 
C
ar
ri
b
ea
n
, 
(v
i)
 f
o
r 
S
o
u
th
-E
as
t 
A
si
a 
an
d
 t
h
e 
P
ac
if
ic
 i
n
cl
. 
O
ce
an
ia
, 
;
(v
ii)
 G
E
O
, 
th
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 f
o
r 
ge
o
gr
ap
h
y
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 a
s 
d
is
ta
n
ce
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
eq
u
at
o
r;
 (
v
iii
) 
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 t
ra
d
e,
 t
h
e 
in
st
ru
m
en
t 
fo
r 
tr
ad
e 
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
 F
ra
n
k
el
 a
n
d
 R
o
m
er
; 
(i
x)
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y
 t
h
at
 s
p
ea
k
s 
E
n
gl
is
h
 (
E
n
g_
L
an
g)
; 
an
d
 (
x)
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y
 t
h
at
 s
p
ea
k
s 
an
y
 
W
es
te
rn
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 L
an
gu
ag
e 
(E
U
R
_
L
an
g)
. 
S
ee
 t
h
e 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 f
o
r 
m
o
re
 d
et
ai
le
d
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
an
d
 s
o
u
rc
es
. 
M
is
si
n
g 
v
al
u
e 
in
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
at
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 w
as
 d
ro
p
p
ed
 d
u
e 
to
 c
o
lli
n
ea
ri
ty
. 
R
o
b
u
st
 S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 E
rr
o
rs
 a
re
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
*
*
*
 ,
*
*
 a
n
d
 *
 d
en
o
te
 
st
at
is
ti
ca
l 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 
at
 t
h
e 
1
, 
5
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 le
v
el
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
A
n
gr
is
t 
an
d
 P
is
ch
k
e 
(2
0
0
9
) 
p
ro
p
o
se
 a
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
 f
ir
st
-s
ta
ge
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 f
o
r 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 e
n
d
o
ge
n
o
u
s 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
u
n
d
er
 t
h
e 
n
u
ll 
th
at
 t
h
e 
eq
u
at
io
n
 i
s 
u
n
d
er
-i
d
en
ti
fi
ed
.
T
h
e 
n
u
ll 
h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 o
f 
th
e 
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
 L
M
 t
es
t 
is
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
eq
u
at
io
n
 i
s 
u
n
d
er
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 (
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
 a
n
d
 P
aa
p
,
2
0
0
6
).
 T
h
e 
fi
rs
t-
st
ag
e 
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
 W
al
d
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
is
 t
h
e 
ge
n
er
al
iz
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 C
ra
gg
 a
n
d
 D
o
n
al
d
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
to
 n
o
n
-i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
tl
y
 a
n
d
 
-i
d
en
ti
ca
lly
 d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
B
el
o
w
, 
w
e 
re
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
cr
it
ic
al
 v
al
u
es
 f
ro
m
 S
to
ck
 a
n
d
 Y
o
go
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
u
n
d
er
 t
h
e 
n
u
ll 
o
f 
w
ea
k
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
i.
e.
 t
h
e 
re
je
ct
io
n
 r
at
e 
o
f 
r 
(h
er
e 
gi
v
en
 a
s 
1
0
 p
er
ce
n
t 
an
d
 2
5
 p
er
ce
n
t)
 t
h
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
to
le
ra
te
d
 i
f 
th
e 
tr
u
e 
re
je
ct
io
n
 r
at
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
5
%
. 
A
lt
h
o
u
gh
 c
ri
ti
ca
l 
v
al
u
es
 d
o
 n
o
t 
ex
is
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
K
le
ib
er
ge
n-
P
aa
p
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
, 
w
e 
fo
llo
w
 t
h
e 
lit
er
at
u
re
 s
u
gg
es
te
d
 i
n
 B
au
m
, 
S
ch
af
fe
r 
an
d
 S
ti
llm
an
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
an
d
 a
p
p
lie
d
 i
n
 B
az
zi
 a
n
d
 C
le
m
en
s 
(2
0
1
3
),
 a
n
d
 u
se
 t
h
e 
S
to
ck
 a
n
d
 Y
o
go
 c
ri
ti
ca
l 
v
al
u
es
 a
s 
p
o
in
t 
o
f 
co
m
p
ar
is
o
n
.
 98 
 
 
 
2005 (IV): 
Dependent variable = Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 63 63 63 63 63
Geography 1.22 0.94 0.51 -0.06 -0.35
(GEO) (0.64)* (0.69) (0.75) (0.19) (1.01)
Trade -0.18 -0.07 -0.01 0.15 0.27
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.29) (0.34)
Institutions 1.28 1.27 1.22 1.11 1.03
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.16)*** (0.17)*** (0.20)*** (0.25)*** (0.29)***
R-Square 0.59 0.51 0.36 0.06 0.01
Pagan Hall test (p-value) 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.23 0.19
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.15
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.07
Appendix Table 2.28: Determinants of income: Estimates using OWW data
Notes: The dependent variable are hourly wages from the OWW database with country-specific calibration and imputation, converted into USD 
using official average exchanges rates 2003-2007. There are five samples for which the IV regressions are run per time period: (1) refer to the 
bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and 
(5) regress the top 10% income group. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as the absolute value of 
latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP which is instrumented following Frankel and 
Romer (1999); and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from the Rule of Law Index, which is instrumented following Hall and Jones 
(1999). See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The Pagan Hall tests of heteroskedasticity for instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation under the null of homoskedasticity. The endogeneity test is based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, but adjusted here for 
heteroskedasticity. The Hansen Test follows the standard methodology. 
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Dependent variable = 
 Trade Institutions 
(1) (2)
Sample size 63 63
Geography 0.57 2.09
(GEO) (0.47) (0.65)***
Constructed Trade 0.42 0.34
(Trade_FR_ROM) (0.09)*** (0.13)***
Pop. speaking English -0.35 1.49
(Eng_Lang) (0.24) (0.29)***
Pop. speaking other European languages 0.04 0.37
(EUR_Lang) (0.16) (0.27)
First-stage F-test 11.2 10.8
Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (p-value) <0.001 <0.001
Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic  
   Stock-Yogo critical values 10%
   Stock-Yogo critical values 25%
R-Square 0.31 0.37
13.43
5.45
Appendix Table 2.29: First stage estimates of two-stages least square 
estimates using OWW data
6.40
0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the Rule of Law Index (Inst_rule_of_law) for even columns, 
and trade (LN_TRADE_WB) as share of imports and exports over nominal GDP for uneven 
columns. The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured as the 
absolute value of latitude of country divided by 90; (ii) constructed trade, the instrument for 
trade obtained from Frankel and Romer; (iii) the proportion of the population of a country that 
speaks English (Eng_Lang); and (iv) the proportion of the population of a country that speaks 
any Western European Language (EUR_Lang). See the Appendix for more detailed variable 
definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) propose a conditional first-stage F-statistic for the case of multiple endogenous 
variables under the null that the equation is under-identified. The null hypothesis of the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test is that the structural equation is underidentified (Kleibergen and 
Paap, 2006). The first-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics is the generalization from Cragg 
and Donald (1993) to non-independently and -identically distributed errors. Below, we report 
the critical values from Stock and Yogo (2005) under the null of weak instruments, i.e. the 
rejection rate of r (here given as 10 percent and 25 percent) that may be tolerated if the true 
rejection rate should be 5%. Although critical values do not exist for the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic, we follow the literature suggested in Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and applied 
in Bazzi and Clemens (2013), and use the Stock and Yogo critical values as point of 
comparison.
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1985-2010 (6 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 32 32 32 32 32
Geography 2.32 1.71 0.78 -0.24 -0.63
(GEO) (1.87) (1.83) (1.79) (1.85) (1.88)
Trade 0.67 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.55
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.27)** (0.25)** (0.23)*** (0.23)** (0.23)**
Institutions 0.58 0.54 0.60 0.65 0.66
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35)* (0.36)* (0.37)*
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.71 0.43 0.21 0.28 0.31
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.77 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.71
1990-2010 (5 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 43 43 43 43 43
Geography 5.29 2.88 1.69 0.27 -0.27
(GEO) (3.27)* (3.00) (2.89) (2.95) (2.99)
Trade 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.11
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.37)
Institutions 0.31 0.48 0.57 0.68 0.72
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.46) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43)*
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.64 0.02 <0.001 0.01 0.11
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.90 0.29 0.19 0.20 0.19
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13
1995-2010 (4 periods): Dependent variable = 
Log GDP per capita of
First 
Quintile Median
Average 
Popula-
tion
Top 
Quintile Top Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample size 55 55 55 55 55
Geography 13.71 11.76 10.00 8.43 7.77
(GEO) (5.37)*** (5.05)** (4.65)** (4.41)** (4.32)*
Trade 1.04 0.94 0.80 0.69 0.67
(LN_TRADE_WB) (0.74) (0.73) (0.67) (0.65) (0.64)
Institutions -1.06 -0.91 -0.72 -0.57 -0.51
(Inst_rule_of_law) (0.81) (0.73) (0.66) (0.62) (0.60)
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) (p-value) 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.27
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) (p-value) 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.17
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.38 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.30
Appendix Table 2.30: Determinants of income: Core specifications, 
dynamic panel-data estimation, one step system GMM
Notes: The dependent variable is per capita GDP on PPP basis. For each specification, there are five samples for which the two-step dynamic 
panel-data estimations are run: (1) refer to the bottom 20% income group; (2) regress the median income; (3) refer to the average per capita 
GDP; (4) regress the top 20% income group; and (5) regress the top 10% income group. Three panel specifications are analyzed: 1985-2010 
(six time periods), 1990-2010 (five time periods), and 1995-2010 (four time periods). The model used, known as "system GMM", is based on 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Variables are used  as bases for "GMM-style" instrument sets described in Holtz-
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The regressors are: (i) GEO, the variable for geography, which is measured 
as distance from equator; (ii) trade, the log share of imports and exports to national GDP; and (iii) Institutions (Inst_rule_of_law), taken from 
the Rule of Law Index . See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation 
and is applied to the differenced residuals. The Hansen Test for over-identifying restrictions follows the standard methodology.
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Appendix Table 2.33: Data and Sources
Variable Name Description Source Available Years Remarks
Country Name of country Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation 
of the Penn World Table" available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt
1983-2012 Czechoslovakia was 
continued as Czech 
Republic after 1989. 
Germany classified as 
"West Germany" until 
1989.
First Quintile Log of GDP per capita of first income 
quintile per time period (Output-side real 
GDP at current PPPs)
Median Median of all quintile logs of GDP per 
capita per time period (Output-side real 
GDP at current PPPs)
Average Population Simple average of log of GDP per capita 
per time period (Output-side real GDP at 
current PPPs)
Top Quintile Log of GDP per capita of fifth income 
quintile per time period (Output-side real 
GDP at current PPPs)
Top Decile Log of GDP per capita of tenth income 
decile per time period (Output-side real 
GDP at current PPPs)
Inst_rule_of_law Rule of Law index (from World 
Governance Indicators).
World Bank.  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 1983-2012 1996 approximates for all 
1983-1996. 1997, 1999, 
2001 taken as average of 
the 1996 and 1998, 1998 
and 2000, and 2000 and 
2002, respectively.
Eng_Lang Fraction of the population speaking English 
as mother tongue
Hall, R., & Jones, C.I. (1999). Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More per 
Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 , 83-116.
1983-2012
EUR_Lang Fraction of the population speaking one of 
the major languages of Western Europe as 
mother tongue: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, or Spanish
Hall, R., & Jones, C.I. (1999). Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More per 
Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 , 83-116.
1983-2012
Inst_sett_mort Log of settler mortalities in European 
colonies
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J.A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. The American Economic Review, 91 (5), 1369-
1401.
1983-2012
LN_Trade_WB Log of nominal trade per country (sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic 
product). 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?cid=GPD_31
1983-2012
Trade_FR_ROM Log of predicted trade shares computed 
following Frankel and Romer
Frankel, J.A., & Romer, D. (1999). Does Trade Cause Growth? The American Economic 
Review, 89(3), 379-399. Own construction for missing countries
1985 (fixed) Instrumental variable for 
trade
HC_schoolenr_70 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 1970-1979
1970-1979
HC_schoolenr_85 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 1983-1987
1983-1987
HC_schoolenr_90 Log  of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 1988-1992
1988-1992
HC_schoolenr_95 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 1993-1997
1993-1997
HC_schoolenr_00 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 1998-2002
1998-2002
HC_schoolenr_05 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 2003-2007
2003-2007
HC_schoolenr_10 Log of primary gross school enrollment 
rates, averaging 2008-2012
2008-2012
GEO_disteq Mean distance to equator, measured as 
abs(latitude of country centroid)/90
Own construction, based on John L. Gallup, Andrew D. Mellinger, and Jeffrey D. Sachs' 
Geography Datasets; http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm
1983-2012
Malaria Malaria Index 1994 Gallup and Sachs (1998) 1983-2012
Meantemp Average temperature in given country 
(Celsius)
CID Harvard University (2002) 1983-2012
Health_lifeexp Life expectancy at birth in 1970 (number 
of years)
World Bank World Development Indicators 1970
Ethnoling_frac Ethnic fractionalization using Ethnicity 
data points between 1979-2001
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W. Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). 
Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 155-194.
1979-2001 Available values per 
country used as proxy for 
all time periods
EUR_colony Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
had a European colonizer, 0 otherwise
Subsah_AFR Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0 
otherwise
MEast_Nafr Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in Middle East or North Africa, 0 
otherwise
Eur_Asia Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in Europe or Central Asia, 0 
otherwise
North_Am Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in North America, 0 otherwise
LatAm Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in Latin America, 0 otherwise
SE_Asia Dummy variable taking value 1 if country 
is located in South or South-East Asia, 0 
otherwise
GINI
Measure of statistical dispersion to 
represent the income distribution within a 
country; commonly used measure of 
inequality. World Bank World Development Indicators
WTID World Top Incomes Database
Alvaredo et al. (2015), retrieved from 
http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/#Database: 1983-2012
Own construction, based on: Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer 
(2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" available for download at 
www.ggdc.net/pwt, combined with World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.0B) 
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/WIID-3b/en_GB/database/.
The alternative robustness specification uses the Occupational Wages around the World 
(OWW) database, which are derived from the ILO October Inquiry database, and are 
available for download at http://www.nber.org/oww/. Income shares are then constructed 
by splitting the overall available wage distribution per country in the respective percentiles 
examined.
World Bank, UNESCO Institute for Statistics
Own construction based on World Bank definition of world regions
1983-2012 for  
core specification 
using Penn World 
Tables and WIID 
/ 2003-2007 for 
OWW data
1983-2012
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Appendix Table 2.34: Overview of countries per time period in regular specification using WIID data
1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
56 71 107 84 117 91
Argentina Argentina Argentina Angola Argentina Angola
Australia Australia Armenia Argentina Armenia Argentina
Austria Bangladesh Austria Austria Australia Armenia
Bangladesh Belgium Bangladesh Bangladesh Austria Australia
Belgium Bolivia Belarus Belgium Bangladesh Austria
Bolivia Brazil Belgium Belize Belarus Bangladesh
Botswana Bulgaria Belize Bolivia Belgium Barbados
Brazil Canada Bolivia Brazil Benin Belarus
Canada Chile Brazil Bulgaria Bhutan Belgium
Chile Colombia Bulgaria Burkina Faso Bolivia Bhutan
Costa Rica Costa Rica Burkina Faso Burundi Botswana Bolivia
Cote d`Ivoire Cote d`Ivoire Cameroon Cambodia Brazil Brazil
Denmark Czech Republic Cambodia Cameroon Bulgaria Bulgaria
Dominican Republic Denmark Canada Canada Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Ecuador Dominican Republic Chile Cape Verde Cambodia Cambodia
Finland Ecuador China Chile Canada Canada
France Egypt Colombia China Central African Republic Central African Republic
Germany El Salvador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Chile
Ghana Finland Cote d`Ivoire Costa Rica China China
Guatemala France Czech Republic Cote d`Ivoire Colombia Colombia
Honduras Gambia, The Denmark Czech Republic Comoros Costa Rica
Hungary Germany Djibouti Denmark Congo Cote d`Ivoire
India Ghana Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Costa Rica Croatia
Indonesia Guatemala Ecuador Ecuador Cyprus Cyprus
Iran Guinea Egypt El Salvador Czech Republic Czech Republic
Ireland Honduras El Salvador Ethiopia Dem. Rep. Congo Denmark
Israel Hungary Estonia Finland Denmark Dominican Republic
Italy India Ethiopia France Dominican Republic Ecuador
Jordan Indonesia Finland Gambia, The Ecuador Egypt
Korea, Republic of Iran France Germany Egypt El Salvador
Lesotho Israel Gambia, The Ghana El Salvador Estonia
Luxembourg Italy Georgia Greece Estonia Ethiopia
Malawi Jamaica Germany Guatemala Ethiopia Fiji
Malaysia Jordan Ghana Guinea-Bissau Fiji Finland
Mauritania Kenya Guinea-Bissau Honduras Finland France
Mexico Korea, Republic of Greece Hong Kong France Germany
Morocco Luxembourg Guinea Hungary Gabon Greece
Nepal Malaysia Honduras India Gambia, The Honduras
Netherlands Mali Hong Kong Iran Georgia Hong Kong
New Zealand Mauritania Hungary Ireland Germany Hungary
Nigeria Mexico Indonesia Israel Ghana Iceland
Norway Morocco Iran Italy Greece India
Pakistan Netherlands Ireland Jamaica Guatemala Ireland
Paraguay New Zealand Israel Kenya Guinea Italy
Peru Niger Italy Korea, Republic of Honduras Japan
Philippines Nigeria Jamaica Laos Hong Kong Jordan
Poland Norway Japan Luxembourg Hungary Kazakhstan
Sri Lanka Pakistan Jordan Madagascar Iceland Kyrgyzstan
Sweden Panama Kazakhstan Malawi India Laos
Thailand Paraguay Kenya Mali Iran Latvia
Tunisia Peru Korea, Republic of Mauritania Iraq Lithuania
Turkey Philippines Kyrgyzstan Mexico Ireland Luxembourg
United Kingdom Poland Laos Mongolia Israel Macedonia
United States Portugal Latvia Morocco Italy Madagascar
Uruguay Romania Lesotho Jamaica Malawi
Venezuela Russia Lithuania Japan Malaysia
Senegal Luxembourg Jordan Mali
Spain Macedonia Kazakhstan Mexico
Sri Lanka Madagascar Kenya Moldova
Sweden Malaysia Kyrgyzstan Namibia
Switzerland Mali Latvia Nepal
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Appendix Table 2.34 continued: Overview of countries per time period in regular specification using WIID data
1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012
Tanzania Mauritania Netherlands Lesotho Netherlands
Thailand Mexico Norway Liberia Niger
Tunisia Moldova Pakistan Lithuania Norway
Uganda Mongolia Panama Luxembourg Pakistan
United Kingdom Morocco Paraguay Macedonia Panama
United States Mozambique Peru Madagascar Paraguay
Uruguay Namibia Philippines Malawi Peru
Venezuela Nepal Poland Malaysia Philippines
Yemen Netherlands Portugal Mali Poland
Zambia New Zealand Romania Mauritania Portugal
Niger Russia Mauritius Romania
Nigeria Senegal Mexico Russia
Norway South Africa Moldova Singapore
Pakistan Spain Mozambique Slovak Republic
Panama Sri Lanka Namibia Slovenia
Paraguay Suriname Nepal South Africa
Peru Sweden Netherlands Spain
Philippines Switzerland Niger Sudan
Poland Taiwan Nigeria Sweden
Portugal Tanzania Norway Switzerland
Romania Thailand Pakistan Taiwan
Russia Tunisia Panama Thailand
Senegal Uganda Paraguay Turkey
Slovak Republic United Kingdom Peru Uganda
Slovenia United States Philippines Ukraine
South Africa Uruguay Poland United Kingdom
Spain Venezuela Portugal United States
Sri Lanka Vietnam Romania Uruguay
St. Lucia Yemen Russia Venezuela
Swaziland Zambia Rwanda Vietnam
Sweden Senegal
Taiwan Singapore
Tanzania Slovak Republic
Thailand Slovenia
Tunisia South Africa
Turkey Spain
Uganda Sri Lanka
Ukraine Sweden
United Kingdom Switzerland
United States Syria
Uruguay Taiwan
Uzbekistan Tanzania
Venezuela Thailand
Vietnam Togo
Zambia Tunisia
Zimbabwe Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
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III. Marriage Age Affects Educational Gender Inequality* 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the effect of female age at marriage on female education and 
educational gender inequality. We provide empirical evidence that early female marriage age 
significantly decreases female education with panel data from 1980 to 2010. Socio-cultural 
customs serve as an exogenous identification for female age at marriage. We also show that 
effects of spousal age gaps between men and women significantly affect female education 
relative to male education. Each additional year between husband and wife reduces the female 
secondary schooling completion rate by 10 percentage points, the time women spend at 
university by one month, and overall affects female education significantly more negatively than 
male education. We also document that marriage age and conventional measures of gender 
discrimination do not act as substitutes. 
III. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Improving access to education for women is a central theme in economic development 
(United Nations, 2015). Not only are equal educational opportunities a pressing issue for the many 
disadvantaged women around the world; there is also evidence for the positive role of female 
human capital on economic development (Esteve-Volvart, 2000; Klasen 1999, 2002; Schultz, 
2002; Sedgley & Elmslie, 2005; Todaro & Smith, 2014). Not only scholars and international 
institutions argue for positive overall effects of women’s equality, even a report by McKinsey & 
Company (2015), a consultancy, suggests that $12 trillion could be added in 2025 to annual global 
GDP by bringing the gender parity level around the world “only” to the best-in-region country.  
While we observe that the global educational gap is gradually shrinking, girls have still not 
caught up to boys and do not realize their full human capital potential (United Nations, 2015).  The 
reasons for this educational gap may also relate to cultural customs and traditions that are not 
compatible with the idea of a highly educated female and male population. This work contributes 
                                                 
*  A working paper of this chapter is circulating (Stimpfle & Stadelmann, 2016a) and has been presented at 
the 2016 Annual Conference of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik), and the 2016 Annual 
Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (EPCS), where helpful feedback was provided by Alexander Fink. 
We are also grateful to Hartmut Egger, Mark Schelker, Elena Groß and Mario Larch for useful and encouraging 
comments at the Graduate Research Seminar of the University of Bayreuth.  
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to that field of research by linking gender inequality in education with marriage age. Marriage, 
marital customs and traditions of founding a family are a central cultural feature of different 
societies. The timing for marriage and, in particular, marriage age of women with respect to men 
can lead to significant economic ramifications for investments in education and human capital of 
the different sexes.32 Differences in education and human capital in turn affect overall economic 
development (Barro, 2001; Lucas, 1988). There is only comparatively scarce international 
evidence on economic consequences of early female marital age in particular regarding effects of 
age of marriage on educational achievements.  
Our analysis attempts to fill  this gap in the literature, as we examine whether the marriage 
age for women, i.e. at which age the bride gets married and how that compares to her husband’s 
age, matters for female educational prospects. We document that women get married at relatively 
young age in many countries and almost everywhere around the world at a considerably younger 
age than men, i.e. wives are usually younger than husbands and there often exists a considerable 
spousal age gap. The marriage age of women and the phenomenon of wives being on average 
younger than husbands impacts educational investment and we empirical identify it as a relevant 
factor for determining female education. 
We provide a basic economic framework to conceptualize how a woman’s timing of 
marriage affects her educational decision. Societal expectations of marriage age signal the timing 
for child-rearing, as marriage is usually the first and still the socially most accepted institution for 
conceiving children. Anticipated family offspring affects future female labor force participation, 
since, for given societal conventions, wives tend to be more often in charge of raising children 
which impacts their educational pay-off in the job market. The timing of marriage is related to 
exogenous socio-cultural customs but influence individual decisions on marriage. The earlier a 
women gets married, the shorter her anticipated pay-off to educational investments such that 
educational investments are lower for younger marriage ages than for older marriage ages. We 
thus hypothesize that for countries where women get married younger, their achieved level of 
education is likely to be lower.  
                                                 
32 A recent article in The Economist, January 23rd 2016, mentions the story of Aisha Abduallai, a girl from Nigeria as 
an indicative example: “[…] so they [the parents] marry me off. He was 50 and I was 13. […] [Aisha’s] education 
ended abruptly.” 
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We employ a global panel data set from 1980-2010 to analyze the relationship between 
marriage age and educational achievements. Empirical results indicate that the absolute female age 
at marriage has a theory-consistent and highly significant effect on female education: Each year of 
marriage postponement for women is associated with a 3%-points higher female completion rate 
in secondary schooling, and to about three weeks, or 13% longer female tertiary education. To take 
account of endogeneity issues, we first employ fixed effects and different instrumentation 
strategies: We explain the culture-induced domestic female marriage age with a weighted average 
of the marriage age in adjacent countries and other instruments employed in the literature. Second, 
we investigate the effects of spousal age gaps, i.e. the female relative to the male marriage age. 
Introducing this variable tackles potential biases in case women in one part of the world get married 
earlier than somewhere else, irrespective of education levels. Our empirical results become even 
stronger: Each additional year difference between wife and husband reduces the female secondary 
schooling completion rate by 10%-points and the time women spend at university by one month. 
Finally, we employ a quasi difference-in-difference strategy to focus on differences between 
women and men regarding marriage age and educational achievement, i.e. we specifically examine 
spousal age gaps and educational gaps. This approach helps to eliminate potential confounding 
factors that affect the level of educational achievements jointly for women and men as we focus 
only on the differences between the two sexes. We show that spousal age gaps affect female 
education significantly more negatively than male education.  
Numerous robustness tests support our main empirical findings. Further refinements and 
differential analyses suggest that gender parity in literacy, but not primary schooling, is affected 
by women’s marriage age which is consistent with our theoretical considerations. The marriage 
age tradition of the parental generation also has an influence on current educational inequality. 
Importantly, we document that marriage age is no substitute measure for conventional indicators 
of gender discrimination, i.e. female marriage age consistently and significantly affects 
educational achievements of women independently of existing levels of other gender 
discrimination in society. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the related literature and our conceptual framework. The data and identification strategy 
is presented in Section 3. We present our main empirical results and instrumental variable 
strategies in Section 4, and discuss a set of robustness tests and refinements in Section 5. Section 
6 offers concluding remarks.  
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III. 2. RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Related Literature 
This study relates to three strands of literature. First, we complement the literature on 
educational attainment of women and men. As the importance of human capital for economic 
development is ever more highlighted (Lucas, 2015), numerous studies have investigated the 
impact of educational gender inequality on growth and found generally negative effects. Esteve-
Volart (2004) argues that educational gender inequality is an inefficient practice, as distortions in 
the allocation of talent and human capital investment lower economic growth. Some empirical 
analyses, however, tend to find opposite effects (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In work by Barro 
and Lee (1994), higher male and female education positively affects a number of variables that 
indirectly foster development, such as life expectancy and child mortality. However, regression 
results suggest that female secondary schooling affects a country’s growth rate negatively, while 
male secondary schooling has a significantly positive effect, an outcome for which they “do not 
have a convincing story” as explanation (ibid., p. 22). Easterly (2007), on the other hand, reaffirms 
that educational inequality represents a mechanism that hinders growth, and Klasen and Lamanna 
(2009) conclude from cross-country and panel regressions that gender gaps in education and 
employment significantly reduce economic growth. Knowles, Lorgelly, and Owen (2002) also find 
that that educational gender gaps are an impediment to economic development. Hill and King 
(1995) furthermore emphasize the beneficial aggregate social effects for growth when advancing 
female education. Apart from higher female productivity based on more equal education between 
genders, social benefits also promote growth indirectly, for example through extending the average 
life expectancy in a population or improving the political systems and processes.  
Nevertheless, lower education for women in comparison to men remains a widespread 
phenomenon (Pekkarinen, 2012 surveys the literature). Alexander and Eckland (1974) have early 
documented gender gaps in education in a study on the U.S. Hyde, Fennema and Lamon (1990) 
summarize from American mathematics performance tests that gender differences emerge only in 
high school and college. A further study by Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) finds 
that girls’ underperformance in math relative to boys may be eliminated as a society becomes more 
gender-equal. Given such a societal trend, girls perform as well as boys in mathematics, and much 
better than boys in reading. Barro and Lee (2013) provide further encouraging empirical results, 
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as significant progress has been made in developing countries towards reducing educational gender 
inequality. Yet, the authors emphasize that many challenges in making education more inclusive 
remain. An important driver for this persistent educational gender inequality is thought to relate to 
socio-cultural institutions. We show that educational attainment of women is systematically 
influenced by a core socio-cultural institution at the macro level, namely female age of marriage 
and the differences between female and male age of marriage. Morrison, Raju, and Sinha (2007) 
argue that the impact of gender equality on human development at the macro level is less well 
understood than at the individual level. 
Second, our work adds to the literature on spousal age gaps, which suggests income prospects 
and fecundity, among others, as key explanatory variables.33 Vella and Collins (1990) develop a 
model that proposes a link between income difference and age difference, as males and females 
are willing to trade youth for income. In general, the model suggests a positive age differential in 
favor of the husband due to biological differences, and the authors confirm their theoretical 
predictions with marital records from the U.S. H. Zhang (2014) develops a theoretical model which 
incorporates several variables to explain the husband-wife age gap. The model uses stochastic 
returns from human capital investments and emphasizes the interrelatedness between marriage 
timing, education levels, and labor market outcomes. It also builds in differential fecundity, i.e. 
depending on the expected number of children, women have more or less urgency to plan ahead 
and marry early.  
The fecundity horizon is also the key explanatory variable in the model by Díaz-Giménez 
and Giolito (2013), who argue that the spousal age gap will persist even if gender wage gaps 
disappear. This is because, given regular reproductive conditions, shorter biological clocks force 
women to be less choosy than men of the same age, i.e. women are willing to marry older men 
because delaying marriage is too costly. These stable dynamics may only change through 
exogenous advances in reproductive technologies. X. Zhang (2014) confirms in his empirical study 
that the asymmetric fecundity horizon and the demand for children are driving forces for the 
spousal age gap. From cross-country regressions she also concludes that spousal age gaps are 
positively associated with the role children play in economic activities, the importance of the 
                                                 
33  There are of course many more explanatory variables suggested in the literature. Edlund (1999), for example, lists 
unbalanced sex ratios, social status, and the functioning of capital markets (respectively ease of borrowing) as 
determinants of a spousal age gap. Li (2008) suggests that the gender life expectancy gap in favor of women tends to 
decrease the spousal age gap. 
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agricultural sector, and the share of rural population. Mansour and McKinnish (2014) suggest that 
lower occupational wages drive up the spousal age gap, i.e. negative selection causes the husband-
wife gap to increase. The authors argue that better educated individuals with more economic 
opportunities rather marry similarly-aged spouses so that the ones “left behind” are more likely to 
marry someone with a larger age difference. 
Anderberg, Hener, and Wilson (2014) conclude from individual data that more education 
leads to a smaller age gap, driven by the bride’s later average age of marriage. They exploit the 
exogenous variation in qualifications induced by a legislative change to the minimum compulsory 
school leaving age in England and Wales in 1972 and find that while a spousal age gap is generally 
found desirable by individuals, that gap is attenuated by a higher level of education. 
In a case study on Indonesia, Utomo (2014) reports a comparable association between a 
higher level of the wife’s education and a decreasing spousal age gap, but limits her conclusion to 
a correlation. Similar results for the link between education and marriage age are found by 
Carmichael (2011) for a panel data set of 77 developing countries from 1950 to 2005 34 , by 
Danziger and Neuman (1999) for a study on Muslims and Jews in Israel, by Gustafson and 
Fransson (2015) for Swedish marital data, by Glick, Handy, and Sahn (2015) for a case study on 
Madagascar, and by Garenne (2004) for sub-Saharan Africa. Issues of endogeneity have been 
pointed out in strands of the literature (Lise & Seitz, 2007; Matz, 2013; van der Vleuten, 2013), 
and causal links may be running from marriage age (due to established societal conventions) to 
female education outcomes. Casterline, Williams, and McDonald (1986, p. 354) note that “any 
systematic effort to test […] explanations is undermined by the fact that the [spousal] age 
difference can exert an independent influence on the forces suggested as its causes.” Similarly, 
Mensch, Singh, and Casterline (2005) remark that there are nearly no studies that economists 
would consider acceptable in addressing the endogeneity problems around determinants of 
marriage timing. 
Our contribution explicitly addresses the possibility that marriage age affects education, and 
our evidence suggests that societal conventions related to marriage timing can explain differences 
in female education. Moreover, analyzing the (absolute) age at marriage for women may overlook 
potential biases. If couples in a certain region habitually marry at younger ages than what the 
                                                 
34 Moreover, she finds no clear evidence for the role of Islam on marriage age, while urbanization is significantly 
positive for marriage age and negative for spousal age gaps.  
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global average suggests, one might draw incorrect conclusions from examining absolute age levels 
only. We thus also systematically analyze the relative marriage age (spousal age gap) and show 
that the spousal age gap affects female education significantly more than male education.  
Third, we also contribute to the literature relating marriage to differential gender outcomes 
and discrimination. Sociological literature in this field alludes to societal expectations and gender 
discrimination associated with female marriage age and husband-wife age gaps (Banks & Arnold, 
2001; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Freud, 1962; Lehmiller & Agnew, 2008), although Bhrolcháin (1992) 
cautions that trends in the age difference are not readily interpretable as reflecting change in the 
relative status of the sexes. Jensen and Thornton (2003) argue that women who marry young are 
more likely to experience domestic violence, whilst Lise and Seitz (2011) conclude that the spousal 
age gap has an economically and statistically insignificant effect on intra-household income 
allocation. The strand of literature presented here discusses the “internal complexity and the 
variety of social contexts” that shape husband-wife age differences (Pyke & Adams, 2010, p. 770), 
but does only partly support its conclusions and hypotheses with quantitative evidence. Our 
contribution adds to these analyses and provides international evidence which link societal 
expectations, resulting economic incentives, female age at marriage, and human capital 
investments.  
Thereby, we also directly contribute to the economics of marriage. Economic perspectives 
on marriage have received attention in academia, following the seminal two-part articles by Becker 
(1973, 1974). The following papers represent no exhaustive overview but appear particularly 
suitable in our research context. Korenman and Neumark (1990) find no empirical support for the 
contention that marriage lowers women’s wages. On the other hand, in a related paper (Korenman 
& Neumark, 1991), the authors find that wages for married men rise, even after controlling for 
human capital details such as actual labor market experience, and that such a marriage wage 
premium is persistent. Polachek and Xiang (2006) find more specifically that the husband-wife 
age gap increases the gender pay gap. In general, the literature suggests that in countries with larger 
spousal age gaps, women have lower incentives in the labor market since their older husbands are 
likely to have accumulated more wealth and higher wages. Matz (2013) estimates a negative 
impact of the spousal age gap on Ethiopian household incomes as cooperation between spouses 
may be impeded by large age differences. Spousal age gaps are also considered to affect fertility 
levels and, consequently, population growth (Casterline et al., 1986; Hajnal, 1965; van Zanden, 
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2011). Results from a study by Saardchom and Lemaire (2005), where marriage patterns between 
males and females are compared, indicate that social and cultural variables play a more important 
role than economic modernization variables. Fernández, Guner, and Knowles (2005) develop a 
model on marriage and inequality, and document empirically that the extent of marital sorting is 
negatively associated with per capita income levels, and greater gender discrimination is associated 
with more sorting. Rao (1993) suggests that spousal age gaps could be behind this century’s rise 
in dowries in South Asia, and Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak, and Lafortune (2013) present a study on 
India that outlines a model on why economic forces have not been able to undermine the 
importance of in-caste marriage. 
A stream of literature more explicitly connects gender inequality, human capital and 
marriage. Mincer and Polachek (1974) focus on the relation between human capital investments 
and observed market earnings of women within a family. Relatively shorter lifetime labor market 
participation of married women (mothers) implies lower returns on human capital investments 
than for married men (fathers), and hence yields persistent gender inequality. Goldin and Katz 
(2002) discuss how the introduction of the birth control pill enabled relatively more women in the 
U.S. to pursue higher education by indirectly lowering the cost of career investment. The reduced 
gender inequality due to the pill was additionally reinforced by its impact on delaying the average 
age at first marriage. Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) echo the relationship between later age 
of marriage and a narrowing of the educational gender gap, in particular because the rising trend 
for the age at first marriage for both sexes has affected women overproportionately. In a careful 
historical analysis, Goldin (2006) tracks gender inequality in the U.S. especially in education and 
labor market participation throughout the twentieth century. She finds that for the last fifty years,  
in a “quiet revolution” women have continuously increased their investments in formal schooling 
and career building, since they have acquired longer planning horizons and an altered attitude 
towards marriage. A paper by Iyigun and Walsh (2007) argues that higher investment in female 
education raises women’s bargaining power within a marriage, which reduces gender inequality 
in households and ultimately makes marriage integral to the process of economic development. 
Finally, Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) propose a framework for the determination of pre-
marital schooling and marriage patterns of men and women. Their approach suggests that 
investments in education are taken in anticipation of being married to a spouse with whom one can 
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share consumption and coordinate work activities, a feature from which again women benefit 
disproportionately much. 
Building on the general literature consensus of a positive association between female 
education and female marriage age, we specifically analyze causal effects of female age at 
marriage on female human capital in a global perspective, i.e. we investigate effects in a variety 
of development stages and economic settings. This helps examine whether such a relationship 
exists independent of national boundary conditions. We also aim to advance beyond a theoretical 
model, as we provide empirical evidence in addition to our conceptual considerations.  
We are interested in female education levels, because educational gender discrimination 
matters not only for the directly affected girls, but also for the nation on a macroeconomic level 
(Kabeer & Natali, 2013). Studies show that investments in the education of young females can 
lead to outstanding returns (Psacharopoulos, 1988). A better trained women's labor force and 
higher labor force participation fuel growth through increased female productivity rates and 
earnings abilities (Dollar & Gatti, 1999). Dougherty (2005) finds that female education even has 
a double beneficial effect on women’s earnings, since besides higher productivity it also reduces 
the gender wage gap that is related to discrimination, tastes, and circumstances. A more equal 
distribution of human capital in the population also leads to more allocative efficiency of the work 
force as shown by Lagerlöf (2003). He develops a model that explains important changes in 
economic growth in Europe throughout economic history with developments in gender equality. 
Seguino and Floro (2003) find from panel data analyses for a set of semi-industrialized economies 
between 1975 and 1995, that an increase in the women’s wage share relative to that of men is 
associated with an increase in the domestic savings rate. Furthermore, beneficial generational 
effects have been proposed as children of more educated women display overall better well-being 
and higher productivity (Basu, 2002).35 
Four received papers explore the causal effects of marriage age on education, and are hence 
closely linked to our contribution: In an early paper on the U.S., Marini (1978) concludes that 
women's earlier age at marriage is critical for limiting their educational attainment. Age at first 
marriage has no significant effect on the educational attainments of men but has a strong impact 
on female educational attainment. Foreman-Peck (2011) suggests from European historical 
                                                 
35 For additional theoretical literature on this topic, see for example Lagerlöf (2003), Galor and Weil (1996), Dollar and 
Gatti (1999), Knowles et al. (2002) 
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evidence that later marriage sets up a virtuous cycle as it allows more female education and 
ultimately spurs economic growth. Field and Ambrus (2008) find for individuals in Bangladesh 
that each additional year that marriage is delayed for females is associated with an increase in years 
of their schooling and higher female literacy rate. Maertens (2013), based on her sample of three 
villages in India, argues similarly that educational gender inequality can be traced back to female 
marriage timing. However, this literature does not examine spousal age gaps, the case study 
character is relevant but does not provide international evidence, and the impact of other “regular” 
gender discrimination variables is not explicitly examined. Thus, to the best of our knowledge this 
work provides for the first time in the literature macro-evidence from international panel data via 
two alternative identification mechanisms, while also taking account of other gender 
discrimination variables. A final motivation to study how female education is affected by marriage 
age also lies in the fact that marriage age could potentially be regulated by age of marital consent 
laws and intensive public information campaigns may affect societal conventions in the long run 
too.   
 Conceptual Framework for the Gender-Specific Effect of Marriage Age  
We consider a simple theoretical framework to better understand the economic rationale 
linking age at marriage and education of women. As argued in the literature (DiMaggio, 1994; 
Huntington, 1996; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), we assume that cultural influences are robust, and 
cultural habits in a society adjust slowly over generations if at all, such that certain socio-cultural 
characteristics are given.36  
For our purpose, the most relevant cultural dimension consists of the societal expectations 
and conventions on when to get married as a woman. These expectations belong to the decisive 
factors for the actual timing of a woman’s marriage. Even if an individual young woman might  
not feel fully “ready” for marriage, established socio-cultural customs and resulting societal 
pressure may overrule personal sentiment. Societal norms and customs have also been repeatedly 
cited in the literature to explain observed female marriage age (Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell, 
1983; Maertens, 2013; Mason & Smith, 2003; Mensch et al., 2005; Srinivas, 2000). Expected 
female marriage age due to societal expectations hence represents an important factor for female 
                                                 
36 This is closely related to Cervellati and Sunde (2005), who develop a model for human capital accumulation based 
on expected lifetime. 
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life planning, and affects the incentives for individuals. The known expectations on marriage age 
allow for nearly perfect foresight planning, so that we may assume economically rational, and 
hence identical behavior of all family members (the girl and her parents).  
Societal expectations and socio-cultural factors also apply to male marriage age. However, 
marriage age expectations affect a future wife much more than a future husband due to two 
important reasons: First, marriage represents the main socially accepted institution for conceiving 
children. We see that, globally and independent of cultural background, marriage is considered not 
an end in itself, but serves, as documented through a close temporal link, to begin childbearing.37 
For a global sample, Jensen and Thornton (2003) empirically document a continuous relationship 
for women between their marriage age and age at first birth, i.e. the older the bride is, the older 
she will become a mother. The authors explain this result as well with social norms, which 
emphasize the importance of child-birth taking place within marriage. Foreman-Peck (2011) also 
establishes the close link between marriage and the timing of first childbirth in a theoretical model. 
This pattern is even more reinforced still today in many cultures that are concerned with preserving 
a woman’s virginity until marriage (Mensch et al., 2005), a behavior which is influenced also by 
economic rationale (Mariani, 2012). We hence assume that marriage has a signaling effect for 
conceiving children, which is particularly relevant for women. 
Second, societal conventions differentiate between the time women and men invest into 
raising children, and usually dictate that mothers do most of the job (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & 
Robinson, 2000; Levant, Slattery, & Loiselle, 1987; OECD, 2011; Sinno & Killen, 2009). Even in 
very gender-equal societies such as Sweden, women still use the majority of days for parental 
allowance (Statistics Sweden, 2014), and critical tasks such as giving birth are linked to females 
by nature. Wives hence tend to be more affected since global cultural customs put a higher 
emphasis on mothers to raise children than on fathers. This may in turn have a gender-specific 
effect on the labor market population. Mothers are not only the primary affected agent in the weeks 
and months before the date of delivery; the birth also indicates additional years of female work 
mostly dedicated to raising this child. The labor force of a man, in contrast, is less affected by 
becoming a father. Even in countries that may be regarded as most gender-egalitarian, the father’s 
                                                 
37 Malthus (1830) already observed that a prudential restraint on marriage, i.e. a later marriage age, would lead to 
lower birth rates and therefore act as demographic control, since the timing for the first child is pushed backwards.  
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involvement in raising children is usually confined to some weeks or a few months’ time (Brandth 
& Kvande, 2016; Monna & Gauthier, 2008; OECD, 2011).  
In essence, the foresight of expected marriage equaling expected offspring yields different 
incentive patterns for women versus men which should be empirically observable. The former 
know in advance that their labor force will be relatively more tied to raising children, whereas the 
latter expect less of an effect on their labor force trajectory. Out of economic rationale, girls (as 
well as their parents) know the expected marriage age affects the number of years they can be 
employed (before a child is conceived). If girls get married very young, the projected participation 
in the labor market approaches zero (child birth is “imminent”), and later entry less likely due to a 
missing previous job experience. In line with our theoretical reasoning, Miller (2011) documents 
that women’s careers benefit from delaying the first child. In addition, the higher the socially 
expected number of children, the more unlikely would be a potential return into the labor market 
after the birth of the first child.  
Finally, with this incentive scheme of labor market prospects in mind, we hypothesize that 
the socially expected female marriage age determines how much a girl initially intends to invest 
in education. Related work has suggested that the level of educational investments depends on the 
expected returns (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2007; Ngyuen 2007). As women will usually be married 
not before their first menstrual cycle, we define educational investments as forms of schooling 
beyond primary education. Also, we assume that individuals maximize their utility through 
efficient educational investment. Hence, only the amount of education is invested into which is 
required for expected successful labor market participation. Education obtained for “personal 
wisdom” that lacks economic pay-off is supposed to be irrelevant (or not differentially relevant 
between man and woman). An expected young age for getting married then means that educational 
investments are less likely to pay off because returns from joining the labor market are not 
sufficient. We argue that this effect holds in general, since there are always costs attached to 
schooling. In large parts of the world, families face even dual costs in the form of direct expenses 
for sending girls to school, as well as the opportunity cost for not having them as labor support in 
the household (Glick & Sahn, 2000; King & Hill, 1997). But also families in advanced economic 
countries with affordable schooling and university tuition will incur substantial costs in the form 
of associated expenses such as learning materials, commuting and new housing, extracurricular 
activities etc.  
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An agent therefore considers sending girls to school as foregone investment from an 
economic point of view, if expected future returns from their education are not adequately realized 
through subsequent labor force participation. Assuming (nearly) perfect anticipation through 
stable intra-generational cultural customs, a societal expectation of young female marriage age 
will prevent agents from investing in the girls’ education already ex ante. This means that the 
decision on female education is caused by her expected marriage age, i.e. a socio-cultural 
convention. The mechanism is further reinforced by a negative relationship between female 
marriage age and the fertility rate.38 Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000), and Cervellati and 
Sunde (2007), among others, point to the fact that more educated parents face a higher opportunity 
cost of child-rearing. Given a low female marriage age environment and resulting little investments 
in female education, women are more likely to replace child quality with child quantity. This may 
prolong their expected time period outside the labor market and further reduces incentives to invest 
in their education; it contrasts to a high female marriage age environment that is associated with 
fewer children and an expected shorter break from work. In summary, we suggest that socio-
cultural customs for marriage age signal the timing for child-rearing, which primarily affects 
female labor force participation and hence the expected pay-off to female educational investments. 
Qualitatively, this means the earlier a woman gets married, the lower we expect her education to 
be, which forms the hypothesis to be tested.39  
III. 3. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
Data 
According to our theoretical considerations we expect that the age at marriage of women 
affects their level of human capital. For our empirical work, we measure our outcome variable, 
namely gender-specific education levels, via two measures that are common in the literature (see 
for example Barro & Lee, 2001, 2013; Castelló-Climent & Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2012). First, we 
consider the accumulation of human capital measured via secondary school completion rates 
(Lorentzen, McMillan, & Wacziarg, 2008; Mankiw et al., 1992). Second, we measure the stock of 
human capital by the average years of tertiary schooling achieved. Both data stem from the set by 
                                                 
38 In our panel data set, these two variables correlate significantly (r = -0.62). 
39 We summarize our conceptual framework schematically in figure 3.1 in the appendix.  
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Barro and Lee (2013). We hypothesize that marriage rather affects later schooling attainment, 
because this is when marriage decisions mostly interfere. Later we will examine further outcome 
variable alternatives as robustness checks, and we also compile both absolute female values and 
gender-relative values where male are divided by female values. 
In order to test our hypothesis empirically, we apply a standard cross-country regression 
framework, as we posit that the economic mechanisms described hold independent of geography. 
Related studies have examined individual level data (Field & Ambrus, 2008; Maertens, 2013), 
which naturally have the advantage of capturing single household characteristics and socio-
economic factors which aggregate variables can only proxy. However, we deliberately choose a 
different methodological approach to contribute with a macro perspective to this strand of 
literature. Moreover, including a larger set of geographies should increase the validity of results, 
as it allows to draw more general conclusions about the relationship under investigation. Hence, 
instead of individual information on marriage age we employ the 2012 World Marriage Data by 
the United Nations (2013), which provide cross-country singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) 
data separately for males and females. This allows us to calculate average values for three decadal 
intervals per country from 1980 to 2010. Using the gender split, we can also create a spousal age 
gap which captures the female age at marriage relative to the male, so we can analyze differences 
between women and men. We simply refer to the SMAM for men and women as the Female 
Marriage Age, respectively Male Marriage Age, which is formally defined as the average length 
of single life expressed in years among those who marry before age 50 (United Nations, 2013). 
The SMAM represents the most common and natural measure for marriage age.40 In total, we have 
86 different countries with available data on gender-specific marriage age and educational 
outcomes for all three time intervals in our panel.41  
A number of control variables enter our empirical analysis. These are linked to our theoretical 
considerations and they are also commonly used in related literature (Carmichael, 2011; Danziger 
& Neuman, 1999; Díaz-Giménez & Giolito, 2013; Field & Ambrus, 2008; Garenne, 2004). As we 
propose that marriage serves as an institution for conceiving children, we want to ensure our 
                                                 
40  The marriage age data are generally not available for every year, hence we average data points per country in ten-
year intervals. In cases of quick and dynamics changes, the SMAM variable might be prone to measurement errors 
(Preston et al., 2001). However, upon data inspection we find no evidence that this could be problematic in our context.  
41 In the appendix, see table 3.19 for a detailed variable description and sources table, and table 3.20 for detailed list 
of the countries employed for the panel. Including additional controls reduces the sample size due to lower data 
availability. The cross-section we estimate later in this paper has a larger sample of up to 135 countries. 
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estimates are not biased by fertility rates in a country. It is plausible that education for females 
differs across countries not because marriage happens in one country earlier, but because 
differences in the number of children per woman affects their educational decisions. By controlling 
for this variable, we eliminate cross-country differences in the average number of children a 
woman raises, which otherwise may have an unobservable effect on our core relationship between 
Female Marriage Age and female education. We also include the rate of urbanization in a country 
to capture socio-economic advancement, and the share of Muslim population as control for 
religious differences that may impact gender roles. Furthermore we employ four population gender 
ratios that potentially affect a balanced marriage market and could be a reason for age differences.42 
Finally, we consider effects from legal origin differences, from the share of women engaged in the 
labor market as well as from national income levels.43  
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for our key variables, broken down by decade. 
Differences in marriage age are profound: In the latest decade (2000-2010) for example, the 
Female Marriage Age in one country was more than double the age of another country (16 years 
in Niger versus 33 years in Jamaica). Over the last 30 years, both Female and Male Marriage Age 
have globally increased by on average two years. This goes hand in hand with a decline in fertility 
rates (Foreman-Peck, 2011); women have on average one child less in the 2000s than in the 1980s. 
The spousal age gap displays a stable pattern of around three and a half years, which is 
consolidating as reflected in the decreasing standard deviation. In all countries observed, men 
marry on average later than women. The age gap between husband and wife in the 2000s ranges 
from an average 1.1 years in Ireland to 8.8 years in Niger. The share of the Muslim population 
(based on McCleary & Barro, 2006), has remained rather constant and, for the aggregate sample, 
closely reflects actual shares of the world population. We also observe stable trends for the gender 
ratios (boys over girls) regarding birth and subsequent mortality rates: More boys than girls are 
born globally, but they also suffer from a higher mortality rate than girls in childhood and 
adolescence. Finally, labor participation rate rose in our time window from 40 to 50 percent, and 
                                                 
42 These are the sex ratio at birth, the death rate of boys with ages 0-4, respectively 0-14, divided by the death rate of 
girls with ages 0-4, respectively 0-14, and the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 over the 
cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40. 
43  Legal origin has been found to affect gender inequality in Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) and Potrafke  
 and Ursprung (2012), among others. We are aware that labor market characteristics as well as income   
 levels are potentially endogenous. However, we want to ensure that cross-country differences in female   
 labor force participation and per capita incomes do not bias our results. Not including these variables does  
 not materially influence the coefficient of interest.  
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income (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) as well as urbanization levels have grown (UNESCO, 
2013), in line with common findings.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptives
1980s 1990s 2000s
Female Marriage Age 22.81 24.17 24.76
(2.98) (3.48) (3.60)
Male Marriage Age 26.35 27.63 28.24
(2.50) (2.78) (2.87)
Spousal Age Gap 3.54 3.46 3.48
(1.60) (1.51) (1.38)
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 1.16 1.15 1.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Fertility 3.99 3.51 2.97
(1.84) (1.77) (1.57)
Urbanization 50.09 53.41 55.36
(23.52) (23.99) (23.45)
Share of Muslim population 0.19 0.21 0.22
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Sex ratio at birth 1.05 1.05 1.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 1.09 1.08 1.08
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 1.10 1.09 1.10
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19)
Cum. pop. married at 40 0.98 0.98 0.98
(0.36) (0.04) (0.05)
French Legal Origin 0.40 0.47 0.43
(0.49 (0.50) (0.50)
Female Labor Force Participation 40.52 42.28 50.24
(17.50) (14.59) (15.69)
Log GDP per Capita 8.46 8.54 8.77
(1.17) (1.28) (1.28)
Female Secondary Schooling Completion 13.94 17.32 24.19
(11.36) (12.25) (15.21)
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio 1.57 1.42 1.29
(0.99) (0.81) (1.00)
Average Female Years Tertiary Education 0.17 0.24 0.39
(0.17) (0.23) (0.34)
Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio 1.94 1.88 1.40
(0.94) (1.50) (0.79)
Gender Parity Index in Literacy 0.81 0.83 0.89
(0.21) (0.21) (0.16)
Primary Schooling Completion Ratio 1.33 1.16 1.38
(0.85) (0.49) (2.66)
Number of observations 120 115 135
Notes: This table lists mean and (standard deviation) for the main variables of this paper, where each 
column shows the ten-year simple average value for the respective decade. The variables are: (i) the 
Female Marriage Age (SMAM); (ii) the Male Marriage Age (SMAM); (iii) the Spousal Age Gap, 
calculated as difference between Male and Female Marriage Age; (iv) the ratio of Male over Female 
Marriage Age; (v) the fertility rate; (vi) the level of urbanization in percent; (vii) the share of muslim 
population per country; (viii)-(x) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys 
over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (xi) the cumulative percentage of 
married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of 
married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (xii) dummy if the country's legal origin is 
based on French system; (xiii) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xiv) the log of per 
capita GDP in PPP terms. (xv) the percentage of females that completed secondary attainment as highest 
school degree; (xvi) the percentage of males that completed secondary attainment as highest school degree 
divided by that percentage of females; (xvii) the average years of tertiary schooling for females; (xviii) the 
average years of tertiary schooling for males divided by that of females; (xix) the Gender Parity Index 
(females divided by males) for adult literacy; (xx) the percentage of males that completed primary 
attainment as highest school degree divided by that percentage of females. See the Appendix for more 
detailed variable definitions and sources. 
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Our outcome variables follow a common trend: Females have not only significantly 
improved their levels of education, but also reduced educational inequality relative to males.44 All 
three categories that compare education along gender indicate that about 50 percent of the gap 
between boys and girls could be closed between the 1980s and the 2000s.45 This general trend 
towards educational inequality reduction is well in line with literature findings (e.g., Todaro & 
Smith, 2014). Nevertheless, within that positive trend line large discrepancies remain: whereas in 
Benin still five times more men than women finish tertiary education and less than half of the 
women are literate relative to men, the Dominican Republic reports equal gender literacy and a 
one and a half times female to male ratio for average years of tertiary education. 
Identification Strategy 
We begin by estimating effects of the female age at marriage on education in country c and 
time period t with the following equation, using a regression control approach: 
(3.1) Educct = µ + α (Female Marriage Age)ct + βXct + εct , 
where Educ is our gender-specific educational outcome variable of interest, and Female Marriage 
Age denotes the Female Marriage Age variable as defined earlier. X is a vector of the control 
variables introduced before, which we include to mirror our conceptual framework. We then 
estimate effects in a panel setting with fixed effects over three ten-year timespans from 1980, 
which represents the earliest sensible data set available, up to 2010. Throughout this chapter, we 
will make modifications to equation 3.1, which will be presented in detail as they are introduced.   
We noted endogeneity concerns when discussing the association of female education levels 
and female age at marriage in the literature. Three approaches are used in the following to mitigate 
this issue: (1) We include fixed effects regularly in our regression estimates as mentioned above. 
(2) We introduce a new instrumental variable that tries to identify the effect of socio-cultural 
customs, and (3) we apply a quasi difference-in-difference strategy as a complementary 
examination (starting p. 135).  
Regarding point (2), we provide a new instrument related to socio-cultural customs to ensure 
effects of Female Marriage Age on education can be causally interpreted. Specifically, we 
                                                 
44  Table 3.1 already includes summary statistics for the Gender Parity Index (GPI) in Adult Literacy for   
comprehensiveness reasons, as we will employ this variable at a later stage. 
45  In that time period, the gap between boys and girls shrank by 51 percent for completed secondary  
attainment, by 43 percent for average years of tertiary schooling, and by 58 percent for literacy rates. 
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instrument the domestic Female Marriage Age with an average Female Marriage Age of 
neighboring countries. This is the econometric mirroring of our conceptual framework presented 
earlier, which argues that shared socio-cultural expectations, which are stable within a generation 
and exogenously given, are closely associated with the actual timing of female marriage. This 
feature is suitable beyond national borders, since these expectations are much more determined 
through a common culture sphere than along formal borders. On the other hand, cross-country 
marriages that could cause endogeneity concerns represent exceptions. Hence, taking the 
neighboring Female Marriage Age from culturally closely associated nations constitutes a 
meaningful and relevant instrumental approach.  
The exclusion restriction requires that the average Female Marriage Age from neighboring 
countries impacts domestic female education levels only through the average domestic Female 
Marriage Age. We find it indeed difficult to imagine how marriage age abroad would directly 
affect domestic education levels other than through the domestic marriage age. While we cannot 
directly test this assumption, we believe it is valid, especially since any formal domestic legislation 
on (female) schooling is confined to the national border, and thus should not impact our instrument. 
Similarly, foreign education should not have an effect on domestic marriage age, which would 
theoretically represent a case of reverse causality. For instance, we see little ground to argue that 
foreign education affects domestic education (and via that channel potentially domestic marriage 
age), since education levels even of adjacent countries differ on a substantial and persistent level, 
i.e. we consider cross-border effects as implausible. Education falls under governmental 
regulation, whereas decisions on marriage timing apart from minimum marriage age does not.46 
Hence, we believe that only the latter is primarily grounded in socio-cultural customs and can have 
an impact across borders. 
We compile our basic instrument by following Correa, Jetter, & Agudelo (2016) in our base 
specification, i.e. we weigh all values of adjacent countries by the length of shared borders for an 
average “neighboring value”. Adjacent countries with missing values are omitted for the weighted 
average calculation, which also means that islands are excluded from this sample altogether as 
they share no direct land border. Domestic Female Marriage Age and the Female Marriage Age 
                                                 
46 For this reason we also test empirically if the years of compulsory schooling per country impact our proposed 
relationship between marriage age and education. While we do not report detailed results, inclusion of a compulsory 
schooling variable does not change or affect any of our empirical results in section IV. 
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of neighboring countries are highly correlated (r = 0.8 in our panel), which documents the 
relevance of our instrument. Related literature also proposes to use neighboring values as 
instrument to establish exogeneity. Maertens (2013) uses the stated ideal age for getting married 
of neighboring households within the same subcaste as instrument for an Indian case study. Similar 
to this micro-setting, here we employ neighboring values on a country level. This yields the 
following first-stage regression equation: 
(3.2) Female Marriage Agect = γ+ λNEIGHBORct + θXct + εFemaleMarriageAgect , 
where NEIGHBORct refers to the average weighted neighbor value of the Female Marriage Age 
in adjacent countries of country c in time t.   
III. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Baseline Results 
Figure 3.2 provides the central motivation for our study and shows the unconditional 
relationship between our two main outcome variables and Female Marriage Age for each time 
period. All scatterplots in the first three columns display a significant positive relationship between 
Female Marriage Age and female education levels, i.e. the later a woman gets married, the higher 
her education.  As we move from the 1980s to the 2000s, the association becomes stronger for 
both secondary and tertiary education. The fourth column presents first differences, where for each 
country the changes in female education from the 1980s to the 2000s are plotted against the 
changes in Female Marriage Age, i.e. we evaluate whether changes in the age of marriage are 
associated with changes in female education over time, thus holding country characteristics 
constant. We observe that first differences in marriage age correlate most strongly with changes in 
advanced education. Changes in female secondary schooling show a weaker but still positive 
correlation with changes in women’s marriage age over time.  
Next we run OLS regressions based on equation (3.1) for our panel as summarized in table 
3.2. Effects are estimated for secondary and tertiary schooling of women (for now, we focus on 
absolute female education levels), and we include step-wise additional controls as well as fixed 
effects. The empirical results support our theoretical predictions. Female Marriage Age has a 
positive and highly significant impact on female education, robust to inclusion of additional 
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Figure 3.2: Scatter plots of Female Marriage Age against education variables 
 
Female Marriage Age 
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controls and fixed effects.47 Taking the most stringent specification in columns (3) and (6), each 
additional year a woman delays marriage means that the share of all females in the country who 
complete secondary schooling, rises by 1.14 percentage points. Average years of tertiary education 
                                                 
47 Based on highly significant p-values of a Hausman test for both our outcome variables, which serves to analyze 
whether the unique errors (εi) are correlated with the regressors (see Appendix, table 3.11), we continue with regularly 
controlling for fixed effects in our model.  
Table 3.2: Panel for level of female education, ordinary least squares (OLS)
1980-2010
Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 86 85 81 86 85 81
Observations 258 255 243 258 255 243
Female Marriage Age 2.22 0.82 1.14 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.26)*** (0.34)*** (0.50)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Fertility -4.03 -3.64 -0.02 0.01
(1.11)*** (1.84)* (0.01)** (0.02)
Urbanization 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.18) (0.001)*** (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 3.04 46.41 -0.08 0.11
(3.46) (16.76)*** (0.06) (0.29)
Sex ratio at birth -3.67 -12.23 -0.89 -2.69
(31.96) (44.16) (0.85) (1.31)**
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -38.47 -17.80 -2.75 -2.21
(36.39) (49.42) (0.76)*** (0.81)***
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 35.54 3.18 2.73 2.07
(38.24) (49.10) (0.82)*** (0.88)**
Cum. pop. married at 40 -41.92 -16.52 -1.55 -0.94
(21.55)** (26.25) (0.35)*** (0.42)**
French Legal Origin -4.69 0.04
(1.64)*** (0.04)
Female Labor Force Participation -0.08 0.01
(0.09) (0.001)**
Log GDP per Capita 6.12 0.17
(2.40)*** (0.04)***
Continent dummies no yes no no yes no
Country fixed effects no no yes no no yes
R-squared 0.27 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.58 0.67
Female Secondary Schooling 
Completion
Average Female Years Tertiary 
Education
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(3) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns 
(4)-(6) estimate the average years of female tertiary schooling. The regressors are: (i) The female Marriage Age (SMAM); (ii) the total fertility 
rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth (males over 
females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the cumulative 
percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 
40 (out of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of females in 
the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. French Legal Origin omitted in columns (3) 
and (6) because of inclusion of fixed effects. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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are likewise increased by 0.02 years, which equals about one week more time spent at university 
or roughly a tenth of a semester. Among the additional controls, fertility rates and per capita 
income levels tend to matter for both outcome variables.48 Per capita income levels and female 
labor force participation are likely endogenous in our model, but should still be taken into 
consideration to ensure that other covariates are not biased from omitted variables.   
For this reason, we estimate one model without these two controls, and compare it to the 
specification with all controls: results are very similar. We also include a control variable for 
imbalances in the marriage market (cum. pop. married at 40, i.e. the cumulative ratio of married 
males over married females at age 40). It might be that the bridal marriage age is determined not 
so much based on socio-cultural expectations, but is more directly related to the widely debated 
issue of “missing women” (Anderson & Ray, 2010; Sen, 1990), which affects marriage market 
characteristics. 
If there are women missing on the marriage market due to unbalanced overall population 
ratios, men would likely have to choose and marry young females as long as they are still available. 
This would bias the female marriage age downwards. Such a missing women effect could also 
result in a “marriage squeeze” (Edlund, 2002; Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993), as relatively more 
men do not marry because the unbalanced marriage market leaves them without a matching 
partner. Against this backdrop, we proxy for a distorted marriage market with this ratio as we 
would expect a balanced ratio for a population with normal distribution of sexes.49 Other covariates 
are either non-significant, or they have no consistent effect on the two outcome variables under 
investigation, i.e. they are rather erratic.  
Lastly, we test specifications where we additionally control for the average age of a woman 
when giving birth to her first child (see table 3.14 in the appendix). This variable has no large 
effects and Female Marriage Age remains robust, thus the overall outcome remains unchanged. It 
seems that indeed our key variable of interest, the Female Marriage Age, exerts a crucial influence 
on education, while the timing of first birth has an evidently more subordinate impact. This 
                                                 
48 Given the high correlation between fertility and marriage age, we may also interpret the sex ratio at birth as de-facto 
instrument for fertility, following Becker, Cinnirella & Woessmann (2010). Based on a reviewer’s suggestion we also 
exclude fertility in an alternative specification (not reported here). This leads to even more significant results for our 
core variable of interest. 
49 We also tested an alternative specification with the ratio of cumulative percentage of married men over that of 
married women at the age of 30 as control variable, and we omitted this variable as well in another specification, based 
on a reviewer’s suggestion. Results turn out to be very similar.  
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confirms our conceptual framework in which we derived that marriage age constitutes the more 
fundamental explanatory variable, i.e. age at first birth is an outcome of this regressor. Related 
studies tend to emphasize the role of maternal age at first birth for female education, but according 
to our theoretical logic and empirical findings, incorrectly so since both variables are ultimately 
impacted by female marriage age. If the timing of marriage shifts, so does the maternal age at first 
birth as a consequence (not vice versa). Hence, we believe our considerations reflect better the 
causal sequence that leads to educational gender inequality.  
Instrumental Variables and Spousal Age Gaps 
Although the initial association between female age at marriage and female education levels 
appears statistically and economically relevant, we try to ensure that the relationship between the 
two variables can be causally interpreted. Hence, in table 3.3 (Panel A) we proceed to instrumental 
variables estimates, where the average of the Female Marriage Age of adjacent countries, weighted 
by shared land border, serves as our instrument.50 The domestic Female Marriage Age is strongly 
affected by established societal expectations, which a country shares with its neighbors through 
common cultural heritage. Thereby, we account for concerns of causality and endogeneity between 
marriage age and education.  
We then take an additional step to tackle omitted variable bias. So far we have analyzed our 
key variable of interest, the marriage age for women, as absolute values through the Female 
Marriage Age. We accounted for national differences by the inclusion of country fixed effects as 
well as cultural variables such as Muslim population shares. However, our absolute perspective 
might still overlook particular social customs regarding marriage age that would bias results. Also, 
Male Marriage Age correlates highly with Female Marriage Age so that results so far could 
capture effects simply from marrying young per se, rather than from Female Marriage Age. Hence, 
we take the difference between the Marriage Age of husband and wife to obtain a spousal age gap 
(SAG) per country. Introducing this new variable is by and large due to methodological 
considerations, as our overall focus in this research remains with the age at marriage. Yet, 
                                                 
50 In a comment on the related working paper version of this chapter, concerns were raised regarding the limited 
number of countries in the following regressions and resulting potential selection bias. However, we do not believe 
this to be an issue. The sample still features countries from all six continents and represents simultaneously the large 
majority of the world population since basically all highly populous nations are included. Furthermore we employ 
continent dummies to address bias of potentially over-represented regions, and we note that related literature operates 
on a similar empirical data basis. 
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examining SAG effects should even be better suited to reduce biases in case women in one part of 
the world get married earlier than somewhere else, irrespective of education levels. It likewise 
considers how men behave in terms of timing for marriage. As a ll of our observations display a 
higher average age for men than for women at marriage, spousal age gaps are consistently positive 
values. For our regression analyses in table 3.3, we examine spousal age gap effects in a simple 
OLS regression (Panel B), and then again instrument the domestic SAG with neighboring values, 
where for consistency reasons we now use the SAG of adjoining countries weighted by shared 
border length (Panel C).  
Finally, we seek further evidence by employing Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
techniques. These allow for a more flexible estimation than least squares methods and further 
address potential endogeneity issues. The specific method chosen is the one-step Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimator, which is based on the idea that our instrumental variables approach so 
far does not exploit all of the information available in the sample, and which also recognizes fixed 
effects (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this GMM context, we may construct more efficient estimates 
of the dynamic panel data model, especially for our panel which is characterized by few time 
periods with many individual cases (countries). However, as the model needs to employ all 
available lags of the specified variables in levels dated t-1 or earlier, our panel is reduced from 
three to two independent observation points per country.  
All results confirm a strong and significant relationship according to our theoretical 
considerations: In panel A, the IV procedure increases the coefficients increase in comparison to 
before, i.e. Female Marriage Age explained by societal conventions displays a greater impact on 
female education. Estimated effects more than double in size in comparison to the OLS results. 
Hence, estimates that do not explicitly address causality (table 3.2) tend to bias down marriage age 
effects.  First stage F-test statistics in the linear model indicate very good identification of our 
instrument, which is always a highly significant predictor for spousal age gaps.51 The IV results 
also remain robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables: in our most comprehensive GMM 
specification, each year a woman postpones marriage translates into a 3.2 percentage points higher 
female completion rate in secondary schooling. For tertiary education, one year of marriage delay 
equals nearly three weeks longer tertiary schooling for women. Note that the sample average in 
the 2000s amounts to only one semester of total university attendance for women; reducing those 
                                                 
51 See table 3.12 in the Appendix for detailed first stage results.  
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twenty weeks by three because of one year earlier marriage means corresponds to a cut by 13 
percent.52  
Moving on to panel B, the relative Marriage Age effects (spousal age gap) appear to have a 
slightly more robust impact on tertiary than on secondary education. The latter is no longer 
significant in either linear or GMM specification if all controls and fixed effects are added to the 
model. In any case, coefficients are now consistently negative which is in accordance with our 
theoretical considerations: The larger the spousal age gap, i.e. the earlier a woman gets married 
relative to the husband, the lower her education. In absolute size the effects are smaller than before. 
This likely reflects the fact that effects from simply “marrying young” are now removed, since we 
only analyze the gender-specific impact from women marrying relatively younger than the 
husband. Also, the lack of instrumentation in panel B is likely to again bias coefficients downwards 
due to reverse causality.  
We therefore employ our described instrument (in this case the average spousal age gap of 
neighboring countries weighted by length of border shared) in panel C. Revisiting the strength of 
our instrument, the first stage F-test values display mostly robustness with regards to common 
threshold levels (Staiger & Stock, 1997). However, we note that once all controls and fixed effects 
are added, the coefficients of spousal age gap in the second stage can no longer be estimated 
precisely enough to maintain significance levels. This suggests that fixed effects capture a lot of 
the rather invariant spousal age gap regressor, which does not fluctuate much over time. Still the 
direction remains unambiguous and coefficients are larger than in panel B. We attribute this again 
to better identification and resolved reverse causality issues, consistent with the observations we 
made when contrasting OLS and IV estimates for absolute Female Marriage Age.  
In our preferred GMM specification with only exogenous controls and fixed effects (columns 
10 and 14), one additional standard deviation of the spousal age gap variable (1.4 years) leads to a 
14 percentage point lower secondary schooling completion rate for girls. It analogously translates 
into about six weeks less of female tertiary education. In the 2000s, Germany and Albania 
displayed roughly such a gap in female educational levels, and correspondingly a spousal age gaps 
of approximately 1.4 years (4.0 years in Albania versus 2.7 years in Germany).
                                                 
52 Our estimates tend to be smaller compared to findings for Bangladesh and India: Field and Ambrus (2008) estimate 
that one additional year of delayed marriage results in 2.6 more months of total education in Bangladesh, while 
Maertens (2013) estimates up to 8.5 months for rural India. We would reconcile the numbers such around three weeks 
of that total additional time can be attributed to tertiary education.  
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Table 3.3: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age 
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Female Marriage Age (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 71 70 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198 142 140 132 142 140 132
Female Marriage Age 3.21 2.09 2.12 3.88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 3.61 3.62 3.23 0.07 0.06 0.05
(0.05)*** (0.67)*** (0.78)*** (1.17)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.58)*** (1.25)*** (1.23)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)**
Fertility -3.98 -4.04 -4.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -3.29 -3.59 -0.01 -0.01
(0.88)*** (0.96)*** (1.54)*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (1.42)** (1.39)*** (0.03) (0.02)
Urbanization 0.03 -0.04 -0.22 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.15 0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.09) (0.18) (0.001)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.22) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 4.04 4.44 63.01 -0.05 0.04 0.09 46.09 37.21 0.17 0.01
(3.84) (4.52) (22.58)*** (0.07) (0.08) (0.30) (17.47) (17.18)** (0.30) (0.29)
Sex ratio at birth -3.67 -27.29 1.70 -0.12 -0.11 -1.09 14.64 -29.19 -0.39 -1.01
(58.43) (62.03) (100.74) (1.00) (1.01) (1.34) (75.29) (78.79) (0.68) (0.69)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 28.68 48.73 112.85 -1.56 -1.20 -1.38 52.42 54.82 -1.19 -0.92
(42.45) (43.76) (60.77)* (0.72)** (0.69)* (0.81)* (51.32) (48.52) (0.98) (0.87)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -32.01 -51.86 -140.22 1.52 1.14 1.27 -69.57 -68.22 0.99 0.83
(45.98) (47.34) (70.74)** (0.78)** (0.76) (0.94) (59.38) (55.63) (1.19) (1.06)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -48.13 -42.67 11.83 -1.64 -1.59 -1.19 8.21 9.81 -0.33 -0.42
(25.46)* (28.48) (42.52) (0.43)*** (0.46)*** (0.57)** (46.61) (47.50) (0.82) (0.75)
French Legal Origin -6.23 -5.98 -0.01 0.02
(2.27)*** (2.51)** (0.04) (0.04)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.05 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.01
(0.06) (0.10) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.12) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 1.42 3.06 0.05 0.11 4.28 0.11
(1.92) (3.05) (0.03)* (0.04)*** (2.17)** (0.03)***
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no no no no no no no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 274.96 52.93 41.05 19.07 274.96 52.93 41.05 19.07
R-squared 0.33 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.59 0.61 0.69
Linear Regression Generalized Method of Moments (GMM Arellano-Bond)
Female Secondary Schooling 
Completion
Average Female Years 
Tertiary EducationFemale Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
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Table 3.3 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age 
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (OLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Number of countries 86 85 81 81 86 85 81 81 86 85 81 86 85 81
Observations 258 255 243 243 258 255 243 243 172 170 162 172 170 162
Spousal Age Gap -3.51 -0.46 -0.60 -0.66 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.76 -0.13 -0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
(0.65)*** (0.23)** (0.79) (1.11) (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01) (0.02)** (0.39)** (0.08)* (1.05) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Fertility -4.70 -4.14 -4.29 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -4.59 -4.06 -0.05 0.02
(0.66)*** (0.76)*** (1.05)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.02) (1.54)*** (1.55)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)
Urbanization 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.01
(0.05)** (0.07) (0.16) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.01) (0.17) (0.16) (0.001)***(0.01)
Share of Muslim population 2.78 2.77 44.21 -0.06 0.02 0.25 15.74 11.96 -0.16 -0.16
(3.40) (3.84) (20.65)** (0.07) 80.07) (0.32) (12.14) (14.02) (0.22) (0.25)
Sex ratio at birth -18.51 -8.22 -28.22 -1.03 -0.42 -3.09 35.67 -1.87 -2.32 -2.91
(53.79) (57.34) (86.71) (1.00) (1.02) (1.35)** (42.59) (50.66) (1.70) (1.68)*
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -68.89 -42.53 -55.03 -3.43 -2.58 -2.87 -93.37 -64.88 -3.46 -2.43
(30.96)** (33.43) (40.72) (0.56)*** (0.58)*** (0.64)*** (33.67)***(36.77)* (0.88)*** (0.77)***
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 69.76 42.95 48.79 3.52 2.62 2.84 93.98 64.28 3.57 2.51
(32.03)** (34.51) (43.28) (0.58)*** (0.60)*** (0.68)*** (35.56)***(38.72)* (0.93)*** (0.83)***
Cum. pop. married at 40 -54.55 -50.25 -33.61 -1.94 -1.76 -1.22 -61.23 -44.79 -1.66 -1.14
(19.77)*** (20.37)*** (25.19) (0.36)*** (0.35)*** (0.39)*** (24.25)***(22.18)** (0.37) (0.37)***
French Legal Origin -5.18 -4.66 0.04 0.08
(2.11)*** (2.26)** (0.04) (0.04)*
Female Labor Force Participation 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01
(0.06) (0.09) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.08) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 3.49 7.60 0.10 0.21 5.38 0.16
(1.47)** (2.26)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (2.21)** (0.04)***
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no no no no no no no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.20 0.52 0.50 0.11 0.26 0.59 0.59 0.44
Linear Regression Generalized Method of Moments (GMM Arellano-Bond)
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
Female Secondary Schooling 
Completion
Average Female Years 
Tertiary Education
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Table 3.3 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age 
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 71 70 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198 142 140 132 142 140 132
Spousal Age Gap -9.15 -0.83 -0.54 112.30 -0.19 -0.09 -0.09 1.14 -6.59 -9.77 -22.51 -0.14 -0.07 -0.25
(1.25)*** (0.40)** (2.95) (255.31) (0.02)*** (0.05)** (0.06)* (2.66) (1.07)*** (4.64)** (15.69) (0.03)*** (0.04)** (0.19)
Fertility -3.76 -3.56 -26.96 -0.01 0.01 -0.24 -4.27 -4.08 -0.05 -0.08
(0.90)*** (0.91)*** (46.59) (0.02) (0.02) (0.49) (2.52)* (6.00) (0.03) (0.06)
Urbanization 0.15 0.11 1.45 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.88 0.01 -0.01
(0.07)** (0.09) (3.89) (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.04) (1.35) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 2.50 4.07 -704.20 0.03 0.09 -7.67 78.79 169.92 -0.02 1.52
(3.78) (3.91) (1687.95) (0.07) (0.07) (17.62) (307.24) (114.21) (1.46) (1.37)
Sex ratio at birth -25.76 -36.83 532.05 0.06 0.17 4.27 63.76 42.77 -0.40 -2.40
(52.16) (56.34) (1481.59) (0.99) (1.06) (15.47) (145.18) (134.47) (1.14) (2.13)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -46.08 -17.95 89.21 -1.87 -1.31 -1.61 -80.65 -1.44 -3.48 -1.86
(34.88) (39.28) (425.02) (0.66)*** (0.74)* (4.43) (76.01) (98.41) (0.98)*** (1.23)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 50.77 22.21 93.39 2.12 1.57 3.63 63.63 -34.15 3.70 1.69
(35.23) (39.18) (408.90) (0.67)*** (0.74) (4.27) (156.10) (123.42) (1.04)*** (1.54)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -71.89 -67.66 -471.59 -2.86 -2.78 -6.07 -79.00 -53.58 -1.97 -1.43
(27.92)*** (28.91)** (910.76) (0.53)*** (0.55)*** (9.51) (77.95) (54.81) (0.46)*** (0.64)**
French Legal Origin -6.40 -6.44 0.02 0.03
(2.03)*** (2.06)*** (0.04) (0.04)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.09 -0.17 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01
(0.06) (0.75) (0.001)** (0.01) (0.17) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 1.52 -6.55 0.04 0.02 12.71 0.23
(1.56) (38.88) (0.03) (0.41) (7.58)* (0.10)**
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no no no no no no no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 76.06 19.68 15.54 8.91 76.06 19.68 15.54 8.91
R-squared 0.24 0.55 0.54 0.03 0.25 0.57 0.57 0.03
Linear Regression Generalized Method of Moments (GMM Arellano-Bond)
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
Female Secondary Schooling 
Completion
Average Female Years 
Tertiary Education
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) and (9)-(11) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns (5)-(8) and (12)-(14) estimate the average years of female tertiary schooling. The regressors are: (i) The Female 
Marriage Age (SMAM) in Panel A, and the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age) in Panels B and C; (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth 
(males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married 
women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. French 
Legal Origin omitted in columns (4), (8), and (9)-(14) because of inclusion of fixed effects, respectively first differences. The GMM estimator in Panel B uses as instrument the regressor itself to mirror the linear OLS scenario. Panels A and C use as instrument the 
weighted average of the absolute, respectively relative Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust 
Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Effects on Female Relative to Male Education 
Our research so far has identified negative effects of young female marriage age as well as 
of large spousal age gaps on female education levels. Our theoretical considerations attribute a 
negative impact on females only, since men’s career prospects are generally not  constrained by 
children and founding a family. The following analysis tests more explicitly if indeed male and 
female education is affected differently.  
For this purpose, we go back to equation (3.1), but employ a re-coded variable as regressor, 
namely the ratio of Male over Female Marriage Age (spousal age gap ratio). Analogously, our 
outcome variable for secondary and tertiary education is now coded as male over female values 
per country. We hence have a quasi diff-in-diff specification, employing relative levels on both 
sides of the equation, as gender ratios in education levels are explained with gender ratios in 
marriage age. Estimating gender-relative education serves to identify the real educational gender 
gap independent of the many other characteristics that potentially influence a country’s level of 
education. Nonetheless, we also include a set of control variables to strengthen our findings, and 
we address endogeneity in the usual way by taking neighboring countries’ values as instruments.53  
Table 3.4 reports econometric results of how gender differences in marriage age translate 
into gender differences in education. There is strong evidence for a gender-discriminating effect 
of marriage age gaps, since larger age gaps also increase the educational gap between men and 
women. This lends strong support to our hypothesis that women’s education is relatively more 
influenced by marriage timing than men’s. Consistent with previous results, estimated effects 
using instruments are again considerably larger when we compare all significant spousal age gap 
ratio regressors of the OLS with the equivalent IV specifications. Our preferred and highly 
significant IV specification with key controls (columns (3) and (7)) suggests that switching from 
the same age of both husband and wife to a scenario where the husband is twice as old (a switch 
in the ratio from one to two) leads to a more than three times higher completion rate for boys than 
girls in secondary schooling, and a nearly eleven times longer time spent at university for male 
than for female adolescents. Results indicate that robustness cannot be held at conventional 
significance levels when including fixed effects on top of other controls. This is likely again due 
                                                 
53 See table 3.13 in the Appendix for detailed first stage results.  
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Table 3.4: Panel for relative male-to-female education levels (ratio)
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (OLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 86 85 81 81 86 85 81 81
Observations 258 255 243 243 258 255 243 243
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 5.32 4.51 1.64 0.85 7.52 4.47 5.38 4.98
(1.32)*** (2.74)* (0.88)* (1.75) (1.97*** (2.26)** (2.67)** (3.43)
Fertility 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.23
(0.07)** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.11)**
Urbanization -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Share of Muslim population -0.22 0.15 -1.66 -0.64 -0.85 -2.67
(0.27) (0.15) (1.20) (0.53) (0.57) (1.61)*
Sex ratio at birth 2.23 3.34 -4.39 -0.39 0.13 -6.21
(2.00) (1.29)*** (5.64) (3.74) (3.45) (3.43)*
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -0.85 -0.14 0.64 2.52 0.33 0.88
(1.68) (1.28) (1.75) (1.89) (1.99) (2.63)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 1.10 0.60 -0.49 -2.71 -0.52 -1.55
(1.67) (1.28) (1.84) (1.91) (1.98) (2.72)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.45 -0.68 0.08 0.45 -0.16 1.68
(1.32) (0.69) (0.95) (1.57) (1.61) (1.75)
French Legal Origin 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.07
(0.18) (0.10) (0.21) (0.23)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.10 0.10 -0.11 -0.03
(0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.22)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.20 0.30 0.54 0.28 0.24 0.33 0.38 0.23
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 7.34 5.24 3.62 -54.17 8.47 9.29 10.71 -36.53
(1.29)*** (2.84)* (1.49)*** (118.00) (0.90)*** (2.75)*** (2.64)*** (91.95)
Fertility 0.27 0.20 1.21 0.14 0.12 0.91
(0.09)*** (0.04)*** (1.96) (0.07)** (0.08) (1.39)
Urbanization -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Share of Muslim population -0.22 0.18 15.69 -0.59 -0.66 11.19
(0.35) (0.18) (37.20) (0.33)* (0.32)** (29.21)
Sex ratio at birth 4.87 4.45 -20.09 -2.07 1.87 -18.91
(5.19) (2.58)* (38.84) (4.38) (4.46) (27.37)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -3.82 -1.96 3.83 2.43 0.07 4.11
(3.51) (1.81) (12.92) (2.84) (3.11) (9.22)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 4.75 2.62 -10.30 -2.35 -0.01 -9.53
(3.56) (1.83) (23.76) (2.89) (3.14) (17.21)
Cum. pop. married at 40 1.35 0.01 16.40 1.05 0.30 14.34
(2.48) (1.19) (35.60) (1.92) (2.02) (26.45)
French Legal Origin 0.27 0.04 -0.17 -0.17
(0.18) (0.09) 0.16 (0.15)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01)* (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Log GDP per Capita -0.14 0.37 -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.82) (0.13) (0.49)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
First stage F-test statistics 216.92 54.75 48.60 5.18 216.92 54.75 48.60 5.18
R-squared 0.21 0.34 0.58 0.01 0.30 0.40 0.44 0.01
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is the ratio of  the male over female population share with a  completed secondary education. Columns (5)-(8)  estimate the ratio of  the male 
over female average years of tertiary schooling. The regressors are: (i) The Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age); (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in 
percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 
years, respectively; (viii) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out 
of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in 
PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. French Legal Origin omitted in columns (4) and (8) because of inclusion of fixed effects. Panel B uses as instrument the weighted average of the 
Spousal Age Gap Ratio of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions 
and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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to the rather invariant spousal age gap ratio which is consequently absorbed into fixed effects so 
that its stand-alone explanatory power decreases.54 
Altogether, the estimates again support the conclusion that educational gender gaps are 
exacerbated by marriage age. Spousal age gaps do not only have a negative effect on female 
education, but this effect is also significantly larger than what we observe for male education. 
Women’s education suffers not only in absolute levels, but also relatively more than men’s when 
an age gap between husband and wife opens up.  
III. 5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND REFINEMENTS 
Alternative Instruments 
In this section we run a number of additional specifications to further check the robustness 
of our results. We begin by employing two alternative instruments to confirm that the conclusions 
drawn so far do not depend on a particular choice of instrumental variable.  
On the one hand, we use as instrument the average female marriage age of five neighboring 
countries. If a country has less than five neighboring countries with a shared land border, we 
include countries in the same (cultural) region to always obtain a balanced group of five. While 
this is a mathematically less deterministic approach than our base instrument, it has the advantage 
of including more countries (especially islands), and of shaping the exposure to neighboring values 
towards countries that have similar cultural customs.  
In a second check we proceed to another alternative instrument to corroborate our findings 
through an entirely different channel. The origin of different gender roles and gender treatment as 
a result of agricultural practices and physiological differences between men and women has 
recently received renewed interest. Following Boserup (1970), Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) 
present findings that link the suitability of a location for cultivating crops that benefitted from plow 
adoption to unequal gender norms today. As these “plow-positive” crops required more body 
strength and force, men assumed the natural role of performing such work. Women, in return, 
adopted primarily roles within the domestic household. The authors argue that these labor division 
                                                 
54 We also tested the impact of three dummies for different female marriage age groups (18-23, 23-28, and 28-32 
years); see table 3.15 in the appendix. The two younger age groups tend to have a marginal negative impact, which 
seems plausible as it reflects that the education of very young women is most adversely affected by entering marriage. 
Nevertheless, the spousal age gap variable keeps robustness in terms of coefficient size and significance, hence spousal 
age gaps maintain their significant impact irrespective of the absolute female age at marriage.  
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practices transformed into norms about the natural role of each gender.55 These persist as cultural 
beliefs even in today’s time, i.e. after the economy has advanced from a traditional agricultural 
structure. Assuming that such views on gender roles are also mirrored in today’s marriage age 
patterns, plow-positive and plow-negative environments represent relevant instruments for our 
analysis. 
Traditionally, education and schooling were a privilege reserved to very few in society, who 
were not representative of the agricultural workforce. It is implausible to think that girls and boys, 
respectively their parents, would have decided on marriage age back then as a consequence of 
schooling, simply because there was virtually no schooling. Few cases of mandatory schooling 
were limited to basic primary education, which would not interfere with adolescence and related 
marriage decision. Widespread education only appeared in Europe and North America when 
industrialization began – hence precisely once the economy moved away from its traditional 
agricultural character (Barnard, 1969; Cordasco, 1976; Maynes, 1985; Mulhern, 1959; Too, 2001). 
In other, less developed parts of the world, general schooling has only emerged in the second half 
of the twentieth century (Lockheed & Verspoor, 1992). In summary, education appeared only 
relatively recently in time, and hence could not have possibly influenced traditionally anchored 
gender roles and the associated female marriage age. In contrast, the cultural heritage of 
agricultural economic reasons on gender roles is likely important in the decision-making of when 
a woman should get married. Thus, we believe that plow-positive and plow-negative environments 
could serve as valid instruments. Note that we cannot run this model with fixed effects since our 
invariant instrument variables would be omitted from the analysis. We therefore estimate a random 
effects model, but include continent dummies as additional control to proxy geographical fixed 
effects.  
Table 3.5 summarizes the empirical results for spousal age gap effects on female education, 
when the former is instrumented with our two alternative variables presented. Coefficients closely 
correspond to the preferred instrument as used in tables 3.3 and 3.4, but the estimates are 
comparatively less precise. Given the known strength of our other control variables for impacting 
female education, full robustness is difficult to achieve when employing this relatively weaker 
instrument and including all covariates (see table 3.16 in the appendix for first stage results). 
                                                 
55 The line or argument is supported by Gimbutas (2007) who finds that prior to the invention of the plow, societies 
tended to be matriarchal and more equal. Hodder (2005) argues similarly.  
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Overall, the additional IV results using our alternative instruments are nonetheless economically 
meaningful. In particular, the sign of coefficients is as expected in 14 out of 16 cases (negative for 
spousal age gaps, and positive for spousal age gap ratio), suggesting that spousal age gaps causally 
and negatively affect female education. 
 
Alternative measures for educational gender inequality 
We introduce additional outcome variables designed to reaffirm that we correctly measure 
educational gender inequality. We first adopt the gender parity in literacy (GPI) index by the 
UNESCO (2013). Literacy rates also serves as category of human capital beyond formal 
educational attainment measures. The latter are criticized for ignoring human capital accumulated 
outside schooling (Barro & Lee, 2013). As this variable is not available for our panel data, we 
move to a cross-section analysis, taking the latest time interval averaging the years 2000-2010. We 
also look at primary schooling completion rates of boys relative to girls. So far we analyzed 
secondary and tertiary schooling, since this is when we would expect marriage decisions to 
Table 3.5: Panel for level of female education using alternative instruments
Instrument employed
Panel A: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Number of countries 86 81 86 81 86 81 86 81
Observations 258 243 258 243 258 243 258 243
Spousal Age Gap -6.79 7.77 -0.15 -0.10 -7.76 -0.19 -0.17 -0.12
(1.03)*** (11.37) (0.02)*** (0.16) (1.77)*** (0.29) (0.04)*** (0.05)**
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Country fixed effects no yes no yes no no no no
First stage F-test statistics 161.20 2.02 161.20 2.02 25.43 5.98 25.43 5.98
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.26 0.33 0.20 0.49 0.26 0.51
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Number of countries 86 81 86 81 86 81 86 81
Observations 258 243 258 243 258 243 258 243
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 11.85 20.64 20.73 200.37 5.66 2.47 6.61 -1.49
(3.64)*** (36.03) (5.81)*** (1558.84) (1.90)*** (2.83) (2.13)*** (7.51)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Country fixed effects no yes no yes no no no no
First stage F-test statistics 17.03 0.44 17.03 0.44 29.02 5.77 29.02 5.77
R-squared 0.21 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.20 0.54 0.24 0.30
Secondary Schooling 
Completion Ratio
Average Years 
Tertiary Education 
Ratio
Secondary Schooling 
Completion Ratio
Average Years Tertiary 
Education Ratio
Average of 5 neighboring countries Plow-environment
Female Secondary 
Schooling Completion
Average Female Years 
Tertiary Education
Female Secondary 
Schooling Completion
Average Female Years 
Tertiary Education
Notes: The dependent variable in panel A, column (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) in 
panel A estimate the average years of female tertiary schooling. The dependent variable in Panel B column (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) is the ratio of  the male over female population share 
with a  completed secondary education. Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) in panel B estimate the ratio of  the male over female average years of tertiary schooling. The Spousal Age Gap is 
the Male minus Female Marriage Age and the Spousal Age Gap Ratio the Male over Female Marriage Age. Additional Controls are i) the total fertility rate; (ii) the level of 
urbanization in percent; (iii) the share of muslim population per country; (iv)-(vi) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of 
girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (vii) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of 
married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (viii) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (ix) the percentage of females in the 
national labor force; (x) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; and (xi) six continent dummies for columns (6) and (8). Columns (1)-(4) use as instrument the average of the spousal 
age gap, respectively the spousal age gap ratio, of five neighboring countries; columns (5)-(8) use as instrument plow-positive and plow-negative environment (Alesina et al., 2013). 
See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. 
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interfere most. Put differently, we hypothesize boys and girls to plan primary schooling 
independent of anticipated marriage age so that its explanatory power should be low in this case.  
Table 3.6 lists the results for the GPI, respectively primary schooling outcome variable, 
where OLS, IV, and the quasi diff-in-diff method are each summarized in panels A through C. For 
the GPI we adopt the UNESCO coding, which calculates this variable as female over male literacy 
rates and is inverse to the ratios of primary schooling in columns (4) to (6) (and likewise inverse 
to the secondary and tertiary schooling ratios we analyzed before). Therefore, we would expect a 
negative sign for the GPI, as a relatively younger women (i.e. a larger spousal age gap variable) 
should reduce literacy equality by lowering the numerator. The findings indicate indeed clear 
evidence for the negative impact of spousal age gaps on gender parity in literacy. Coefficients are 
always significant at the one percent level, and also large in absolute terms. The estimates suggest 
for example that one additional year between husband and wife has a larger effect on equal literacy 
levels between men and women than an increase in income levels by one log unit. In the IV 
specification with full controls, an increase of the spousal age gap by one year leads to a reduction 
of the gender parity in literacy by ten percentage points – roughly the difference between Italy and 
Iran. Lastly, also the spousal age gap ratio is highly significant and negative. This means that a 
one unit change in the spousal age gap ratio causes a roughly two times inverse effect on the 
female-to-male literacy ratio.  
Marriage age effects on the pure attainment measure of primary schooling are mixed, which 
is actually in line with our expectations: primary schooling is basic education and not yet 
systematically influenced by marriage decisions. The findings also indicate that primary schooling 
does not fully explain differences in literacy rates as measure by the GPI. This suggests that more 
time is required, i.e. enrollment into secondary schooling, to reach proper literacy. We have 
documented earlier that marriage age does affect female secondary schooling.  
In a further approach towards alternative outcome variables, we examine effects on the 
female average years of total schooling per country, both in absolute terms, and relative to the 
male average years of schooling (see table 3.17 in the appendix). This allows to consider the impact 
on primary, secondary, and tertiary education in an integrated perspective. Results indicate that 
the marriage age for women remains a largely robust and significant determinant for their overall 
education, both in absolute and in relative perspective. For instance, each year of marriage delay 
translates into about four months of longer total schooling. Hence, we are able to show that the 
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total length of education is affected by marriage timing, consistent with our theoretical 
considerations.  
 
Table 3.6: Cross-section for alternative education outcome variables 
2000s: Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Spousal Age Gap (OLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 135 129 111 133 131 119
Spousal Age Gap -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.44 0.07 -0.04
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.17)*** (0.26) (0.04)
Fertility -0.06 -0.05 0.97 0.17
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.27)*** (0.04)
Urbanization 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population -0.07 -0.04 -0.18 0.29
(0.03)** (0.04) (0.93) (0.15)*
Sex ratio at birth -0.74 -0.57 5.95 1.54
(0.42)* (0.48) (13.68) (1.87)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -0.87 -0.22 -7.23 -0.29
(0.46)* (0.59) (10.99) (1.65)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 0.85 0.26 8.36 0.44
(0.46)* (0.60) (11.07) (1.65)
Cum. pop. married at 40 0.21 0.39 0.07 -0.88
(0.23) (0.31) (7.33) (0.99)
French Legal Origin -0.04 -0.03 0.82 0.08
(0.02)** (0.02) (0.57) (0.08)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.06)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
R-squared 0.43 0.68 0.65 0.04 0.10 0.32
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 109 106 96 114 113 103
Spousal Age Gap -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.27 -1.76 -0.02
(0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.27) (0.93)* (0.07)
Fertility -0.02 -0.03 1.54 0.12
(0.02) (0.02)* (0.43)*** (0.04)***
Urbanization -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 0.11 -0.10 2.54 0.22
(0.08) (0.07) (1.86) (0.16)
Sex ratio at birth -0.19 0.03 28.57 2.39
(0.64) (0.62) (18.85) (1.67)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -1.23 -0.25 -1.20 0.45
(0.66)* (0.80) (14.58) (1.62)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 1.41 0.41 3.70 -0.32
(0.67)** (0.78) (14.52) (1.59)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.54 -0.22 -11.67 -0.53
(0.53) (0.46) (11.75) (1.02)
French Legal Origin -0.06 -0.04 1.35 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.74)* (0.07)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.05)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 101.94 10.88 15.98 111.40 14.04 19.96
R-squared 0.35 0.52 0.58 0.04 0.01 0.41
Gender Parity in Literacy (GPI) Primary Schooling Completion Ratio
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Additional Controls and Test on Unobservables 
Next we examine whether effects remain robust if we include a set of additional controls. 
We begin by considering potential issues around the country selection in our data sample. As our 
objective is to provide conclusions that are valid independent of geographies, we already include 
continent dummies regularly in our regressions. We also noted earlier that we include countries 
from all world regions so that selection bias seems unlikely. Here, we revisit the question whether 
our proposed relationship between marriage age and education depends on the state of 
development in a country. We systematically control for income levels and state of urbanization 
in our estimates, which should capture this cross-country variation reasonably well. In addition, 
Table 3.6 continued: Cross-section foralternative education outcome variables 
2000s: Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 109 106 96 132 130 118
Spousal Age Gap Ratio -2.05 -1.90 -1.59 3.28 -51.46 -4.02
(0.21)*** (0.68)*** (0.48)*** (4.30) (24.87)** (1.83)**
Fertility -0.01 -0.03 2.08 0.22
(0.02) (0.02)* (0.64)*** (0.05)***
Urbanization -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 0.01 0.01 3.49 0.48
(0.06) (0.05) (2.09)* (0.19)***
Sex ratio at birth 0.10 0.04 39.49 3.43
(0.64) (0.56) (24.18)* (2.18)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -0.42 0.41 8.43 1.07
(0.60) (0.67) (16.60) (1.86)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 0.43 -0.36 -6.17 -0.92
(0.60) (0.67) (16.48) (1.86)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.01 0.27 -17.15 -1.63
(0.30) (0.34) (12.71) (1.12)
French Legal Origin -0.04 -0.02 1.15 0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.80) (0.08)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.06)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 89.34 9.54 18.86 106.78 7.94 16.82
R-squared 0.39 0.51 0.60 0.04 0.01 0.25
Gender Parity in Literacy (GPI) Primary Schooling Completion Ratio
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the Gender Parity in Literacy Index (GPI), and in (4)-(6) the ratio of male over female primary schooling 
completion rates. The regressors are: (i) Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age), respectively Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Male over Female 
Marriage Age); (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at 
birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the cumulative 
percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of total 
female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the 
log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. Panels B and C use as instrument the weighted average of the spousal age gap (ratio) of 
adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable 
definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
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when including fixed effects, the country-specific “poverty” versus “wealth” effects should be 
removed as well.  
Nonetheless, we now test more explicitly if marriage age effects on education are present in 
developing countries only. We include a dummy in our panel data for all OECD countries, which 
indicates an advancement from a development state to more sustained prosperity. The empirical 
estimates show that the results obtained so far are robust to the inclusion of this control (see table 
3.18 in the appendix). The OECD dummy obviously has a positive effect on female education, but 
not at the expense of our core variable of interest, be it Female Marriage Age or the Spousal Age 
Gap. We also employ an alternative dummy as cross-check, which codes all developing countries 
with one; consistently, the coefficient for this dummy turns negative but again our core variable of 
interest remains robust.56 Thus we correctly attribute educational gender differences to marriage 
age, as the simple distinction of developing versus developed country is not able to better explain 
our dependent variable.57 
The second dimension of additional controls relates to gender discrimination variables. 
These, however, are not available for the entire timeframe of our panel so that data restrictions 
suggest a cross-section, averaging the years 2000-2010. We summarize in table 3.7 the estimates 
for the quasi diff-in-diff specification, extended by a comprehensive list of covariates which have 
been proposed in the literature for gender discrimination in education (Barro & Lee, 2013; Cohen 
& Soto, 2007; Ross, 2008). The objective is to check whether the effect of spousal age gaps can in 
fact be closely replicated by employing commonly used variables of gender discrimination.  
First we add as variable the legal minimum marriage age for women. It might be that our 
proposed causal relationship is biased from legal restrictions on marriage age which are different 
for each country. This could be particularly relevant towards the later stages of education when 
minimum marriage age laws potentially act as additional barrier against marring young and 
quitting education. The empirical results cannot support such a hypothesis. However, the fact that 
the inclusion of this control does not render the spousal age gap ratio insignificant strengthens the 
main results of this work. There is additional potential for educational gender equality through  
                                                 
56 The same effect can be observed when coding all African countries with one, i.e. an African regional dummy does 
not change the core results. 
57 We note that the OECD dummy has a more significant effect on tertiary than on secondary education. Also, we 
experimented with regressions for a sample that excludes all OECD countries. However, we consider the remaining 
number of developing countries (ca. 40) as too small, and it likewise overly limits the degrees of freedom when 
including our sizeable set of regular controls. Hence, estimates appear unreliable and we do not pursue them further. 
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Table 3.7: Cross-section for educational gender inequality with discrimination controls
Panel A 
2000s: Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 118 113 113 105 105 105 105 90
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 4.30 3.44 4.29 5.02 4.34 4.37 4.29 4.60
(2.16)** (2.02)* (2.27)** (2.27)** (2.24)** (2.27)** (2.22)** (2.36)**
Minimum Legal Marriage Age -0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
Gender Inequality Index (GII) 0.26 0.51
(0.50) (0.83)
Women Treated with Respect -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Women's economic rights 0.04 -0.15
(0.10) (0.17)
Women's political rights 0.11 0.24
(0.07) (0.13)*
Women's social rights 0.06 0.13
(0.08) (0.15)
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 10.73 10.98 9.39 9.73 10.68 10.23 10.50 6.90
R-squared 0.24 0.34 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.28
Panel B 
2000s: Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 118 113 113 105 105 105 105 90
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 10.44 10.28 10.67 12.15 10.65 10.93 10.80 14.91
(5.11)** (5.24)** (5.34)** (5.38)** (5.09)** (5.22)** (5.12)** (6.54)**
Minimum Legal Marriage Age 0.11 0.25
(0.07) (0.10)***
Gender Inequality Index (GII) -1.23 -1.68
(1.03) (1.77)
Women Treated with Respect 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Women's economic rights 0.27 0.04
(0.19) (0.42)
Women's political rights 0.20 0.21
(0.13) (0.23)
Women's social rights 0.10 0.01
(0.15) (0.31)
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 10.73 10.98 9.39 9.73 10.68 10.23 10.50 6.90
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.04
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio
Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio
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reducing spousal age gaps, on top of what current marriage age legislation already attempts to 
mitigate. We then consider the Gender Inequality Index (UNDP, 2013) which measures gender 
inequality along three dimensions and reaches values of zero for total equality. This also leaves 
our core relationship between spousal age gaps and educational inequality unaffected.  
A further gender discrimination variable tested deviates from an aggregate index perspective. 
We control for the percentage of agreement among females to a question from the 2014 Gallup 
World Poll.58 Women are asked whether they “believe that women in this country are treated with 
respect and dignity”. This survey variable on gender equality sentiment per country represents a 
different perspective on discrimination than aggregate indices. Nonetheless, our results remain 
robust to the inclusion of this variable as well.  
                                                 
58 We take the values from the dataset comprising the 2014 Social Progress Index (Porter, Stern, & Green, 2014).  
Table 3.7 continued: Cross-section for educational gender inequality with discrimination controls
Panel C
2000s: Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 110 103 101 93 99 99 99 75
Spousal Age Gap Ratio -1.59 -1.46 -1.69 -1.69 -1.54 -1.60 -1.55 -1.40
(0.61)*** (0.66)** (0.80)** (0.71)** (0.60)*** (0.63)*** (0.61)*** (0.94)
Minimum Legal Marriage Age 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Gender Inequality Index (GII) 0.01 -0.13
(0.17) (0.27)
Women Treated with Respect -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Women's economic rights -0.03 -0.01
(0.04) 80.07)
Women's political rights -0.02 -0.09
(0.03) (0.05)*
Women's social rights -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.05)
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage F-test statistics 16.45 13.50 9.49 12.79 15.75 14.03 12.88 5.26
R-squared 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.67
Gender Parity in Literacy (GPI)
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the ratio of  the male over female population share with a  completed secondary education. Panel B estimates the 
ratio of  the male over female average years of tertiary schooling, and Panel C estimates the Gender Parity in Literacy Index (GPI).  The regressors are: (i) The 
Spousal Age Gap ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age); (ii) the minimum legal age of marriage for women without parental consent, taken from the United 
Nations Statistics Division ; (iii) the Gender Inequality Index from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); (iv) the percentage of female 
respondents answering yes to the question, “Do you believe that women in this country are treated with respect and dignity, or not?”, and taken from Gallup 
World Poll; (v)-(vii) three female discrimination measures as taken from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project; (viii) is a vector of additional controls: the total 
fertility rate; the level of urbanization in percent; the share of muslim population per country;  the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate 
of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male 
population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); dummy whether the country's legal origin 
is based on French system; the percentage of females in the national labor force;  the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; six continent dummies.Spousal Age 
Gap Ratio is instrumented by the weighted average of the spousal age gap ratio of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to 
relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** 
,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Finally, we test three control variables for female discrimination as measured through the 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. These have no material impact on our variable 
of interest. Even when all discrimination variables are included simultaneously (column 8 per 
panel), our core relationship remains very stable, and significant in two out of three cases. 
However, in those specifications we note serious finite sample bias as reflected in low first stage 
F-values. Overall, results remain robust, and the coefficients for secondary and tertiary education 
are also similar to the panel estimates presented earlier (table 3.4, panel B).  
Robustness is examined along a further dimension, namely potential endogeneity arising 
from omitted variable bias. Following Oster (2014), we run a test which exploits the variation of 
the coefficient β1 of our key variable of interest (we take here the spousal age gap ratio) when 
including observed control variables in the regression. The objective is to minimize potential 
omitted variable bias. The method by Oster suggests that if the inclusion of observed covariates 
increases the explanatory power (R-squared) of the model substantially, but changes β1 only 
marginally, then potential unobserved variables should not much affect the coefficient either, since 
the included controls capture already what the researcher considered as most relevant for a 
potential bias. This allows to determine the so-called identified set, which we calculate under the 
most conservative assumptions of equal selection between observed and unobserved controls  
(𝛿 ̃ = 1) and a maximum potential value for R-squared (Rmax = 1). If this set excludes zero, we 
may conclude that results are robust to potential omitted variable bias. We run the analysis for the 
cross-section of the 2000s.  
 
Table 3.8: Oster (2014) tests: Potential bias from unobservables in cross-section
Dependent variable = 
Secondary Schooling 
Completion Ratio
Average Years 
Tertiary Education 
Ratio GPI Adult Literacy
2.848 8.462 -2.054
4.297 10.439 -1.588
0.078 0.277 0.391
0.244 0.288 0.604
[4.297, 10.934] [10.439, 138.404] [-1.588, -0.72019]
Zero excluded from identified set? yes yes yes
Uncontrolled   1
Controlled   1
Uncontrolled    
Controlled   
Identified set [  1 , β1*']
Notes: This procedure of assessing potential bias from unobserved variables by looking at movements in coefficients for spousal age gap, and the R-
squared when including observed covariates has been developed by Oster (2014). It is based on previous work by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005, 
2008). The uncontrolled   1 is calculated without including any additional controls, while the controlled   1 employs all regular control variables as 
seen in table 3.7 (column (1) in panels A through C). β1* is calculated with an assumed value of 𝛿 ̃ = 1, and Rmax = 1. 
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Results, presented in table 3.8, are reassuring for all three outcome variables.  The identified 
set remains fully robust, as zero is excluded for all three specifications. We conclude that effects 
of unobserved controls are highly unlikely to have a sizeable impact on the observed effect of 
spousal age gaps on gender inequality in secondary schooling, tertiary education, and adult 
literacy. 
Generational Effects of Marriage Age 
Based on an intra-generational perspective, we have previously argued that societal 
expectations at a given period regarding the “ideal timing” for marriage act as underlying 
mechanism. Now we want to investigate whether there might be an alternative channel to current 
societal expectations, namely the traditional legacy of parental marriage age. This would imply 
intergenerational effects from spousal age gaps on education which we could not capture thus far. 
In that line of thought, the hypothesis here tests whether the age gap between husband and wife 
also affects their children's education by disadvantaging the daughters. This is because in addition 
to current societal expectations, female children would be expected to time their marriage also 
based on the parents’ tradition, so that returns from educational investments in girls would depend 
on that factor as well. This would ultimately suggest that children's education is partly pre-
determined by the relative marriage age of their parents. 
For our inter-generational extension, individual-level data which would directly link the 
spousal age gap of the actual parents to their daughters’ education levels are not available. We 
have to resort to a 20-year lag of the average national spousal age gap ratio as explanatory variable, 
which proxies a one generation timeframe. We then measure effects on female education levels, 
keeping our regular instrumentation specification in addition to the built-in time lag. Data 
availability for marriage age allows to estimate this specification only for education levels in the 
2000s, using parental marriage age data from the 1980s.  
Results are given in table 3.9. The estimates indicate a clearly significant effect from the 
parental generation marriage age pattern to current educational gender inequality. Doubling the 
age gap between “mother and father” is associated with a three times higher inequality between 
“son and daughter” in secondary schooling, and even ten times higher inequality in tertiary 
education; literacy inequality would be increased by a factor of 1.2. The figures confirm findings 
by Sekhri and Debnath (2014) on the role of parental marriage age for children’s education, but 
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we add the perspective that parental marriage age also impacts educational equality between boys 
and girls. In summary, spousal age gaps do not only affect the education within a generation, but 
also potentially impact educational gender equality of the children's generation.59 
 
Marriage Age Effects on Further Aspects of Gender Inequality 
Finally, in table 3.10, we investigate whether spousal age gaps affect further spheres of 
gender inequality. We first re-visit educational gender inequality and address the notion that 
measurement issues of human capital focusing on school attainment have received criticism 
(Hanushek, 2015). The quality of education has been proposed as another important and 
complementary variable to quantitative enrollment rates, as it measures the effectiveness of 
accumulating human capital (Castelló-Climent & Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2012; Hanushek & 
Woessmann, 2009).60 We hence employ the PISA 2006 data set for our latest time interval as 
alternative outcome variable. We then attempt to estimate the ratio of national test scores of boys 
over girls. Results suggest that there is no robust relationship between test scores and spousal age 
gaps. Thus, spousal age gaps are an important determinant for how long a young female attends 
                                                 
59 We also ran an alternative specification using ten year lags of spousal age gaps, with similar effects. In general, 
previous spousal age gaps predict spousal age gaps for the next decade highly significantly, but with a coefficient of 
ca. 0.6, so effects decrease in absolute terms over time.  
60 Barro and Lee (2013) note that educational attainment and human capital quality measures show high correlation, 
but still the latter appears more diverse for countries with similar levels of educational attainment. Guiso et al. (2008) 
explicitly relate the achievement gap between boys and girls in PISA text exams with indicators of a gender -equal 
culture. However, Fryer and Levitt (2010) show that results are not robust to including a group of Middle Eastern 
countries. 
Table 3.9: Cross-section for educational gender inequality effects from parental generation
2000s
Dependent variable = 
Spousal Age Gap Ratio (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 87 79 87 79 76 68
Spousal Age Gap Ratio Parental Generation 4.22 2.98 6.69 9.78 -1.60 -1.21
(1.12)*** (1.60)* (1.67)*** (4.43)** (0.17)*** (0.68)*
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes
First stage F-test statistics 88.98 16.86 88.98 16.86 98.44 11.04
R-squared 0.10 0.37 0.20 0.09 0.54 0.72
Secondary Schooling 
Completion Ratio
Average Years Tertiary 
Education Ratio
Gender Parity in Literacy 
(GPI)
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(2) is the ratio of  the male over female population share with a  completed secondary education. Columns (3)-(4) estimate the 
ratio of  the male over female average years of tertiary schooling, and columns (5) - (6) estimate the Gender Parity in Literacy Index (GPI).  The regressors are: (i) The 
Spousal Age Gap ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age), and Additional Controls: (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of 
muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, 
respectively; (viii) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the 
age of 40 (out of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of females in the national labor force; 
(xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. Spousal Age Gap Ratio is instrumented by the weighted average of the spousal age gap ratio of 
adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and 
sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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schooling in the first place. Once this tollgate of (potential) gender discrimination has been passed, 
there is no empirical evidence that the subsequent quality of education received should differ 
between genders depending on the marriage age. Admittedly though, the sample size is limited, 
and results may show selection bias since the test scores are only collected for girls who could 
enroll to school, i.e. girls who suffered less from educational gender inequality in the first place. 
For our remaining two outcome variables that measure further aspects of gender inequality and 
female discrimination, we find strong and robust effects. Spousal age gaps are associated with a 
significant increase in teenage pregnancies that is also large in absolute size and robust to fertility 
levels in a country. We interpret this as supporting evidence for our proposed conceptual 
framework: marrying (relatively) earlier as a woman means a significantly higher likelihood to 
also conceive children early, i.e. a higher teenage pregnancy rate. Consequently, because of young 
marriage age and subsequent child-rearing, women drop out of the labor market at a comparatively 
younger age, which reduces their expected return on education investments. Similarly, larger 
husband-wife age gaps decrease female participation in politics as measured through the 
proportion of seats in parliament. Based on this additional evidence of spousal age gaps affecting 
Table 3.10: Further gender inequality effects from spousal age gaps
2000s
Dependent variable = 
Spousal Age Gap Ratio (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 49 48 150 133 139 120
Spousal Age Gap Ratio -0.33 -0.07 474.15 228.38 -56.39 -54.28
(0.15)** (0.31) (42.52)*** (79.63)*** (12.99)*** (27.04)**
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes
First stage F-test statistics 36.06 8.69 69.68 22.39 80.16 24.20
R-squared 0.01 0.54 0.51 0.84 0.07 0.36
Quality of Schooling 
(PISA scores) male 
relative to female Adolescent births Women in Politics
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(2) is the ratio of  the male over female student performance on the science scale for the 
PISA test 2006. Columns (3)-(4) estimate the number of births to women with age 15–19 per 1,000 women with age 15–19. Columns 
(5)-(6) are the proportion of seats in parliament held by women, measured in 2000. The variable ranges from 0 to 100. The regressors 
are: (i) The Spousal Age Gap ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age), and Additional Controls: (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the 
level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), 
and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the cumulative percentage 
of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 
(out of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage of
females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. Spousal Age Gap Ratio is 
instrumented by the weighted average of the spousal age gap ratio of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are
according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard 
Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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gender inequality we are confident that the core argument of this study – the causal link from 
marriage age to educational gender inequality – is no accidental empirical finding, but part of a 
broader robust pattern.  
III. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Bridging the gender gap in education is a key challenge in the world, as women on average 
still receive less schooling than men, which affects their livelihoods as well as the growth prospects 
of a country. Equal opportunities for women and economic development are closely interrelated, 
but the interrelationships are often too weak to be self-sustaining so that public policies are needed 
(Duflo, 2012). One specific societal aspect that falls under potential policy intervention relates to 
the minimum marriage age. Entering marriage early as a girl or young woman is widely associated 
with a lack of gender equality. 
This chapter investigated how marriage age influences female education and educational 
gender inequality. Specifically, we answered the question whether getting married younger as a 
woman, both in absolute perspective and in comparison to the husband’s age, leads to worse female 
education. Since marriage is still widely the only socially accepted institution for conceiving 
children, the anticipated marriage age also proxies the expected age of first birth for women. 
Hence, the earlier a woman on average expects to get married, the shorter will be her anticipated 
pay-off to educational investments. Acting rationally, that investment will be adjusted downwards 
already ex ante, so that in essence lower female marriage age leads to lower female education. 
We proceeded to empirically support our hypothesis by estimating marriage age effects on 
various measures of female education. Specifically, we applied a global cross-country panel data 
set from 1980-2010, in which we instrumented the domestic female marriage age with an average 
of the marriage age in adjacent countries weighted by shared land border. The absolute female age 
at marriage has indeed a highly significant effect on female education: In our preferred 
specification, each year of marriage postponement for women leads to a three percentage points 
higher female completion rate in secondary schooling, and to about three weeks longer female 
tertiary education.  
We then moved to examining spousal age gap effects, i.e. female relative to male marriage 
age, to address potential biases in case women in one part of the world get married earlier than 
somewhere else, irrespective of education levels. We obtained similarly robust effects in our panel, 
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where each additional year between husband and wife lowers the female secondary schooling 
completion rate by 10 percentage points, and cuts the time women spend at university by one 
month. Finally, quasi diff-in-diff specifications indicated that spousal age gaps affect female 
education significantly more negatively than male education. Numerous robustness checks 
confirmed our findings, and in a cross-section we conducted a number of refinement analyses. 
Estimates suggested that gender parity in literacy is strongly affected by spousal age gaps, but pure 
primary schooling attainment is not. Moreover, the marriage pattern of the parental generation also 
influences the children’s educational gender inequality. Importantly, we documented that marriage 
age and conventional measures of gender discrimination do not act as substitutes. 
Building up human capital through sufficient education is a key mechanism to empower 
women. In addition to compulsory schooling laws, our results suggest that governments have the 
regulation of minimum marriage age at their disposal to influence how much schooling young 
females receive. A lower barrier for marriage age in our framework would set a minimum threshold 
of “guaranteed” pay-off to educational investments, since the likelihood of women becoming 
mothers at a young age and thus dropping out of the labor market from early on decreases. In 
contrast to legal boundaries for fertility or maternal age at first birth, both of which raise strong 
ethical concerns especially with regards to implementation enforcements, marriage age as the 
underlying cause lends itself much better to formal regulation. In essence we believe that 
pregnancy rates at very young ages, which likely lead to female drop-out of education and thus 
gender gaps in education, could be effectively reduced by enforcing adequate minimum marriage 
age laws. 
We recognize that our macro-perspective does not allow to account for individual differences 
in skills and ability, which may make further education unsuitable independent of marriage plans. 
Furthermore, there are of course more dimensions than human capital where gender equality is 
critical, such as access to markets and decision-making power within the household, political 
empowerment, health, and many more. But with the documented gender-specific negative impact 
of a young female marriage age on female education, the case for more rigorous minimum 
marriage age laws around the world appears to be justified. 
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Anticipated labor 
market effects from 
marriage/ children
Anticipated pay-
off to educational 
investments
Resulting ex-
ante decision 
on educational 
investments
(Exogenous) 
societal 
expectations
Boundary conditions Effects on female labor and education
1 2 3 4 5
Expected 
marriage 
age for 
women 
Subsequent 
imminent 
childbearing
In conjunction: marriage 
as usually the only socially 
acceptable institution for 
conceiving children Observable effect
Early drop-
out: Less time 
in labor market 
Lower 
pay-off 
returns
Lower 
educa-
tion
Appendix Table 3.11: Hausman Test
1980-2010 
Dependent variable = 
Fixed Random Difference St. Error Fixed Random Difference St. Error
Female Marriage Age 1.1477 0.8334 0.3143 0.2322 0.0238 0.0230 0.0008 0.0029
Fertility -3.5572 -3.3160 -0.2412 0.7745 0.0132 0.0136 -0.0004 0.0105
Urbanization -0.0043 0.0268 -0.0311 0.1438 0.0023 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0021
Share of Muslim population 46.0170 2.4950 43.5220 18.3068 0.0924 0.0266 0.0659 0.2853
Sex ratio at birth -4.4022 -6.9957 2.5935 2.0934 -0.0861 -0.0879 0.0018 <0.0001
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -18.0639 -13.2141 -4.8498 25.3503 -2.2736 -1.7060 -0.5676 0.3036
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 3.3904 3.6200 -0.2300 29.9149 2.0977 1.3733 0.7244 0.3811
Cum. pop. married at 40 -17.0570 -30.9666 13.9097 14.4322 -1.0577 -1.2918 0.2341 0.1691
French Legal Origin
Female Labor Force Participation -0.0798 0.0375 -0.1173 0.0617 0.0031 0.0042 -0.0011 0.0008
Log GDP per Capita 5.9773 1.9485 4.0288 1.6563 0.1564 0.0827 0.0737 0.0220
Chi-Square (p-value)
Average Female Years Tertiary EducationFemale Secondary Schooling Completion
26.50 (0.003) 57.12 (<0.001)
n/a (omitted because of collinearity)
Appendix Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for female marriage age effects on female 
education 
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1980-2010 (IV First Stage) 
Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198
Female Marriage Age of Bordering Countries 0.79 0.51 0.46 0.42
(0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.10)***
Spousal Age Gap of Bordering Countries -0.25 -0.15 -0.13 0.01
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)
Fertility -0.28 -0.29 -0.42 0.09 0.02 0.19
(0.16)* (0.17)* (0.26)* (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)**
Urbanization 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.01)*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)
Share of Muslim population -0.28 -0.21 -4.05 1.26 0.94 6.69
(0.79) (0.90) (4.14) (0.25)*** (0.28)*** (1.41)***
Sex ratio at birth -4.91 1.17 -4.84 1.65 -4.21 -4.89
(11.95) (12.35) (19.57) (4.65) (4.78) (6.64)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -19.71 -16.25 -17.84 -2.03 -0.40 -0.41
(7.36)*** (7.61)** (9.80)* (3.25) (3.40) (3.32)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 22.39 18.86 23.24 3.91 2.35 -1.28
(7.75)*** (8.00)** (10.73)** (3.36) (3.49) (3.64)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -10.22 -13.04 -15.74 -7.18 -6.56 3.76
(4.69)** (4.74)*** (6.39)** (2.14)*** (2.16)*** (2.17)
French Legal Origin -0.54 -0.48 0.56 0.45
(0.47) (0.50) (0.14)*** (0.15)***
Female Labor Force Participation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.84 0.79 -0.06 0.11
(0.33)*** (0.53) (0.13) (0.18)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
F-test 274.96 52.93 41.05 19.07 76.06 19.68 15.54 8.91
Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.64
Anderson LM test (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.64
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  274.96 52.93 41.05 19.07 76.06 19.68 15.54 8.91
   Stock-Yogo critical values 10%
   Stock-Yogo critical values 25%
R-squared 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.60 0.27 0.69 0.68 0.24
16.38
5.53
Appendix Table 3.12: First stage of panel for level of female education, absolute and relative
Female Marriage Age (Panel A) Spousal Age Gap (Panel C)
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is the Female Marriage Age. Columns (5)-(8) estimate the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age).  The regressors are: 
(i) The weighted average of the Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border; (ii) the weighted 
average of the Spousal Age Gap of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border; (iii) the total fertility rate; (iv) the level 
of urbanization in percent; (v) the share of muslim population per country; (vi) the sex ratio at birth (males over females); (vii) the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls 
under 5, and (viii) under 15 years, respectively; (ix) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of 
married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (x) a dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (xi) the percentage of females in the 
national labor force;  (xii) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xiii) six continent dummies. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard 
 154 
 
 
 
1980-2010 (IV First Stage) 
Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap Ratio of Bordering Countries 0.84 0.54 0.50 -0.06
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.13)
Fertility 0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)***
Urbanization -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 0.06 0.04 0.32
(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.08)***
Sex ratio at birth -0.06 -0.40 -0.27
(0.25) (0.25) (0.40)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 0.16 0.16 0.09
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -0.11 -0.09 -0.21
(0.17) (0.17) 80.21)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.20 -0.12 0.30
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)**
French Legal Origin 0.02 0.02
(0.01)*** (0.01)**
Female Labor Force Participation -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Continent dummies no yes yes no
Fixed effects no no no yes
F-test 216.92 54.75 48.60 5.18
Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.61
Anderson LM test (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.61
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  216.92 54.75 48.60 5.18
   Stock-Yogo critical values 10%
   Stock-Yogo critical values 25%
R-squared 0.52 0.75 0.74 0.28
Appendix Table 3.13: First stage of panel for relative male-to-female education levels (ratio)
Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Panel B)
16.38
5.53
Notes: The dependent variable is the Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age). The regressors are: (i) The weighted average 
of the Spousal Age Gap Ratio of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border; 
(ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v) the sex ratio at birth 
(males over females); (vi) the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and (vii) under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the 
cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women 
at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (ix) a dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (x) the percentage 
of females in the national labor force;  (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six continent dummies. See the Appendix for more 
detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 3.14: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with Age at First Birth Control
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Female Marriage Age (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 56 56 52 52 56 56 52 52
Observations 168 168 156 156 168 168 156 156
Female Marriage Age 3.36 2.05 1.66 7.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10
(1.64)** (0.98)** (0.82)** (10.74) (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.03)* (0.05)**
Mother Age at First Child -0.64 -0.98 -0.19 -3.38 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.07
(1.60) (1.74) (1.69) (9.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13)
Fertility -3.47 -3.86 -0.50 0.07 0.09 0.04
(1.76)** (1.83)** 86.08) (0.03)** (0.03)*** (0.09)
Urbanization 0.08 0.05 0.24 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.10) (0.13) (0.55) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 5.16 5.82 99.33 -0.06 0.03 0.32
(5.66) (5.97) (78.03) (0.09) (0.09) (1.11)
Sex ratio at birth 21.44 -45.84 -256.53 2.86 4.07 -2.27
(132.38) (139.75) (478.37) (2.22) (2.18)* (6.81)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -10.41 19.14 -9.14 -2.00 -1.04 -4.09
(56.08) (63.97) (179.28) (1.00)** (1.01) (2.55)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 10.24 -19.72 -70.70 2.07 1.15 4.60
(54.99) (62.96) (133.16) (0.97)** (1.00) (1.89)**
Cum. pop. married at 40 -34.65 -22.46 119.34 -0.88 -0.53 0.74
(45.97) (57.70) (197.66) (0.78) (0.90) (2.81)
French Legal Origin -9.12 -9.95 -0.06 -0.03
(3.26)*** (3.58)*** (0.05) (0.06)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.16) (0.001)*** (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.55 -2.09 0.06 0.12
(3.98) (16.17) (0.06) (0.23)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.32 0.57 0.57 0.07 0.43 0.68 0.76
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 56 56 52 52 56 56 52 52
Observations 168 168 156 156 168 168 156 156
Spousal Age Gap -11.82 -1.63 -0.87 5.85 -0.05 -0.16 -1.22 0.08
(3.39)*** (0.57)** (0.51)* (6.90) (0.02)*** (0.07)** (5.86) (0.12)
Mother Age at First Child -1.07 -0.65 6.36 3.25 0.04 -0.01 -0.15 0.02
(3.31) (1.65) (16.43) (1.21)*** (0.04) (0.03) (0.84) (0.02)
Fertility -3.64 -6.17 -4.23 0.06 0.12 -0.01
(1.76)** (6.30) (3.00) (0.03)* (0.28) (0.05)
Urbanization 0.15 0.62 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.20) (2.01) (0.36) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 2.91 -40.37 27.92 0.04 1.31 -0.67
(8.95) (145.78) (45.89) (0.17) 86.33) (0.80)
Sex ratio at birth 11.95 -464.37 -162.27 4.07 15.79 -0.96
(163.10) (1292.27) (351.77) (3.07) (59.25) (6.16)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -32.72 349.98 133.50 -2.79 -10.72 -2.12
(93.93) (1011.01) (104.37) (1.78) (47.46) (1.83)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 49.66 -392.15 -168.07 3.02 12.37 3.25
(103.59) (1138.56) (105.99) (1.96) (54.45) (1.86)*
Cum. pop. married at 40 -98.74 -2.61 -23.41 -2.91 -4.96 -1.24
(89.13) (175.21) (49.87) (1.70) (17.83) (0.87)
French Legal Origin -9.06 -27.07 0.01 0.47
(6.27) (50.37) (0.12) (2.59)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.01
(0.26) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 6.75 8.92 -0.03 0.27
(17.73) (5.20)* (0.69) (0.09)***
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.26 0.60 0.09 0.10 0.50 0.65 0.10 0.36
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
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Appendix Table 3.14 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with Age at First Birth Control
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 56 56 52 52 56 56 52 52
Observations 168 168 156 156 168 168 156 156
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 7.41 5.27 2.52 -0.42 0.27 1.32 1.68 -0.32
(2.14)*** (2.32)** (1.46)* (0.31) (0.14)** (0.33)*** (1.87) (1.53)
Mother Age at First Child 0.03 0.06 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 -0.24
(0.05) (0.08) (0.44) (0.06)* (0.04) (0.06) (0.32) (0.28)
Fertility 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.05
(0.18) (0.23) (0.14) (012) (0.29) (0.71)
Urbanization -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.07
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09)
Share of Muslim population -0.84 -1.21 2.20 0.19 -1.92 -0.55
(0.57) (2.89) (2.09) (0.60) (1.60) (10.53)
Sex ratio at birth 10.16 -5.61 -25.01 4.07 -9.98 -19.14
(10.14) (30.96) (16.00) (7.58) (23.90) (82.78)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 0.25 8.30 -7.82 3.51 6.80 -7.10
(7.30) (23.60) (4.75)* (5.01) (17.81) (24.64)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 0.45 -9.73 8.84 -2.84 -9.50 6.93
(7.01) (27.18) (4.82)* (4.83) (20.26) (24.95)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.70 7.39 0.94 -0.12 8.06 -0.38
(4.47) (14.19) (2.27) (2.52) (17.41) (11.91)
French Legal Origin 0.38 -0.56 -0.22 -0.49
(0.32) (1.38) (0.26) (1.13)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Log GDP per Capita -0.02 -0.11 0.19 1.12
(0.46) (0.24) (0.58) (1.28)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.14 0.22 0.05 0.26 0.27 0.37 0.19 0.02
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns (5)-(8)  estimate the average years of female tertiary schooling. The regressors are: (i) The 
Female Marriage Age (SMAM) in Panel A, and the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age) in Panels B (absolute) and C (relative); (ii) the average age of a woman at the birth of her first child; (iii) the total fertility 
rate; (iv) the level of urbanization in percent; (v) the share of muslim population per country; (vi)-(viii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 
years, respectively; (ix) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (x) dummy 
whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (xi) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xiii) six continent dummies. French Legal Origin omitted in 
columns (4), and (8) because of inclusion of fixed effects. All panels use as instrument the weighted average of the absolute, respectively relative Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights 
are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. 
Appendix Table 3.15: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with Age Dummies
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Female Marriage Age (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198
Female Marriage Age 4.45 3.79 3.61 5.78 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.87)*** (1.46)*** (1.63)** (2.53)** (0.01)*** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.03)*
Dummy_18 14.61 10.89 10.05 20.40 0.34 0.15 0.10 0.13
(7.31)** (8.87) (9.46) (13.93) (0.12)*** (0.15) 0.15 (0.17)
Dummy_23 8.78 4.87 4.19 9.54 0.17 0.06 (0.05) 0.06
(4.50)** (5.25) (5.53) (7.88) (0.08)** (0.09) 0.09) (0.10)
Dummy_28
Fertility -4.11 -4.57 -4.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(1.04)*** (1.11)*** (1.78)** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Urbanization -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.11) (0.21) (0.001)*** (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 8.41 7.13 68.30 -0.04 0.04 0.12
(5.62) (6.51) (26.74)*** (0.07) (0.08) (0.33)
Sex ratio at birth 27.57 4.95 52.01 0.05 0.01 -0.75
(69.63) (72.84) (119.23) (1.06) (1.04) (1.46)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 52.54 61.22 103.21 -1.66 -1.28 -1.44
(44.11) (44.03) (64.67) (0.70)** (0.67)** (0.79)*
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -62.74 -70.37 -136.94 1.59 1.20 1.29
(49.28) (49.15) (77.28)* (0.77)** (0.73)* (0.95)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -30.80 -28.39 11.74 -1.61 -1.59 -1.19
(28.64) (30.49) (47.12) (0.44)*** (0.46)*** (0.58)**
French Legal Origin -6.92 -7.02 -0.01 0.02
(3.44)** (3.89) (0.04) 80.04)
Female Labor Force Participation -0.03 -0.13 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.11) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Log GDP per Capita 1.97 2.36 0.05 0.11
(2.29) (3.63) (0.03) (0.04)***
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.30 0.44 0.42 0.26 0.31 0.57 0.60
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
 157 
 
 
Appendix Table 3.15 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with Age Dummies
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap -7.45 -2.07 -1.74 32.40 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.29
(2.42)*** (0.86)** (0.78)** (27.14) (0.05)*** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.29)
Dummy_18 -7.02 -11.64 -9.73 -29.66 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.31
(5.44) (5.84)** (6.33) (17.57)* (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19*
Dummy_23 -6.93 -8.30 -7.03 -11.54 -0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.13
(3.15)** (3.65)** (3.43)** (6.53)* (0.07)** (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)**
Dummy_28
Fertility -4.22 -3.92 -10.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
(0.92)*** (0.85)*** (4.10)*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Urbanization 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.08)*** (0.11) (0.52) (0.001)*** (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population -2.26 2.91 -166.17 -0.01 0.17 -1.97
(5.25) (5.68) (178.09) (0.10) (0.16) (1.93)
Sex ratio at birth -32.20 -37.99 68.99 0.01 -0.08 -0.60
(51.63) (56.14) (233.28) (0.95) (1.24) (2.53)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -16.11 9.55 118.59 -1.63 -1.82 -1.30
(36.89) (39.47) (131.24) (0.68)** (0.90)** (1.43)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 12.52 -8.73 -73.82 1.81 2.05 1.85
(39.95) (42.68) (120.54) (0.73)*** (0.99)** (1.31)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -28.76 -47.40 -130.29 -2.48 -2.66 -2.46
(36.77) (36.75) (92.17) (0.67)*** (0.78)*** (1.00)***
French Legal Origin -8.22 -6.79 0.01 0.05
(2.33)*** (2.43)*** (0.04) (0.06)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.21) (0.01)* (0.01)*
Log GDP per Capita 1.52 1.49 0.04 0.10
(1.54) (7.38) (0.03) (0.08)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.27 0.57 0.56 0.05 0.26 0.61 0.49 0.12
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap Ratio 6.95 5.72 3.83 -20.81 0.55 12.57 16.83 -11.71
(1.39)*** (3.31)* (1.71)** (19.29) (0.07)*** (5.87)** (6.89)** (14.96)
Dummy_18 -0.22 -0.23 -0.05 0.99 -0.22 -0.54 -0.65 0.63
(0.29) (0.41) (0.20) (0.93) (0.24) (0.41) (0.45) (0.73)
Dummy_23 -0.20 -0.07 0.08 0.33 -0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.16
(0.24) (0.31) (0.14) (0.35) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28)
Dummy_28
Fertility 0.28 0.21 0.56 0.24 0.17 0.47
(0.09)*** (0.04)*** (0.25)** (0.07)*** (0.08)** (0.18)***
Urbanization -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Share of Muslim population -0.27 0.16 4.85 -1.13 -1.48 3.09
(0.37) (0.18) (6.03) (0.61)* (0.67) (4.70)
Sex ratio at birth 4.87 4.39 -8.72 -4.94 -3.02 -11.29
(5.23) (2.59)* (10.19) (4.99) (5.48) (7.85)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -2.86 -1.58 -1.65 4.36 3.20 0.70
(3.67) (1.87) (5.11) (2.98) (3.49) (4.02)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 3.70 2.24 -0.50 -4.77 -3.58 -3.11
(3.79) (1.91) (5.16) (3.09) (3.62) (4.02)
Cum. pop. married at 40 1.44 -0.28 4.47 1.83 1.30 6.06
(2.73) (1.31) (5.05) (1.92) (2.14) (3.75)
French Legal Origin 0.28 0.06 -0.19 -0.25
(0.18) (0.09) (0.23) (0.25)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.14 0.29 -0.04 -0.02
(0.07)** (0.30) (0.16) (0.22)
Continent dummies no yes yes no no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes no no no yes
R-squared 0.20 0.33 0.58 0.58 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.05
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns (5)-(8)  estimate the average years of female tertiary schooling. 
The regressors are: (i) The Female Marriage Age (SMAM) in Panel A, and the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age) in Panels B (absolute) and C (relative); (ii)-(iv) three dummies for 
female age at marriage (18-23, 23-28, 28-32 years); (v) the total fertility rate; (vi) the level of urbanization in percent; (vii) the share of muslim population per country; (viii)-(x) the sex ratio at birth (males 
over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (xi) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male 
population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (xii) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (xiii) the 
percentage of females in the national labor force; (xiv) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xv) six continent dummies. French Legal Origin omitted in columns (4), and (8), because of inclusion of fixed 
effects, and Dummy_28 because of collinearity. All panels use as instrument the weighted average of the absolute, respectively relative Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a common border, 
where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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1980-2010 (IV First Stage) 
Dependent variable = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of countries 86 81 86 81 86 81 86 81
Observations 258 243 258 243 258 243 258 243
Spousal Age Gap of 5 Neighboring Countries 0.81 -0.15
(0.06)*** (0.11)
Spousal Age Gap Ratio of 5 Neighboring Countries 0.03 0.01
(0.01)*** (0.01)
Plow-positive environment -0.20 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01
(0.30) (0.24) (0.02) (0.01)
Plow-negative environment 2.72 1.48 0.15 0.08
(0.49)*** (0.45)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Fertility 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.01
(0.08)* (0.07) (0.001)*** (0.01)***
Urbanization -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01)*** (0.001)** (0.01)* (0.001)**
Share of Muslim population 8.03 0.81 0.36 0.05
(1.48)*** (0.28)*** (0.07)*** (0.02)***
Sex ratio at birth -3.97 1.87 -0.07 0.16
(6.36) (4.63) (0.32) 0.26
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 4.44 4.37 0.25 0.25
(3.00) (2.86) (0.16) (0.16)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -6.33 -4.15 -0.35 -0.26
(3.17)** (2.93= (0.17)** (0.16)
Cum. pop. married at 40 2.68 -2.60 0.27 -0.06
(1.85) (1.77) (0.10)*** (0.10)
French Legal Origin 0.25 0.01
(0.16) (0.01)
Female Labor Force Participation -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.39 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.17) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Continent dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Fixed effects no yes no no no yes no no
F-test 161.20 2.02 25.43 5.98 17.03 0.44 29.02 5.77
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value) 0.08 0.14 0.97 0.16
Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (p-value) <0.001 0.14 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 0.49 <0.001 0.002
Anderson LM test (p-value) <0.001 0.14 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 0.50 <0.001 0.003
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  161.20 2.02 25.43 5.98 17.03 0.44 29.02 5.77
   Stock-Yogo critical values 10% 16.38 16.38 19.93 19.93 16.38 16.38 19.93 19.93
   Stock-Yogo critical values 25% 5.53 5.53 7.25 7.25 5.53 5.53 7.25 7.25
R-squared 0.39 0.26 0.16 0.53 0.07 0.37 0.21 0.57
Appendix Table 3.16: First stage of panel of female education using alternative instruments
Spousal Age Gap (Panel A) Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Panel B)
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age). Columns (5)-(8) estimate the Spousal Age Gap Ratio (Male over Female Marriage Age).  The regressors are: (i) 
The average of the Spousal Age Gap of five neighboring countries, respectively the (ii) the Spousal Age Gap Ratio of five neighboring countries; (iii)-(iv) plow-positive and plow-negative environment based on Alesina et al. 
(2013); (v) the total fertility rate; (vi) the level of urbanization in percent; (vii) the share of muslim population per country; (viii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females); (ix) the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate 
of girls under 5, and (x) under 15 years, respectively; (xi) the cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out 
of total female population); (xii) a dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (xiii) the percentage of females in the national labor force;  (xiv) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xv) six 
continent dummies. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Female Marriage Age (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198
Female Marriage Age 0.69 0.30 0.26 0.34
(0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.11)***
Fertility -0.89 -0.88 -0.85
(0.11) (0.11)*** (0.15)***
Urbanization 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.02)
Share of Muslim population -0.29 -0.05 4.81
(0.62) (0.69) (2.13)**
Sex ratio at birth -5.10 -6.89 -4.75
(7.45) (7.39) (9.51)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -8.94 -7.22 -4.60
(5.05)* (4.83) (5.74)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 7.82 6.23 2.13
(5.59) (5.34) (6.68)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -2.67 -3.03 0.16
(3.15) (3.23) (4.01)
French Legal Origin -1.65 -1.48
(0.38)*** (0.41)***
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01
(0.01)* (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita 0.30 0.43
(0.23) (0.29)
Continent dummies no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes
R-squared 0.45 0.79 0.80 0.27
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap -2.59 -1.19 -0.36 9.75
(0.28)*** (0.37)*** (0.43) (22.38)
Fertility -0.80 -0.72 -2.84
(0.13)*** (0.13)*** (4.08)
Urbanization 0.05 0.04 0.17
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.34)
Share of Muslim population -1.02 -0.87 -61.80
(0.57)* (0.57) (147.94)
Sex ratio at birth -12.84 -15.34 41.30
(7.79)* (8.26)* (129.85)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -15.58 -10.34 -6.65
(5.21)*** (5.76)* (37.25)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 14.87 10.03 22.42
(5.26)*** (5.74)* (35.83)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -7.32 -6.56 -41.82
(4.17)* (4.24) (79.82)
French Legal Origin -1.71 -1.52
(0.30)*** (0.30)***
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.07)
Log GDP per Capita 0.38 -0.41
(0.23)* (3.41)
Continent dummies no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes
R-squared 0.40 0.82 0.81 0.18
Average Female Years of Education
Appendix Table 3.17: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative 
(Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with alternative outcome variable
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1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel A: Female Marriage Age (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 71 70 66 71 70 66
Observations 213 210 198 213 210 198
Female Marriage Age 3.09 2.22 2.21 0.07 0.05 0.04
(0.36)*** (0.71)*** (0.83)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
OECD Country Dummy 1.95 2.15 1.18 0.06 0.18 0.17
(2.57) (4.08) (4.48) (0.05) (0.07)*** (0.07)**
Fertility -3.91 -4.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.91)*** (1.00)*** (0.02) (0.02)
Urbanization 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.001)* (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 4.45 4.71 -0.03 0.07
(3.96) (4.69) (0.07) (0.08)
Sex ratio at birth -1.96 -25.82 -0.03 0.01
(59.21) (62.74) (1.01) (1.01)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 34.41 51.92 -1.22 -0.94
(43.99) (45.01) (0.75)* (0.72)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -39.39 -56.02 1.06 0.78
(48.27) (49.37) (0.82) (0.79)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -45.38 -40.82 -1.51 -1.46
(26.19)* (29.29) (0.45)*** (0.47)***
French Legal Origin -6.31 -6.04 -0.01 0.01
(2.33)*** (2.58)** (0.04) (0.04)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.05 0.01
(0.06) (0.001)***
Log GDP per Capita 1.37 0.04
(1.99) (0.03)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Country fixed effects no no no no no no
R-squared 0.34 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.60 0.63
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
Appendix Table 3.18: Panel for level of female education, absolute and 
relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with OECD dummy
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of countries 71 70 66 66
Observations 213 210 198 198
Spousal Age Gap 0.26 0.16 0.01 -1.66
(0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.06) (3.88)
Fertility 0.16 0.18 0.51
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.71)
Urbanization -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.001)*** (0.01) (0.06)
Share of Muslim population 0.24 0.21 9.96
(0.10)** (0.15) (25.68)
Sex ratio at birth 5.30 2.30 -16.56
(1.84)*** (2.13) (22.68)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality 0.58 0.01 -0.37
(1.32) (0.148) (6.47)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality -0.16 0.44 -2.29
(1.29) (1.48) (6.22)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -2.19 -2.16 5.05
(0.89)*** (1.09)** (13.86)
French Legal Origin 0.09 0.16
(0.07) (0.08)**
Female Labor Force Participation -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.13 0.38
(0.06)** (0.59)
Continent dummies no yes yes no
Country fixed effects no no no yes
R-squared 0.29 0.56 0.58 0.05
Average Years of Education Ratio
Appendix Table 3.17 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and relative 
(Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with alternative outcome variable
Notes: The dependent variable is the average years of female schooling (absolute in Panels A and B, and relative to male 
average years of schooling in Panel C). The regressors are: (i) The Female Marriage Age (SMAM) in Panel A, and the 
Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age) in Panels B (absolute) and C (relative); (ii) the total fertility rate; (iii) 
the level of urbanization in percent; (iv) the share of muslim population per country; (v)-(vii) the sex ratio at birth (males over 
females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (viii) the 
cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of 
married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (ix) dummy whether the country's legal origin is based on 
French system; (x) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xii) six
continent dummies. French Legal Origin omitted in column (4) because of inclusion of fixed effects. All panels use as 
instrument the weighted average of the absolute, respectively relative Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a 
common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for more detailed variable 
definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel B: Spousal Age Gap (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 71 70 66 71 70 66
Observations 213 210 198 213 210 198
Spousal Age Gap -8.49 -0.71 -0.40 -0.17 -0.13 -0.14
(1.83)*** (2.61) (3.05) (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)**
OECD Country Dummy 1.84 -0.45 -0.51 0.07 0.17 0.17
(2.96) (2.77) (2.82) (0.06) (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Fertility -3.80 -3.60 0.01 0.02
(0.93)*** (0.93)*** (0.02) (0.02)
Urbanization 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.01
(0.08)** (0.09) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population 2.34 3.88 0.10 0.15
(3.93) (4.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Sex ratio at birth -26.14 -36.57 0.20 0.08
(52.27) (56.43) (1.07) (1.16)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -46.65 -18.64 -1.66 -1.08
(35.09) (39.51) (0.72)** (0.81)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 51.55 23.12 1.82 1.27
(35.59) (39.55) (0.73)*** (0.81)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -71.51 -67.20 -3.00 -2.94
(28.06)*** (29.04)** (0.57)*** (0.60)***
French Legal Origin -6.43 -6.46 0.03 0.04
(2.04)*** (2.06)*** (0.04) (0.04)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.09 0.02
(0.06) (0.01)**
Log GDP per Capita 1.55 0.03
(1.57) (0.03)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Country fixed effects no no no no no no
R-squared 0.25 0.56 0.54 0.29 0.53 0.52
1980-2010  
Dependent variable = 
Panel C: Spousal Age Gap Ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of countries 71 70 66 71 70 66
Observations 213 210 198 213 210 198
Spousal Age Gap 0.41 0.21 0.18 0.52 0.26 0.77
(0.07)*** (0.16) (0.14) (0.07)*** (0.26) (0.40)**
OECD Country Dummy 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.25 1.06 0.44
(0.17) (0.24) (0.13)** (0.14)* (0.24)*** (0.35)
Fertility 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.24
(0.09)*** 80.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.12)**
Urbanization -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Muslim population -0.09 0.34 -0.10 -0.85
(0.27) (0.19)* (0.38) 80.53)
Sex ratio at birth 8.45 5.14 0.68 2.78
(4.84)* (2.60)** (4.10) (6.81)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality -2.60 -1.53 3.49 -0.66
(3.46) (1.82) (2.32) (4.75)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality 3.26 1.83 -4.24 -0.36
(3.54) (1.82) (2.37)* (4.76)
Cum. pop. married at 40 -0.71 0.67 2.26 0.99
(2.38) (1.34) (1.53) (3.47)
French Legal Origin 0.22 -0.01 -0.27 -0.04
(0.18) (0.10) (0.23) (0.27)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.01 0.01
(0.001)** (0.01)
Log GDP per Capita -0.17 -0.06
(0.07)** (0.20)
Continent dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Country fixed effects no no no no no no
R-squared 0.19 0.28 0.57 0.27 0.43 0.33
Secondary Schooling Completion Ratio Average Years Tertiary Education Ratio
Appendix Table 3.18 continued: Panel for level of female education, absolute and 
relative (Spousal Age Gap) Female Marriage Age with OECD dummy
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Average Female Years Tertiary Education
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(3) is the percentage of the female population with a  completed secondary education. Columns (4)-(6)  estimate the average years of female 
tertiary schooling. The regressors are: (i) The Female Marriage Age (SMAM) in Panel A, and the Spousal Age Gap (Male minus Female Marriage Age) in Panels B (absolute) and C 
(relative); (ii) a Dummy for a country being member of the OECD; (iii) the total fertility rate; (iv) the level of urbanization in percent; (v) the share of muslim population per country; 
(vi)-(viii) the sex ratio at birth (males over females), and the mortality rate of boys over the mortality rate of girls under 5, and under 15 years, respectively; (ix) the cumulative percentage 
of married men at the age of 40 (out of total male population) divided by the cumulative percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of total female population); (x) dummy 
whether the country's legal origin is based on French system; (xi) the percentage of females in the national labor force; (xi) the log of per capita GDP in PPP terms; (xiii) six continent 
dummies. Specification with country fixed effects not included since this would eliminate the country dummy of interest. All panels use as instrument the weighted average of the 
absolute, respectively relative Female Marriage Age of adjoining countries with a common border, where weights are according to relative length of shared border. See the Appendix for 
more detailed variable definitions and sources. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. *** ,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 3.19: Data and Sources
Variable Name Description Source Data restrictions and remarks
Country Name of country Feenstra, Robert C., Inklaar, R. & Timmer, M. P. (2015). The Next 
Generation of the Penn World Table.  American Economic Review, 
forthcoming, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt
CCode ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 country codes Defined in ISO 3166-1, part of the ISO 3166 standard published by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
Male Marriage Age (SMAM) Singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for men, 
measured as the average length of single life expressed 
in years among those who marry before age 50.
Female Marriage Age (SMAM) Singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for women, 
measured as the average length of single life expressed 
in years among those who marry before age 50.
First Difference Female Marriage Age smam_female in the 2000s (average 2000-2009) minus 
smam_female in the 1980s (average 1980-1989)
Spousal Age Gap (SAG) Male Marriage Age minus Female Marriage Age
Spousal Age Gap Ratio Male Marriage Age over Female Marriage Age
plow_negative_environment The average fraction of ancestral land that was suitable 
for growing barley, rye, and wheat divided by the 
fraction that was suitable for any crops. 
plow_positive_environment The average fraction of ancestral land that was suitable 
for growing foxtail millet, pearl millet, and sorghum 
divided by the fraction that was suitable for any crops.
LOG GDP per Capita The log of GDP per capita per time period (Output-side 
real GDP at current PPPs)
Feenstra, Robert C., Inklaar, R. & Timmer, M. P. (2015). The Next 
Generation of the Penn World Table.  American Economic Review, 
forthcoming, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt
for each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values on income 
per country 
Secondary Schooling Completion (Diff) Secondary Schooling Completion rate of males minus 
the rate of females
Secondary Schooling Completion (Ratio) Secondary Schooling Completion rate of males over the 
rate of females
Average Years Tertiary Education (Diff) Average years of tertiary education of males minus the 
years of females
Average Years Tertiary Education (Ratio) Average years of tertiary education of males over the 
years of females
Female Secondary Schooling Completion Secondary Schooling Completion rate of females 
First Difference Female Secondary Schooling 
Completion
Female secondary schooling in the 2000s (average 2000-
2009) minus female secondary schooling in the 1980s 
(average 1980-1989)
Female Average Years Tertiary Education Average years of tertiary education of females 
Primary Schooling Completion (Ratio) Primary Schooling Completion rate of males over the 
rate of females
Gender Parity Index (GPI) for Adult 
Literacy
Ratio of female to male aduty literacy rates UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) Data Centre 
(http://data.uis.unesco.org).
Fertility Total fertility (children by women) United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, DVD 
Edition.
Female Labor Force Participation Female labour force as a percent of the female working 
age population.
International Labour Organization (ILO); data online available.
Urbanization Urban population (as % of total population) Own construction based on "Rural population" indicator from UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics (UIS) Data Centre (http://data.uis.unesco.org).
Muslim Muslim population (as % of total population) Religion adherence data from Barro, R. (2003). 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
No data for 1980s and 1990s 
available. Took religion 
adherence from the 1970 as 
proxy for 1980s, and 
adherence from the 2000 as 
proxy for 1990s
French Legal Origin Dummy for country with French legal origin / tradition Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: the 
primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic 
development. Journal of economic growth, 9(2), 131-165.
Cum. pop. married at 40 Cumulative percentage of married men at the age of 40 
(out of total male population) divided by cumulative 
percentage of married women at the age of 40 (out of 
total female population)
Own construction based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012 
(POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012).
For each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values per country 
Asia
Europe
Africa
North America
South America
Oceania
Mother Age at First Child Median age at first birth among women United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division. World Fertility Report 2012
Women's economic rights (wecon) Women's Economic Rights index ranging from 0 (no 
economic rights) to 3 (all or nearly all of women’s 
economic rights were guaranteed by law and the 
government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in 
practice)
Women's political rights (wopol) Women's Political Rights index ranging from 0 (no 
political rights) to 3 (political rights are guaranteed in 
both law and practice)
Women's social rights (wosoc) Women's Social Rights index ranging from 0 (no social 
rights for women) to 3 (all or nearly all of women’s 
social rights were guaranteed by law and the 
government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in 
practice)
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012 (POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012).
for each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values per country 
on male and female SMAM
Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., & Nunn, N. (2013). On the Origin of Gender Roles: 
Women and the Plough. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2): 469-530. 
Data taken from http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0
Dummy variable taking value 1 if country is located on 
given continent, 0 otherwise
Own construction based on World Bank definition of World regions
Own construction based on dataset by Barro and Lee (Barro, R., & Lee, J.-L. 
(2010). A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010. 
Journal of Development Economics, 104 , 184-198.) www.barrolee.com
for each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values for the 
respective education variable 
per country 
for each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values 
Cingranelli, D. L., Richards, D. L., & Clay, K. C. (2014). The CIRI Human 
Rights Dataset.  http://www.humanrightsdata.com. Version 2014.04.14.
 163 
 
  
Appendix Table 3.19 continued: Data and Sources
Variable Name Description Source
Sex ratio at birth Sex ratio at birth by decade and country (males over 
females)
Sex ratio under 5 mortality Deaths of boys with age 0-4 (as % of all boys in that 
age) divided by the deaths of girls with age 0-4 (as % of 
all girls in that age)
Sex ratio under 15 mortality Deaths of boys with age 0-14 (as % of all boys in that 
age) divided by the deaths of girls with age 0-14 (as % 
of all girls in that age)
Female SMAM / SAG Border Neighbors Weighted average of female SMAM / SAG of adjoining 
countries with a common border, where weights are 
according to relative length of shared border
Own construction based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012 
(POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012), and for the weighting by border length from 
CEPII, following Correa, E. A, Jetter, M., & Agudelo, A. M. (2016). 
Corruption: Transcending borders, Kyklos, 69(2), 183-207. 
Female SMAM / SAG 5 neighboring 
countries
Simple average of the female SMAM / SAG of five 
neighboring countries
Own construction based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012 
(POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012), and own selection of 5 neighboring countries
Gender Inequality Index (GII) Index for measurement of gender disparity along three 
dimensions (reproductive health, gender empowerment, 
economic status) scaled from 0 (total equality) to 1 
(total inequality) 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013, for download at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index
Only available since 2010, 
which we take as proxy for 
the 2000s time interval
Women Treated With Respect Percentage of female respondents answering yes to the 
question, “Do you believe that women in this country 
are treated with respect and dignity, or not?”
Data originally from Gallup World Poll; data here taken from respective 
category in Social Progress Index 2014 (www.socialprogressimperative.org)
Took 2014 values as proxy 
for the 2000s time interval
Minimum Legal Marriage Age for Women Minimum legal age for marriage without parental 
consent as defined in terms of the laws of the individual 
country
United Nations Statistics Division (DYB 2011: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ 
demographic/products/dyb/dyb2011/notes/notes24.pdf) 
Spousal Age Gap Ratio Parental Generation Male Marriage Age over Female Marriage Age per 
country
(average 1980-1989)
Own construction based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012 
(POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012)
Due to lags only available for 
2000s time period
Average Female Years of Education  Average Years of Schooling Attained
Female Primary Schooling Percentage of female population with a completed 
primary education
Quality of Schooling male relative to female Gender difference (male over female) in student 
performance on the science scale for the PISA test 2006
OECD 2007. PISA 2006: Science Competencies for Tomorrow's World. 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/programmeforinternationalstudentassessmen
tpisa/pisa2006results.htm
Took 2006 PISA test as 
proxy for the 2000s time 
period
Adolescent births Number of births to women with age 15-19 per 1,000 
women with age 15-19
Taken as sub-dimension from the Gender Inequality Index (GII); United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013, for download at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index
Took 2010 values as proxy 
for the 2000s time interval
Women in Politics Proportion of seats in parliament held by women, 
measured in 2000
United Nations’ Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database.
Barro, R., & Lee, J.-L. (2010). A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in 
the World, 1950-2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104, 184-198. 
www.barrolee.com
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, DVD 
Edition.
For each decade (1980s, 
1990s, 2000s), simple 
averages are taken from all 
available values on the 
respective variable per 
country 
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Appendix Table 3.20: Overview of countries per time period with data on marriage age
Panel 1980-2010 (tables 3.2-3.5) Cross-section 2000s (table 3.6)
86 135
Argentina Afghanistan
Australia Albania
Austria Algeria
Bahrain Antigua and Barbuda
Bangladesh Argentina
Belgium Armenia
Belize Aruba
Botswana Azerbaijan
Brazil Bahrain
Brunei Darussalam Bangladesh
Cameroon Belarus
Canada Benin
Chile Bhutan
China Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Colombia Bosnia and Hercegovina
Czech Republic Botswana
Denmark Brazil
Dominican Republic Brunei Darussalam
Ecuador Bulgaria
Egypt Burkina Faso
Finland Burundi
France Cambodia
Greece Cameroon
Guyana Cape Verde
Haiti Chad
Hungary Chile
Iceland China
India Colombia
Indonesia Congo
Iran (Islamic Republic of) Costa Rica
Iraq Croatia
Ireland Cuba
Israel Cyprus
Italy Democratic People's Republic of  of Korea
Jamaica Democratic Republic of the Congo
Japan Dominican Republic
Kazakhstan Ecuador
Kenya Egypt
Kuwait El Salvador
Kyrgyzstan Estonia
Luxembourg Ethiopia
Malaysia Gabon
Maldives Georgia
Mali Ghana
Malta Greece
Mauritania Guinea
Mauritius Guyana
Mexico Haiti
Morocco Honduras
Mozambique Hungary
Myanmar India
Nepal Indonesia
Netherlands Iran (Islamic Republic of)
New Zealand Iraq
Niger Israel
Norway Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
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Appendix Table 3.20 continued: Overview of countries per time period with data on marriage age
Panel 1980-2010 (tables 3.2-3.5) Cross-section 2000s (table 3.6)
Pakistan Madagascar
Panama Malawi
Paraguay Malaysia
Peru Maldives
Philippines Mali
Poland Malta
Portugal Mauritania
Qatar Mauritius
Republic of Korea Mexico
Saudi Arabia Mongolia
Singapore Morocco
Slovakia Mozambique
South Africa Myanmar
Spain Namibia
Sudan Nepal
Sweden New Caledonia
Switzerland Nicaragua
Thailand Niger
Tonga Nigeria
Trinidad and Tobago Oman
Tunisia Pakistan
Turkey Palau
United Arab Emirates Panama
United Kingdom Papua New Guinea
United Republic of Tanzania Paraguay
United States of America Peru
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Philippines
Vietnam Poland
Zambia Portugal
Zimbabwe Puerto Rico
Qatar
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Republic of Tanzania
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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IV. Does Central Europe Import  
the Missing Women Phenomenon?* 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines whether immigrants have brought the missing women (at birth) 
phenomenon to Germany and Switzerland. Using a range of micro data since 1990, we find no 
systematic gender selection of foreigners collectively, but a group of Balkan, Chinese and Indian 
immigrants tend to display substantially elevated sex ratios at birth. Employing different 
estimation methods we consistently calculate around 1,500 missing girls in Germany (2003-2014) 
and Switzerland (1990-2014) combined from these selected Balkan and Asian immigrant groups. 
A Germany-specific measure of cultural adaptation has no substantial effect on the level of sex 
selection observed, and Swiss-specific data indicate a skewed ratio for Asian higher parity births. 
With household survey data we attempt to identify underlying reasons for sex selection in 
Germany, but find no robust associations for any socio-economic variable employed. However, 
the sex of older siblings tends to matter, and again Balkan, Chinese and Indian immigrants increase 
the boy-birth likelihood whereas immigrants collectively do not. 
IV. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Migration is a pressing global development issue and the United Nations (2016) estimate a 
current 244 million international migrants worldwide, of which 76 million are hosted by European 
countries. Economic prospects and labor market opportunities have recently turned Central Europe 
into the continent’s gravity center for immigration. Migration flows to Germany and Switzerland 
have been of sizeable dimension in the last decades, in particular from countries located in 
Southeast Europe.61  
                                                 
*  A working paper version of this chapter is circulating (Stimpfle & Stadelmann, 2016b) and has been 
presented at the Graduate Research Seminar of the University of Bayreuth. We cordially thank Marco Portmann, 
Mario Larch, and Hartmut Egger for helpful comments.  
61 In the 2014 German micro census, the individually listed groups from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and former 
Yugoslavia alone amount to more than two million people, or twelve percent of all migrants in Germany (Federal 
Statistical Office, 2015a). Migrants from that region have also begun to pursue alternative migration channels: about 
30 percent of all asylum applications in Germany in 2015 were submitted from Balkan people (BAMF, 2016). 
Likewise in Switzerland, the 2014 national statistics indicate that citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Macedonia account for 14 percent of all foreigners in the country, totaling around 275,000 people 
BFS (2015b). 
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The socio-economic consequences of these migration waves have influenced the public 
discourse: changes of the gender composition in European countries due to migration received 
media attention (Ritter, 2016), and migrants may carry a range of traditional practices that differ 
from their new environment.62 Such practices include different gender attitudes and potentially a 
relative preference of sons over daughters. Sen (1990) famously dubbed this form of female 
discrimination the “missing women” phenomenon. Although it is typically rather associated with 
India and China (Croll, 2001; World Bank, 2011), there is evidence that even within Europe gender 
ratios at birth vary among countries (Anderson & Ray, 2010; Guilmoto, 2015; Instat, 2014). 
Previous literature has focused on Asian immigrants and suggests continued gender selection 
practices (Abrevaya, 2009; Dubuc & Coleman, 2007). We are not aware, however, of any work 
that has examined to what extent Southeast European immigrants have affected sex selection at 
birth in Central European countries.63 As migrants in Germany and Switzerland tend to come from 
the Balkans rather than from Asia, this chapter aims to fill the research gap in the economics of 
migration and gender. We search for evidence whether the missing women (at birth) issue was 
“imported” by migrants from Southeast Europe to Central Europe.64  
The map in figure 4.1 reflects our research motivation. It gives an overview of the average 
sex ratios at birth (2003-2013) of all European countries from Germany and Switzerland to the 
East,65 as well as India and China. Countries are highlighted in red whose sex ratio has been at 
least 1.07, i.e. for 100 girl births there are on average 107 boy births or more. We observe a 
geographical concentration in Southeast Europe that deviates from what is considered a 
biologically normal sex ratio at birth of 1.04-1.07 (Chahnazarian, 1988). Albania, for example, 
reports an average ratio of 1.11 which is as high as the widely discussed national Indian figures. 
This significant regional outlier motivates our focus on the (Western) Balkans, and this work is 
the first to provide a deeper explorative analysis of migrant groups from that region to Germany 
and Switzerland.  
                                                 
62 Kountouris and Remoundou  (2016), for example, document how cultural background is a significant determinant 
of migrants' individual environmental attitudes.  
63 We proxy Central Europe with the two countries Germany and Switzerland since other countries that may be 
classified as part of Central Europe have a much lower number of migrants (even less so from Asia and from the 
(West) Balkans), and thus will unlikely materially affect results for the overall region.  
64 Specifically we focus on excess female mortality at birth and refrain from examining unbalanced sex ratios overall, 
acknowledging that the “missing women” phenomenon comprises additional aspects. We revisit the precise scope of 
our research in further detail later in this chapter. 
65 Data for all European countries except Kosovo, are from the World Health Organization Europe (2015); for Kosovo, 
from the Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2014); for India and China, from United Nations Population Division (2015). 
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To examine this complex topic of migration and gender discrimination, we take a “forensic” 
approach, using different empirical techniques and three distinct micro data sources. We initially 
resort to abortion statistics with the aim to discover sex-selective behavior among parents. These 
data offer a first indication on the extent of abortion practices, and their dynamics with respect to 
timing and child parity. We then analyze more than a decade of complete national birth registries 
along maternal citizenship and sex of the born child. Comparing Germany and Switzerland, which 
are otherwise similar both in terms of culture and socio-economic position, serves to investigate 
the consistency of our findings. In addition, we are able to infer from the German data a proxy for 
the parental level of cultural adaptation. Swiss birth records in return document birth parity, which 
also allows for a more granular perspective on prenatal sex selection practices.  
Lastly, we employ the socio economic panel study (SOEP), a representative annual survey 
of households in Germany, to explore potential determinants for different sex ratios at birth. 
Thereby, we try to obtain a more refined picture of individual household characteristics.  
Results from abortion statistics over recent years in Germany and Switzerland offer no 
conclusive evidence and only allow for speculative conjectures about existing sex selection. From 
the birth registries we find that foreigners collectively show a slightly elevated sex ratio at birth 
compared to natives. The ratios, however, are still within biologically normal ranges and provide 
1.06
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Figure 4.1: Average Sex Ratio at Birth (boys over girls) from 2003-2013 in Central and Eastern Europe, 
India, and China
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no evidence of a systematic issue of “missing women” at birth among migrants. Yet, sub-groups 
of Balkan, Chinese, and Indian immigrants display substantially elevated sex ratios. Based on these 
findings we conclude that gender selection is likely present among these sub-groups, which we 
document nonetheless to be small in absolute numbers.  
Further results indicate that sex ratios at birth do not vary much if the father is German or 
from the same country as the mother, and also the number of years the parents spent in Germany 
has no substantial differentiating effect. The birth data for Switzerland reveal a significantly 
skewed ratio for Asian higher parity births. Independent of the estimation method chosen, we then 
consistently calculate around 1,500 missing girls (missing women at birth) in Germany (2003-
2014) and Switzerland (1990-2014) combined from the highlighted Balkan and Asian immigrant 
groups. For foreigners collectively, in return, no robust evidence for missing girls is found.  
Finally, we exploit the German SOEP and regress the proportion of male children as well as 
the boy-birth likelihood per household on demographic and socio-economic variables. Results 
again suggest that a higher likelihood for boys is associated only with selected (Balkan and Asian) 
migrant groups, i.e. not migrants collectively, which is consistent with the findings from birth 
registries. Furthermore, existing female siblings play an important role, raising the odds for a boy 
birth significantly if the first child was a girl. Lastly, religiosity seems to be the only socio-
economic variable that matters, but effects depend on the population group examined.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and points at the 
research gaps regarding Central Europe and migrants from Balkan countries. Section 3 presents 
our three data sources and section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
IV. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter contributes to three strands of the “missing women” literature. First it adds to 
the research quantifying excess female mortality rates. It secondly aims to improve the 
understanding of the mechanisms for effectively implementing gender selection at birth. Finally, 
it seeks to  explain the genuine “underlying motives for gender selection” (Abrevaya, 2009, p.29). 
We will review the literature related to each strand in the following. 
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Quantifying Excess Female Mortality Rates 
A number of estimates have been made on how many women are globally missing due to 
this form of gender inequality. Apart from the challenge of obtaining valid population statistics 
from all countries, the academic discussion mostly revolves around the correct counterfactual, i.e. 
an “unbiased” biological sex ratio. After the famous “100 million” figure by Sen (1990), Coale 
(1991) proposes that in fact rather 60 million females are missing.  Klasen (1994) and Klasen and 
Wink (2003) provide further methodological refinements, where the latter study estimates again 
more than 100 million missing women. Bongaarts and Guilmoto (2015) provide a historical 
perspective and calculate that this figure grew from 61 million in 1970 to 126 million in 2010 and 
will further rise to 150 million in 2035 before declining to 142 million by 2050. Yet another 
contribution by Anderson and Ray (2010) calculates the flow of annually missing women and 
offers a more granular view on mortality rates by age groups.  
Studies have examined this phenomenon in various corners of the world. Findings by 
UNFPA (2012b), and by Basu and Das Gupta (2001) provide a global perspective, while the 
majority of studies examine the two most prominent country cases, namely China and India 
(among others, see Agnihotri, 1996; Das Gupta, Chung, & Shuzhuo, 2009; Das Gupta & Shuzhuo, 
1999; Mayer, 1999; Shepherd, 2008; Sudha & Rajan, 1999). Recent studies expanded the 
geographical focus. Dahl and Moretti (2008) analyze the U.S., China, Mexico, Colombia, Kenya 
and Vietnam. Meslé, Vallin, and Badurashvili (2007) document biased sex ratios in the Caucasus, 
and Yount (2001) examines excess female mortality in the Middle East. 
 Some papers have specifically looked at Southeast Europe, which also displays excess 
female mortality rates as documented in figure 4.1. Studies on general demographics and gender 
inequality in that region (Gjonca, 2004; Gjonca, Aasve, & Mencarini, 2008, 2009; Hall, 1994) 
have been complemented by focused research on the sex ratio at birth. Polasek, Kolcic, Kolaric, 
and Rudan (2005) investigate the sex ratio at birth in Croatia before, during and after the Balkan 
war of the 1990s, but find no significant deviations in any period. Guilmoto (2010) points at the 
biased sex ratios at birth in a “regional block” (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro), and 
calls out the substantial knowledge gaps around that issue.66 A recent report by the United Nations 
                                                 
66 Also, the issue of “missing women” is often unnoticed or not yet acknowledged in the region itself, as described by 
Guilmoto and Duthé (2013). For instance, Stump (2011), a member of the European Council, notes that the Albanian 
authorities do not consider the skewed birth ratio as a nation-wide problem, but a sporadic phenomenon limited to 
some remote areas.  
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(UNFPA, 2012a) on Albania takes up this challenge and provides rich statistical evidence of excess 
prenatal female mortality, as well its likely underlying causes. Anecdotal evidence by Durham 
(1909) describes how the strong symbolic need for a son led women in Albania (so-called “sworn 
virgins”) even to renounce marriage and acquire a masculine identity in order to assume the role 
of a virtual son in families with no male offspring. The dramatic bias of the sex ratio at birth most 
likely began only in the 1990s, since beforehand no contraception was widely available and 
abortion was prohibited (see also David, 1970). Nonetheless, the reliability of official figures is 
discussed in the UN report (UNFPA, 2012a), as the sex ratio at birth from the Albanian census 
differs substantially from the ratio calculated via birth registries (though both are clearly male 
biased).  
Figures by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2012a) as well as national 
statistical bureaus (for example Instat, 2012) also emphasize the enormous migration waves from 
Balkan countries to Western and Central Europe: in Albania alone, 24 percent of the population 
emigrated during the 1990s. It has been pointed out that migration flows may substantially affect 
the level of gender preference and the sex ratio at birth in both the original and the receiving 
country (Attané & Guilmoto, 2007; Dyson, 2012). Recent work therefore analyzed sex ratios at 
birth among migrants from societies that are known for son preference. The initial focus was put 
on people of Asian origin. Among the first authors, Dubuc and Coleman (2007) document an 
increase in the sex ratio of births among India-born mothers in England and Wales, especially for 
higher-order births. The authors hold prenatal sex diagnosis of fetuses and subsequent abortion of 
female fetuses as main responsible factors for this trend. The authors hence question the adherence 
of certain India-born immigrants to Western norms of gender equality.  
Abrevaya (2009) analyzes immigrant groups in the United States. Using three different 
sources (Federal birth data, California birth data, and census data) and controlling for a set of 
observable maternal characteristics, he concludes that over 2,000 Chinese and Indian girls are 
“missing” in the country between 1991 and 2004, especially due to gender selection at later births. 
He also sees strong parallels between birth dynamics of Chinese and Indian migrants in the U.S., 
and the birth statistics found in China and India itself.  Almond and Edlund (2008) summarize 
comparable results for the U.S. Almond, Edlund, and Milligan (2013) confirm a similar outcome 
for South and East Asian immigrants in Canada. The three papers cited on North America all report 
substantially elevated sex ratios at birth at higher parities if the previous children were girls. In 
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addition, there is first evidence for a comparable situation among Chinese and Indian migrant 
families in Australia (SBS Radio, 2015).    
We received a number of papers conducting a similar analysis for continental European 
countries. Verropoulou and Tsimbos (2010) conclude from Greek birth records that Albanian 
mothers have a five percent higher chance of having a male birth than Greek mothers, and Asian 
mothers also have a significantly higher sex ratio at birth than native Greeks. The Albanian sex 
ratio is on average at 1.09 and the ratio of Asians even amounts to 1.29, which compares to 1.05 
for natives. However, their sample for analysis comprises only a bit more than 100,000 births in 
total (out of which 12,000 are Albanian and only 1,200 Asian), which might cause undesired 
random variation linked to the limited sample size. Gavalas, Rontos, and Nagopoulos (2015) 
conduct a second study on Greece with a larger sample, and report for Indian and Chinese mothers 
on average a highly elevated sex ratio at birth of 1.18. They take an additional migrant sample of 
“East Europeans”, which comprises 17 nationalities from Russia to Bulgaria, and find an elevated 
ratio of 1.08 on average, and of 1.13 for third parity births and above.  
 Singh, Pripp, Brekke, and Stray-Pedersen (2010) observe a comparable phenomenon in 
Norway for immigrants from India (1,600 mothers), but not from Pakistan (5,600 mothers), after 
analyzing 21,000 births. As most of these immigrants stem from the Punjab region, which 
according to the authors is fairly similar on both sides of the India-Pakistani border except for 
religious affiliation, they speculate that religion could be responsible for the differences in sex 
ratios at birth. Italy has also been examined several times (Ambrosetti et al., 2015; Blangiardo & 
Rimoldi, 2012; Meldolesi, 2012) with results pointing at skewed sex ratio at birth for migrants 
originating from India, China and Albania, even more so for higher-order births. Finally, González 
(2014) documents son-biased sex ratios at birth among Asian-born parents in Spain using birth 
registries from 2007 to 2012. The male bias remains significant also when controlling for a number 
of family characteristics. However, all in all the observed male bias among Asian-born parents has 
little impact in absolute terms (less than 100 girls are “missing”), since that population group is 
very small in Spain.  
In summary, all papers have found that immigrants from countries with known son 
preference continue to display distorted sex ratios at birth also in their new environment. However, 
nearly all research focuses exclusively on Asian immigrants, and groups from Southeast Europe 
are neglected despite their large migration waves and their strong son preference that can be traced 
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back in birth statistics for around 100 years (UNFPA, 2012a). Balkan migrants are also particularly 
interesting as they belong to the same human race/ethnicity as people in Western and Central 
Europe (Anemone, 2011). In addition they are reasonably proximate in terms of geography, and 
Jorde and Wooding (2004, p. 30) argue based on human genetic variation analysis that “most 
individuals from the same geographic region will be more similar to one another than to individuals 
from a distant region”. Hence, potential biological bias that could cause diverging sex ratios at 
birth because groups belong to different races/ethnicities (Anderson & Ray, 2010; James, 1987) 
becomes arguably smaller through this approach. The study by Verropoulou and Tsimbos (2010) 
examines Albanian migrants in Greece, but it relies on birth data from one single year and contrasts 
two population groups which live directly adjacent and are therefore probably substantially 
intertwined. The related work on Spain and Italy focuses geographically also on Southern Europe. 
Hence, to our knowledge this is the first study to examine prenatal sex selection among Southeast 
European migrants who moved to Central European countries. We also use data from two host 
countries (Germany and Switzerland), each spanning more than ten years of birth records, to 
arguably obtain a sufficiently large sample and robust conclusions.   
Implementing Gender Selection  
Several options during and before pregnancy have been identified in the literature to 
implement a higher boy-birth likelihood (for a comprehensive overview, see Guilmoto, 2015). Yet 
it is essential to understand that such mechanisms for putting son preference into practice are only 
the outcome channel from underlying son preference. In recent decades, the rise of sex-selective 
abortions has been a key instrument. Two very common methods, sonography and non-invasive 
prenatal tests, allow for sex identification at early stages of the pregnancy, upon which the parents 
may act and abort a female embryo. There is no official documentation about this sex-selective 
practice, and Westoff (2005) notes that its extent is particularly unknown in Eastern Europe.  
The level of technology available matters significantly, in particular access to and cost of 
prenatal diagnosis (Abrevaya, 2009). Kim (2005) develops a theoretical model, where falling cost 
of gender detection technologies leads to higher sex ratios, and applies it successfully to pregnancy 
data of Korean women. For India, Arokiasamy (2007) notes how such technologies, once 
available, have been widely misused. His observed pattern of extremely high sex ratio for both the 
last live birth and last two live births in selected Indian states is consistent with the higher levels 
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of use of either sonogram/ultrasound or amniocentesis. Zeng et al. (1993) find similar results for 
China, and Banister (2004) describes that after ultrasound became available, the shortage of girls 
emerged in areas of the country where it had not existed before. On the other hand, Junhong (2001) 
argues that the association is not as evident, as prenatal sex determination by ultrasound is illegal 
in China so that doctors often refuse to inform the parents. Bongaarts (2013) fears that biases in 
the sex ratio at birth might even further increase as technology becomes more widespread, since 
in numerous countries the desired sex ratio exceeds the observed ratio, often by a large margin.   
An alternative mechanism to eliminate children of undesired sex are neglect and lack of 
healthcare, which in theory could also be exercised before birth, but which appear unreliable and 
hence less common. Instead, adjusting the number of children represents a further main mechanism 
for parents to achieve desired son preference, leading to son-preferred differential fertility-
stopping behavior (Filmer, Friedman, & Schady, 2009). The concept denotes that the desired 
number of children depends on the number of boy births, where typically no more children follow 
if the most recent child born was male. Zeng et al. (1993), Park and Cho (1995), and Das Gupta 
(2005), among others, reaffirm this mechanism empirically by documenting highly skewed sex 
ratios at last birth. Related research has also shown that contraception increases after a boy birth 
compared to after a girl birth (Arnold, 1997; Retherford & Roy, 2003), while a girl birth increases 
the likelihood that a mother shortens the birth interval until the next child (Leone, Matthews, & 
Zuanna, 2003; Milazzo, 2012). Our contribution to this research consists of analyzing the two 
major mechanisms proposed (sex-selective abortion and fertility-stopping behavior after a son) for 
different population groups in Germany and Switzerland. Data from abortion as well as birth 
statistics help us understand better how parents might implement son preference in Central Europe.   
Underlying Motives for Gender Selection 
A large research body exists both on roots for gender inequality (among others, Doepke & 
Tertilt, 2009; Doepke, Tertilt, & Voena, 2012; Jayachandran, 2014b), and more specifically on 
determinants of abnormal sex ratios  (among others, see Das Gupta et al., 2003; Kishor, 1993; 
Miller, 1985; Park, Bowen, & Steinbacher, 2012; Visaria, 1971). Bhaskar and Gupta (2007) 
caution to interpret a rise in the population’s sex ratio as reflecting son preference or discrimination 
against women, as other factors impact the sex composition of different age groups as well (see 
also Calvi, 2015). However, with our exclusive focus on the sex ratio at birth we hope to tackle 
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such omitted variable bias. Hesketh and Xing (2006) summarize more than 30 demographic and 
environmental factors that have been associated with the sex ratio at birth, many of which are 
naturally interdependent and thus difficult to isolate. We nonetheless attempt to give a brief 
overview of the most frequently advanced causes. 
Declining fertility levels are widely proposed as major determinant for stronger son 
preference in many parts of the world. Das Gupta and Bhat (1997) and Guilmoto (2009) conclude 
for Asian and Caucasian countries that such a link intensifies gender discrimination, as the average 
number of children decreases. Campbell and Campbell (1997) have similar findings for Botswana. 
Banister (2004) confirms fertility as a key driver behind increasing sex ratios at birth in China, 
Jayachandran (2014a) does so for India, and Graham (2007) discusses this phenomenon for 
Singapore. Lin, Liu, and Qian (2014) provide supporting evidence from an extensive study on 
Taiwan as well. Klasen (2008), however, contests such a cause-and-effect relationship, and 
proposes to treat fertility decline as an endogenous variable affected by a range of other 
determinants in a country. He argues that a decrease in fertility might lead to a reduction of gender 
preference if a third exogenous variable comes into play that causes fertility decline and more 
gender equality.  
Next, the role of public policies has been identified as critical. Klasen and Wink (2003) note 
that state policy can critically influence gender bias in mortality. They cite female inclusion in 
education and employment as curbing son preference, whereas the one-child policy in China rather 
led to the opposite. Sudha and Rajan (1999) summarize that policy measures in India that were to 
address societal female discrimination were insufficient and largely ineffective. For the United 
States, Abrevaya (2009) discusses how the political decision to not ban gender-selective 
procedures might be an indirect policy towards fostering son preference. Nandi and Deolalikar 
(2013) evaluate in a case study a law in India against sex-selective abortion, using a treatment-
effect analysis framework. They conclude with strong positive evidence of the power of public 
policies in constraining son preference. 
Similarly the overall political economy is thought to matter, i.e. the political and economic 
system in place as well as the effects of changes and socioeconomic turmoil. Nicholas and Oxley 
(1993) argue that there were effects of the industrialization on the level of son preference, and 
Horrell, Meredith, and Oxley (2009) similarly link socioeconomic development and gender 
inequality in an analysis of the 19th century British Empire. Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999) analyze 
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China, Korea, and India throughout the 20th century and identify how specific historical events 
such as famines and war have impacted the level of son preference in these countries. For the same 
region, Das Gupta (2010) reaffirms that the type of modern state system in place has been critical 
in influencing son preference. 
 Moreover, differences in environmental and geographical conditions have been suggested 
to explain variations in the sex ratio at birth (Arokiasamy, 2004; Attané & Guilmoto, 2007; 
Guilmoto, 2008, 2012; Rose, 1999). For example, smog, heavy rainfall or floods, earthquakes, or 
other impactful events around conception have been proposed to affect gender selection (Fukuda 
et al., 1998; Hansen et al., 1999, Lyster, 1974).  
The “cultural” aspect of simply preferring a son has been pointed out as yet another main 
reason (Bulte et al., 2011), but a number of authors advanced this notion by investigating how such 
gender discrimination customs originated. This led to discussion on patriarchal traditions, 
including patrilocality and patrilinearity. Several papers argue that biased sex ratios at birth are 
rooted in practices of ancient agriculture-based economics (Aldashev & Guirkinger, 2012; Alesina, 
Giuliano, & Nunn, 2013; Boserup, 1970; Carranza, 2014; Mayer, 1999), while others point at land 
inheritance customs that benefit sons (Arokiasamy & Goli, 2012; Jain, 2014; Lahiri & Self, 2005; 
Lahiri & Self, 2007; Sudha, Khanna, Rajan, & Srivastava, 2007). Increased poverty risk from 
dowries (Das Gupta, 2000), divorce laws (Sun & Zhao, 2011) and relatively less supply of brawn 
(Rosenblum, 2013) in case of a daughter further contribute to a patriarchal and son preference 
culture. A further incentive for male offspring lies in the expected care for parents at old age, for 
which daughters are widely not considered responsible (Bhasin, 1993; Ebenstein, 2014; Geeta, 
2007; Larsen, Chung, & Das Gupta, 1998; Sun, 2002).   
Recently, access to media has been found to affect patriarchal traditions (Gillard, Howcroft, 
Mitev, & Richardson, 2008). Jensen and Oster (2009) document the “power of TV” by observing 
effects from the introduction of cable television in districts in India. They conclude that this new 
access to media led to significant decreases in the acceptance rates of domestic violence against 
women, higher female autonomy, and to lower son preference.  
Yet, with our geographical focus on population groups in Germany and Switzerland, we 
believe that the determinants for son preference cited so far have limited applicability, as they 
unfold rather in developing countries. Four additional socio-economic variables find support in the 
literature, and they are in our opinion also more plausible in our research context. Income levels 
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in a household are thought to have a robust association with gender selection practices, although 
the relationship is not linear but tends to follow an inverted u-curve (Bhat & Zavier, 2007; Klasen 
& Wink, 2003; Sen, 1990). Guilmoto (2015) confirms that the initially positive relationship 
between household income and prenatal discrimination can be reversed above a certain social 
level, with son preference falling among the top income earners. Female labor force participation 
represents an important element in that context, reducing gender inequality and son preference 
(Klasen & Wink, 2002; Qian, 2008; Sudha et al., 2007). However, Retherford and Roy (2003) note 
the monotonous trend of increased propensity for sex-selective abortion with higher (female) 
socioeconomic status. Murthi, Guio, and Drèze (1995), Banister (2004), Chamarbagwala and 
Ranger (2006), and Echávarri and Husillos (2016) caution similarly that one should not rely on 
rising income levels to improve the shortage of daughters. 
Higher incomes are closely linked to access to better health, the second variable we consider 
highly relevant. Many studies identify health differences as a key driver behind missing women 
(Barcellos, Carvalho, & Lleras-Muney, 2014; Basu, 1992; Bhat, 2002; Bose, 2011; Croll, 2000; 
Jayachandran & Kuziemko, 2011; Timaeus, Harris, & Fairbairn, 1998) although they tend to focus 
on post-natal mortality. A recent explanation for pre-natal excess female mortality was centered 
on the prevalence of hepatitis B, but could not be maintained (Das Gupta, 2005; Klasen, 2008; Lin 
& Luoh, 2008; Oster, 2005; Oster, Chen, Yu, & Lin, 2010). Eguavoen, Odiagbe, and Obetoh 
(2007) argue that a woman’s decision-making power on health predicts the level of son preference. 
Bharadwaj and Lakdawala (2013) and Agrawal and Unisa (2007) document preferential prenatal 
treatment of males in Asia, for example through more frequent tetanus shots and visits of antenatal 
clinics during pregnancy.67 
Education levels represent our third socio-economic variable, which is usually associated 
with decreasing female mortality rates (Arokiasamy, 2007; Chung & Das Gupta, 2007; Drèze & 
Sen, 1995; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001; Klasen & Wink, 2003). Guilmoto (2015) conceptualizes 
these empirical findings with the idea that women’s increasing access to education and subsequent 
financial autonomy decreases traditional patriarchal attitudes, and laws against sex discrimination, 
for example when transmitting property, are more frequently enforced. Alam, van Ginneken, and 
                                                 
67 Nutrition as an aspect of health is also discussed in the literature, with mixed results, amongst others in Klasen 
(1996), Sommerfelt and Arnold (1998), Deaton and Drèze (2009). However, that research examines gender-specific 
effects after birth, which is not our direct focus. 
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Bosch (2007) in return find no effects, results by Abrevaya (2009) also yield mixed conclusions, 
and Das Gupta (1987) reports that the sex ratio at birth is actually elevated among more educated 
women for higher order births.  
Lastly, religion has been put forward as important determinant for son preference, both in 
terms of type of religious affiliation, and the extent of religiousness. For South Korea, Kim and 
Song (2007) find that Christians display prenatal sex selection less than the Buddhist majority. A 
similar observation can be made for Muslims in India (Guilmoto, 2008). Almond et al. (2013) 
conduct a detailed study of the son preference for different religious migrant groups in Canada. 
They find male biased sex ratios at birth driven by immigrants who are neither Christian nor 
Muslim, with the “worst in class” being Sikh immigrants. The authors argue that the strong 
protection of the human life in Christianity and Islam extends also to the prenatal phase, i.e. it 
largely depresses sex-selective abortion. Yet, Guilmoto (2015) notes that for all main religious 
groups except Judaism a skewed sex ratio at birth can be found somewhere in the world. Hence, it 
would likely be a hasty judgment to select a single “son preferring” religion. Due to this fact and 
with the intense public discussion on the impact of (non-traditional) religious groups in Germany 
and Switzerland in mind, we decide to include it as variable in our analysis as well.  
Literature that examined reasons for ongoing son preference among migration groups could 
so far not resort to wider individual-level data. Thus little knowledge exists in particular on socio-
economic determinants which could explain the observed patterns. With regards to our focus 
region in Southeast Europe, a report by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2012a) on 
Albania points at deeply entrenched attitudes of male superiority manifesting in every aspect of 
life, and son preference was already visible in birth registries from the 1920s. The communist 
regime that ruled until 1990 did not manage to overcome this gender inequality despite programs 
to emancipate Albanian women, and since then even a reverse trend towards again more traditional 
values can be observed (see also Morris, Herold, Bino, Yili, & Jackson, 2005).  
While the history of Albania’s neighboring countries have their idiosyncrasies, we believe 
that other (Western) Balkan countries with biased sex ratios at birth nonetheless share a similar 
cultural background. Hence it is implausible that current observations of son preference are 
coincidental or temporary. However, is there “more” than the cultural background that makes 
gender discrimination at birth persistent until today, even when migrating to a highly gender-equal 
environment? The third contribution of this research is to explore why this phenomenon continues 
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to exist, in particular among the emigrated Balkan diaspora in Central Europe, with a focus on the 
four socio-economic variables income, health, education, and religion. 
IV. 3. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION 
In order to investigate the number of missing women and potential economic determinants, 
we resort to three micro data sources. These are national abortion data, federal birth records, and 
household surveys. Abortion and birth records are fully comprehensive per country, while the 
survey samples are nationally representative. With this range of sources, we aim to balance 
individual disadvantages of each while leveraging their combined strength.  
Abortion Data 
We begin our empirical work by investigating whether abortion data are suitable as they 
represent the arguably most direct source for sex-selective birth behavior. Germany’s current 
legislation that allows legal abortion has been in effect since October 1995 with the “Schwangeren- 
und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz” (SFHÄndG), while Switzerland’s equivalent law became 
effective in October 2002 (articles 119-120 of Swiss StGB).  
Data and variable structure provided by the national statistical offices differ considerably 
between countries: Records for Germany (Federal Statistical Office, 2015b) are available for a 
longer historical period than for Switzerland (BFS, 2015a), namely since 199668 (GER) versus 
2007 (CHE). We note with regards to the legislative situation that the abortion statistics in both 
countries cannot be affected by changes in abortion law, as the respective major amendments 
described above happened earlier. Both countries collect data for the absolute and relative number 
of abortions per year, as well as the timing of the abortion in terms of weeks of gestation. Germany 
furthermore provides data on the reason for abortion and the number of previous live births.  
Overall, data for Germany and Switzerland allow only for first tentative conjectures since 
key variables of interest are not included, a fact that was observed also in other Western countries 
(Abrevaya, 2009).69 Nonetheless, including these statistics as part of our broad empirical analysis 
                                                 
68 For better legibility, in the analyses we report 2000 as first year for Germany, but the previous years 1996-1999 are 
qualitatively identical. 
69 Information on the gender of the embryo is not recorded, and likewise existing (previous) live births are not broken 
down further along gender. We also miss a detailed citizenship split of the parents which would allow to identify our 
target immigration groups. 
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will be useful for an understanding of abortion dynamics, as well as for exploring initial hypotheses 
on gender-selective practices.  
Federal Birth Data 
Federal birth data for Germany (Federal Statistical Office, 2015c) and Switzerland (BFS, 
2015c) document all individual births per country on an annual basis. Such birth registries are also 
the most widely used source for research on imbalanced sex ratios at birth, respectively “missing 
women” (Almond et al., 2013; Attané & Guilmoto, 2007; Chung & Das Gupta, 2007; Klasen 
& Wink, 2003). For Germany, the key variables of interest, i.e. the citizenship of the mother and 
the sex of the born child, are available as of 2003, whereas the equivalent records for Switzerland 
can be retrieved theoretically back until 1970. We will, however, limit our data analysis to the time 
period since 1990, as this roughly coincides with the fall of the iron curtain and the onset of large 
migration waves from the Balkans to Central Europe. Note that one limitation of the data in both 
countries is missing direct information on race and immigration background, respectively 
parentage. That means we are unable to include foreign-born mothers that have received German 
or Swiss citizenship in our target sample of immigrants, since we have to rely on the technical 
classification of citizenship as sole migration characteristic. Mothers with Asian race and German 
citizenship, for instance, would be accounted towards the overall German population group. As a 
consequence of this strict migrant versus native classification, our estimates of the extent of a 
“missing women at birth” phenomenon appear rather conservative.  
Additional variables collected in the federal birth data vary between the two countries. In the 
German data, we find information on the citizenship of the newborn, which allows to draw 
conclusions on the family’s migration history. According to current legislation, if the mother is 
foreign, the newborn may be German because the father is German (ius sanguinis), or because at 
least one of the two foreign-born parents has lived in Germany as legal resident for a minimum of 
eight years with a permanent right or residence (ius soli) (Federal Foreign Office, 2015).70 
We can then determine through which of these two channels a newborn receives German 
citizenship given the mother is foreign-born. The father’s citizenship is also recorded in the 
German birth registry for all married couples, which we re-code for our purposes as a dummy 
                                                 
70 This rule on citizenship has been into force since the year 2000, hence our data sample covering the years 2003-
2014 is fully governed by described legislation. 
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variable of “being German” versus “carrying the same (foreign) citizenship as the mother”. Hence, 
a newborn that is given German citizenship despite both parents being foreigners must be due to 
the fact that the family (more precisely, at least one parent) has lived in Germany for at least eight 
years. In contrast, we know from a newborn with foreign citizenship that none of the parents is 
German, and that both have lived in Germany for less than eight years.  
Figure 4.2 summarizes the logic of all potential outcomes. Our inference regarding the time 
an immigration family already spent in Germany may directly be associated with its degree of 
socio-cultural assimilation (Robertson, 2001). Put differently, we are able to examine if the sex 
ratio at birth differs depending on the level of assimilation of the respective immigration group, 
measured through the years already spent in Germany. This is a particular feature compared to 
other national birth data statistics, which we are able to exploit for our research.  
 
 
 
The Swiss birth registry includes two other variables that allow additional targeted analyses. 
It records the age of the mother in seven age brackets, which may serve to examine differential 
dynamics of gender-selective practices depending on the woman’s age and lifecycle situation (Lin 
et al., 2014; Verropoulou & Tsimbos, 2010). Even more relevant seems the information provided 
per birth on child parity, i.e. we know how many previous children have been born into the family. 
While there are unfortunately no data on the sex of these existing children, we can nonetheless 
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Figure 4.2: Logic of citizenship of newborns and resulting inference on parental time in Germany 
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investigate the interaction between child parity and sex ratio at birth, which has been suggested as 
a key relationship (Park & Cho, 1995; Retherford & Roy, 2003; Zeng et al., 1993).  
National Household Surveys 
As discussed in the literature review, a variety of reasons are put forward to explain sex 
selective practices for newborns, and determinants why population groups continue to exert such 
behavior even after they migrated to a new country are not well understood. We attempt to shed 
new light on this debate towards the end of this chapter, where we move from census to household 
survey micro data. The German socio economic panel study (SOEP, 2015) is a representative 
annual study of private households, with nearly 11,000 households, and about 30,000 persons 
participating in the survey. For our purposes here, it contains useful information on citizenship, 
migration background, and the number as well as the sex of each child in the household. In 
addition, it collects a range of socio-economic variables. It is that latter part which we do not find 
in abortion statistics or birth registries (which are otherwise preferable as they are exhaustive). We 
base our analysis on version 30 of the SOEP survey, which hence covers the annual rounds from 
1984 until 2013. Representative individual data are available for various population groups, 
including people with migration background.  
Given that our statistics so far covered both Germany and Switzerland, it would seem 
obvious to mirror the micro data analysis also for individuals in Switzerland. To this end, we 
inspect the suitability of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), a yearly panel study following a 
random sample of private households in Switzerland over time. However, the number of 
households is smaller than the SOEP, and the variables that are of interest to us suffer in particular 
from poor response rates. For example, the target Balkan and Asian immigrants in the Swiss 
household survey record only 45 births in total since 1990, which prohibits meaningful analyses, 
especially since we would want to break those further down along birth parity. Hence, the focus 
of the micro data analysis will rest on Germany. 
Our empirical strategy tests whether a set of demographic and socio-economic variables from 
the SOEP data are able to explain differences in the children’s sex ratio at birth per household, 
measured as boy-birth likelihood.71 For this purpose, sufficient data variation and sample size 
                                                 
71 As we will introduce later, the core regression analysis will consist of a logit model. For this purpose, converting 
the otherwise preferable outcome variable sex ratio at birth (male births / female births) to a boy-birth likelihood (male 
births / (male + female births) appears as a more suitable approach.   
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needs to exist per regression equation. We focus on three specifications: One considers all 
respondents, i.e. it mirrors the total population in Germany, the second is a sub-sample of 
foreigners only, i.e. all respondents with migration background, and the third is a sub-sub-sample 
of only those foreigners with migration background from our target Balkan and Asian countries. 
As the survey has a set of questions on origin and migration background, we can develop a less 
technical definition of being a migrant than what we had to resort to in abortion and birth statistics. 
Together with the questions on sex and parity per child and per household, the survey collects the 
country of birth per individual through two separate questions.72 We select all individuals as 
belonging to our target migration group who indicate as country of birth Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, China, or India. We then take only 
the most recent entry per individual to avoid weighing those individuals more who participated 
several times in the survey, and to have the most up-to-date picture of each household. We observe 
in several instances that a household in the most recent survey round reports an additional newborn, 
which is of course critical for our analysis.  
In total, these selection criteria yield 208 target migration individuals, which is ca. 0.3 percent 
of the overall sample of 57,000 cases. This suggests an underrepresentation of this group with 
respect to the German population, as the German micro census accounts more than two million, or 
2.5 percent of the overall population, to these nationalities. Finally, we eliminate all cases with no 
reported children (either because they explicitly report no children, or because the respective data 
entries are missing), which leaves us with 108 distinct target migration households. In the SOEP 
data, this compares to 2,209 foreign households with a general migration background and children, 
and 16,497 German households with children.  
Initial data inspection indicates that the two migration samples (all migrants collectively, and 
our target migrant sub-sample) may not be large enough to create sufficient data variation, which 
is needed to explain the comparatively small differences in the sex ratios at birth (see table 4.8 in 
the appendix for descriptive summary statistics). This is an issue shared with other commonly used 
sources such as DHS surveys (Guilmoto, 2015). The sex ratios at birth are also surprisingly 
elevated for the overall sample (which mainly consists of German households) compared to the 
                                                 
72 These questions are collected as part of the bio information. One entry asks directly for the country of birth; the 
other asks more generally if the country of birth is outside Germany, and in a second step allows respondents to specify 
which foreign country they were born in. 
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migrant sample. The target migration group, however, displays highly male-biased sex ratios at 
birth up until the third child, which exceed all other samples73. Our set of explanatory variables 
recognizes the general need for “controlling for observable differences in parents’ characteristics” 
(Abrevaya, 2009, p. 15), and takes up the four main determinants of son preference which we 
discussed in the literature review. Specifically, we look here at underlying causes of higher boy-
birth likelihood rather than the mechanisms to achieve that (stopping rule behavior, sex-selective 
abortion, neglect of girls, etc.), which literature tends to conflate. We would like to examine a 
larger set of variables, but the data availability and response rate in the SOEP represents a 
substantial limitation. In addition to the information on an individual’s siblings, our selection thus 
remains with income levels, religiosity, health, and education.  
IV. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results from Abortion Data  
We begin with an overview of abortion dynamics over recent years in Germany and 
Switzerland (see table 4.1). The total numbers since the 2000s reflect that abortions are indeed 
sizeable, as on average about one in seven pregnancies is aborted.74 About half of all pregnant 
women who decide to abort are single. A number of conceivable scenarios regarding sex-selective 
abortion may come to mind when inspecting the table. However, none of these can be conclusively 
verified with the data provided. The summary statistics rather open up an initial informative 
perspective on the dynamics in both countries, and we summarize in the following first conjectures 
regarding prenatal gender selection. Yet, we clearly note that the results reflect the need to go 
beyond abortion data in our “forensic” attempt to find evidence for missing women at birth.  
One interpretation of panel B could suggest that availability of early sex-determining 
technologies may influence abortion dynamics. Both in Switzerland and Germany, elective 
abortion is only legal up until the twelfth week of gestation, which however, according to some 
practitioners, already allows to identify the sex given high ultrasound quality (UNFPA, 2012a). 
Efrat, Akinfenwa, and Nicolaides (1999) find that the accuracy of sex determination increases with 
                                                 
73 We regard the fourth parity statistics as not reliable given that these comprise only 22 births.  
74 Comparing this figure with Balkan countries proves to be difficult due to the high heterogeneity of officially reported 
numbers. Albania and Montenegro, for example, report for the 2000s an abortion rate of more than 20%, whereas the 
rate in Kosovo is only at around 5% (Instat, 2014, p. 51; Johnston 2015). 
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gestation from 70.3% at 11 weeks, to 98.7% at 12 weeks and 100% at 13 weeks. Parents willing 
to act on a less than 100% certainty of correct sex determination hence could have a time window 
to abort within the legal boundaries, and a number of pregnant women time their abortion to just 
before week 13. In addition, new noninvasive cell-free fetal DNA testing is widely marketed, 
which allows with a very high level of accuracy sex determination as early as week five after 
conception (Almond & Edlund, 2008; Mozersky & Mennuti, 2013). While theoretically it is illegal 
for doctors in Germany and Switzerland to disclose the baby’s gender to parents until after week 
twelve, adherence to this rule is difficult to enforce if results are on hand.  
 
After week 12, the two countries report only between two and four percent of abortions. This 
still translates into 2,780 abortions in Germany for 2014 after gestation week 12, but it remains 
again speculative how many of those might relate to gender selection. In spite of elective abortion 
being illegal after week 12, our interest group, i.e. European immigrants from the Balkan, have the 
realistic alternative to go on a “medical trip” to their home country and receive the desired 
treatment there. Interviews with Albanian women by the UN note that “there is a law on abortion, 
2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Germany Germany Switzerland Germany Switzerland
Panel A: Number of legal abortions
Total 134,609 116,871 10,645 99,715 10,249
Abortions as share of live births 17.5% 17.0% 13.8% 13.8% 11.7%
Share of Single Women 44.5% 52.9% n/a 57.7% n/a
Panel B: Weeks of gestation
8 weeks or less 46%
1
39%
1
70% 72% 74%
9-12 weeks 52%
1
59%
1
23% 26% 22%
More than 12 weeks 2% 2% 4% 2% 4%
Panel C: Reason for abortion
Elective abortion 130,945 113,774 n/a 96,080 n/a
Health 3,630 3,072 n/a 3,594 n/a
Rape / Reproductive Coercion 34 25 n/a 41 n/a
Panel D: Previous live births
Zero 38% 41% n/a 39% n/a
One 25% 26% n/a 25% n/a
Two or more 36% 33% n/a 35% n/a
2007 2014
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Abortion in Germany and Switzerland
Footnote 1: Until 2009, Germany applied a different split of the weeks of gestation until week 12 as follows: 7 weeks or less (taken here as proxy 
for "8 weeks or less"), and 8-12 weeks (taken here as proxy for "9-12 weeks)". 
Notes: Detailed data for Switzerland only available as of 2007. Numbers may not add up due to rounding or missing data entries. Switzerland has 
no data on the reason of abortion and the previous live births.
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis); Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
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but it doesn't get implemented” (UNFPA, 2012a, p. 87). Consequently, cases like the following 
appear frequently: “My sister-in-law had an abortion when she was at the fourth month of 
pregnancy. The doctor at the hospital refused to do it, so she paid one of the nurses. The nurse let 
her in the hospital during the night, wearing a white uniform, and performed the abortion herself” 
(ibid., p. 85). It seems plausible that pregnant women that are originally from that region will also 
find a way to abort if their intent and financial background are just strong enough – but this would 
never appear in the data.75  
From Panel C we see that at least for Germany elective abortion comprises the overwhelming 
majority of all cases. This may be interpreted as existence of a societal attitude that widely tolerates 
a woman’s “free” choice to abort – so sex-selective abortion might also be questioned less. Finally, 
panel D indicates that more than one third of abortions takes place after two children or more. 
Family planning emerges as key cause for this outcome, in line with declining fertility trends 
(Banister, 2004; Das Gupta & Bhat, 1997; UNFPA, 2012b; World Bank, 2011). Consequently, 
there is also a decline as to how often parents might be willing to “try again” for a son. Limiting 
the number of children has been identified as a major cause of soaring sex ratios at birth (Dyson, 
2012; Filmer et al., 2009; Graham, 2007; Guilmoto, 2009; Jayachandran, 2014a). The abortion 
statistics for Germany, in combination with societal acceptance for abortion, state of the art 
technology for early sex determination, and the possibility to return relatively easy to the Balkans 
to abort after week 12, all leave some room for speculations that prenatal gender selection could 
also exist among migrants in Central Europe. Yet, the findings so far are not conclusive, in 
particular since we have no information on the gender of aborted embryos. 
Evidence from Federal Birth Data  
We therefore turn to statistics of the federal birth data as summarized in table 4.2. Aggregate 
results are broken down by maternal citizenship along the specific birth variables and time periods 
that are available for Germany and Switzerland as introduced earlier. Based on the insights from 
figure 4.1, we select three samples of immigrant groups for analysis. First, we look at all 
immigrants, i.e. all women in Germany who are non-German, respectively all women in 
Switzerland who are non-Swiss. We then take two sub-samples: On the one hand, we pool 
                                                 
75 Allahbadia  (2002, p. 414) describes a similar pattern for Indian parents in the United States and Canada, who are 
“courted by American companies” towards highly effective sex selection.  
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immigrants from the five Western Balkan countries, whose populations have been found to display 
biased sex ratios at birth (Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia Herzegovina). 
On the other hand, we examine Indian and Chinese women to assess their gender selection 
behavior, and to compare it to the birth dynamics of the highlighted Balkan countries. In addition, 
we report German, respectively Swiss citizen birth rates as native “baseline” per country. Note that 
these native ratios are likely biased upwards due to our strict citizenship classification (i.e. all 
Germans and Swiss with migration background count towards the native ratio), which would lead 
to rather conservative estimates of population group differences. 
The census data indicate that foreign mothers account for a substantial portion of overall 
births in our timeframe (21% in Germany, and 49% in Switzerland), totaling over two million 
newborns. In each country, nearly ten percent of these foreign births can be attributed to mothers 
of the highlighted Balkan countries – more than 170,000 births in total. The largest Balkan 
immigration group in absolute birth numbers are Kosovars in Germany with 35,000 births, and 
Macedonians in Switzerland with 26,000 births, over the respective time periods. Chinese and 
Indian births are little in numbers, reflecting their small population share. We hence note that the 
distribution weights among immigrant groups is very different from other regions such as North  
America, which makes our focus on the highlighted Balkan countries all the more relevant.  
Our key variable of interest, the sex ratio at birth, yields three interesting findings that hold 
for both Germany and Switzerland. First, the sex ratio at birth of all foreign mothers shows no sign 
of gender selection. The ratios in column two are below 1.06 for both countries, which is nearly in 
line with the ratios of native citizens, and within the range of biologically normal ratios (Anderson 
& Ray, 2012; Coale, 1991; Klasen & Wink, 2003). However, many of the foreign mothers actually 
come from neighboring Western European countries. For example, births in Switzerland from 
Germans alone account for nearly ten percent of foreign births. Hence, potential deviations from 
normal sex ratios among immigrants are significantly mediated by the large number of fellow 
Western and Central Europeans who show no gender selection in their countries of origin.  
As second insight we note that selected immigrant sub-samples reveal a substantially higher 
level of sex selection at birth. In Germany, our five Balkan countries combined display a 
remarkably skewed sex ratio of 1.08, and we find the same ratio for the Chinese and Indian mothers 
in Switzerland. Given the large number of births from our set of Balkan citizens in Germany, we 
are able to estimate the sex ratios at birth very precisely. We find that these ratios differ between 
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Balkan immigrants and Germans on a one percent significance level, i.e. the probability of  
a newborn being a son is significantly higher if the parents are from the highlighted Balkan 
region.76 The ratio for births of Balkan parents in Switzerland is also elevated though not on 
statistically significant levels.  
The findings for both countries are closely aligned with related studies on sex selection 
practices of immigrants in the Western world (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond et al., 2013; Dubuc 
& Coleman, 2007; Verropoulou & Tsimbos, 2010). The similarity between Balkan and Asian 
immigrants may consequently be interpreted as a comparable extent of son preference in South 
East Europe as has been documented in these Asian countries (Bongaarts & Guilmoto, 2015; 
Chung & Das Gupta, 2007; Das Gupta, 2010; Zeng et al., 1993).77 Yet in direct comparison, the 
                                                 
76 The logic for calculating statistical differences follows Abrevaya (2009), such that we convert the sex ratio at birth 
into a fraction of boy births out of total births, ranging from 0 to 1, which allows to calculate means, standard errors, 
and resulting z-tests. We are not able to provide comparable evidence of statistical significance for the Chinese and 
Indian mothers in Switzerland due to the small sample size and resulting larger standard errors.  
77 While we do not report here the results broken down to individual foreign citizenship due to the comparatively small 
sample size, qualitative evidence suggests also heterogeneity within the pooled samples. Albanians in Germany, for 
Table 4.2: Federal Birth Data in Germany and Switzerland along Citizenship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's Citizenship Native All Foreign
5 Balkan 
Countries
China and 
India
Panel A: Germany (2003-2014)
Total number of births 6,784,294 1,430,242 118,287 22,685
Sex ratio at birth 1.053 1.055 1.077*** 1.057
Father same citizenship as mother n/a 52% 75% 56%
Parents in Germany less than 8 years n/a 30% 34% 42%
Panel B: Switzerland (1990-2014)
Total number of births 1,326,729 655,293 58,713 7,362
Sex ratio at birth 1.055 1.059 1.061 1.080
Mother below 30 years 38% 50% 74% 37%
Birth parity 1.79 1.68 1.80 1.46
Notes: The citizenship in columns refers to the mother's citizenship reported at the time of the child's birth. The sex ratio at
birth is the ratio of male over female births. "Father same citizenship as mother" indicates the percentage of fathers which has
the same citizenship as the mother. As the variable is dummy coded (1 = same citizenship as mother, 0 = German), column 1 
has no values since  here the two dummy categories coincide. Also, this variable is only collected for married parents, which
decreases the sample size by about one third. For Switzerland, "birth parity" denotes the average number of children per 
mother. Information on this variable is not always collected, so that the sample size for this variable is smaller (there are ca. 
250,000 births registered without information on birth parity). Swiss births for 5 Balkan countries include Yugoslavia from 
1990-1993. . *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level as calculated via a z-test that measures the 
difference between a given foreign birth and the native birth (German, respectively Swiss) 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis); Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
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migrant ratios observed in the “new” environment (Germany and Switzerland) are below those in 
the migrants’ countries of origin. This may be indirect evidence for migrant assimilation, i.e. 
migrants tend to adjust their level of sex selection towards natives as they settle down in Central 
Europe (and we have further detailed analyses in the following to test this hypothesis). 
Alternatively, it might be due to an attenuating selection effect, meaning that only those migrants 
come to Central Europe in the first place, who share already a more similar cultural attitude, i.e. 
lower son preference. Indeed it seems plausible that individuals deciding to migrate are not 
representative for their original population, but rather more open towards Western traditions and 
values, including a greater opposition to systematic gender selection at birth.  
As third main finding we document that, apart from the within-country variation, there are 
also between-country differences. Put differently, we see not only that native Germans respectively 
Swiss and our Balkan immigrants display different sex ratios, but also that the Balkan birth 
dynamics differ depending on whether the parents live in Germany or in Switzerland. The 
between-country fluctuations are largest for Chinese and Montenegrin citizens, which we largely 
attribute to the small sample sizes.78 The cross-country differences between the average sex ratios 
at birth for the same population groups are never statistically significant, but they can be observed 
also in the pooled immigrant groups. Specifically, the sex ratios at birth of the highlighted Balkan 
countries as well as Chinese and Indian immigrants differ by around 0.02 depending if they are 
observed in Switzerland or in Germany.  
As we previously proposed that a direct comparison between the two countries serves to 
evaluate consistency of results, it is fair to state that the cross-country findings for biased sex ratios 
at birth among immigrants are not entirely robust. The fluctuations suggest that prenatal female 
discrimination is not consistently salient in Germany and Switzerland. Our explorative “forensic” 
approach is not well suited for predicting such cross-country differences. Perhaps limited sample 
sizes, and the lack of pronounced gender discrimination at birth contribute to this somewhat non-
stationary outcome. We can think of no deeper theoretical reason that would convincingly explain 
why one of the two country should show a higher value for a particular migration group.  
                                                 
example, have a sex ratio of 1.10 based on 4,294 births, whereas Bosnians have a basically normal ratio of 1.06 based 
on 27,812 births. The differences closely mirror what can be observed in their countries of origin as well. 
78 See table 4.9 in the appendix for more detailed birth statistics per country.  
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Inspection of the country-specific variables allows to conjecture on reasons for the varying 
sex ratios at birth. For the Swiss-specific variables, we observe a striking gap between the Balkan 
countries and the other groups in terms of the mother’s age at birth. Independent of birth parity, 
only every fourth woman from Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is older than 30 years when giving birth, which contrasts to over 60% of Swiss mothers in that age. 
Given that early childbearing is more common among women from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
these findings hint at pronounced socio-economic differences between these groups (Coley & 
Chase-Lansdale, 1998; Moore et al., 1993; Sonfield, Hasstedt, Kavanaugh, & Anderson, 2013).79 
We also find a negative correlation between elevated sex ratios at birth and the number of children  
(r= -0.36), which has been observed similarly in the literature (Banister, 2004; Hu & Schlosser, 
2015; Jayachandran, 2014a). Mothers from China, for instance, have the highest sex ratio in 
Switzerland among our groups, while they are on average the oldest and display the lowest fertility 
levels. 
The Germany-specific variables at first glance suggest an association between homogeneity 
of parental background in terms of common citizenship, and the level of sex selection. Nearly half 
of the partners of all foreign mothers are Germans, and we observe a balanced sex ratio at birth for 
this group. For the highlighted Balkan sub-group, however, three quarters of parents share the 
same Balkan citizenship (only every fourth father is German), and the sex ratio is substantially 
more skewed. For Asian immigrants, the picture is similar: On aggregate, Chinese and Indian 
mothers have a German partner in 44% of cases, and biologically normal ratios of sons to 
daughters. However, a break-down by country reveals that Chinese mothers have German partners 
in 52% of cases, and a particularly low sex ratio of 1.03. In contrast, only 37% of Indian mothers 
have a German partner (i.e., 63% have an Indian partner), and they reach a highly elevated sex 
ratio of 1.09.  
While these figures hence suggest an existing correlation, we do not know if the two variables 
(common citizenship of parents, and sex ratio at birth) are really linked, or if omitted variable bias 
                                                 
79 We could in principle also assume that the maternal age has a direct effect on the children’s sex ratio, for example 
that a higher age of pregnant women is related to a lower boy-birth likelihood which might explain the sex ratio 
differences for Swiss versus foreign newborns. However, the medical literature offers no support for such a 
relationship as overall results are inconclusive. Some studies find a higher likelihood for older mothers to have 
daughters (Mathews & Hamilton, 2005; Matsuo, Ushioda, and Udoff, 2009), others report the opposite (Takahashi, 
1954; Hytten & Leitch, 1971), or conclude that there is no robust association (Rueness, Vatten, & Eskild, 2012; 
Jacquemyn, Martens, & Martens, 2014). Hence, we do not pursue this hypothesis further.  
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is present. It could be, for example, that Balkan mothers in general have a strong son preference 
independent of the citizenship of the father, and that the low number of German partners is 
unrelated. To tackle such potential bias, we will refine our empirical approach by splitting up the 
sample further. Similarly, we also interpret the last row in panel A such that the effect from the 
time spent in Germany requires further analysis, as our basic threshold measure of plus/minus 
eight years is not conclusive. The impact of both the homogeneity of parental citizenship, and of 
the length of stay in Germany will hence be examined in further detail in the next section. 
Refined Analyses of Birth Statistics per Country 
We documented in the previous section that on aggregate levels the sex ratio at birth differs 
between native citizens, and selected Balkan and Asian immigrant groups. Now we exploit 
additional country-specific variables from national birth statistics in order to conduct a number of 
refinement analyses.  
German birth statistics provide information on the citizenship of both parents, and indirectly 
on the time parents with foreign citizenship have been resident in Germany as described earlier. 
We aim to examine if the time immersed in a new and relatively gender-equal sociocultural 
environment affects gender-selective practices of immigrants. There is endorsement in the 
literature for such a relationship (UNFPA, 2012b). Abrevaya (2009) argues that a change of son 
preference among Asian immigrants could occur in the United States, as second- and third-
generation mothers might have a reduced cultural bias, and González (2014) speculates similarly 
for her country analysis of Spain. However, both studies suffer from insufficient data availability 
to verify this hypothesis empirically. Almond et al. (2013) find some empirical evidence for a 
declining son preference in Canada, as second-generation immigrants no longer continued having 
children in the absence of sons to the same extent as first-generation immigrants.  
In table 4.3, we contrast the sex ratios at birth along parental citizenship in panel A, i.e. we 
look at differences depending if only the mother is immigrant (and the father German), versus both 
parents being immigrants and sharing the same foreign citizenship (i.e. no parent holds German 
citizenship). Note that the sample size is about one third smaller than the totals in table 4.2. We 
are missing information on the citizenship of the father in all those cases, since this is only recorded 
if the parents are married. Panel B is a deep-dive of the right side of panel A, since it compares the 
time of permanent residence of all non-German parents, which is our proxy for the level of 
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sociocultural assimilation (see figure 4.2). Given the data structure and legislative situation, we 
can classify foreign parents in two categories of assimilation, depending on if they have had 
residence in Germany for longer than eight years or not.  
Results in panel A indicate that there are no substantial differences in sex selection at birth 
depending if both parents share the same foreign citizenship, or if the father is German. This could 
not be inferred from the aggregate descriptive statistics in table 4.2, which actually rather implied 
a differential effect depending on parental citizenship homogeneity. However, the highlighted 
Balkan countries for instance, only move from a sex ratio at birth of 1.073 (father German) to a 
ratio of 1.079 (father with same foreign citizenship as mother). Note that already the first ratio is 
considerably above a natural birth rate, which then increases just a bit further if mother and father 
share the same citizenship.  
 
Our likelihoods in the left column (father German) might also be biased upwards due to our 
classification which we owe to the data availability. We pointed already earlier at the fact that 
males with migration background who have obtained German citizenship cannot be differentiated 
from German males whose ancestors have lived here for generations. This is likely a relevant issue 
Table 4.3: Sex Ratio at Birth in Germany along Parental Citizenship and Time of Residence in Germany
Panel A: Parental Citizenship
Mother's Citizenship
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
German 1.053 4,045,343 n/a n/a
All Foreign 1.055 519,639 1.054 557,772
5 Balkan Countries 1.073 21,567 1.079 65,513
China and India 1.048 8,978 1.045 11,273
Panel B: Time of residence in Germany
Mother's Citizenship
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
German n/a n/a n/a n/a
All Foreign 1.051 303,585 1.058 254,187
5 Balkan Countries 1.080 40,887 1.078 24,626
China and India 1.030 3,175 1.051 8,098
Father German Both Parents Foreign
Residence for at least 8 Years Residence for less than 8 Years
Notes: Each cell reports the fraction of male over female births along mother's citizenship. In panel A, both parents foreign indicate that the father carries 
same citizenship as the mother, whose citizenship is given in the very left column.  Totals in panel A are about one third smaller than the total of births in 
table 2, because not all births have information attached regarding the nationality of the father. Panel B is a detailed breakdown of the two columns at the 
right of panel A, i.e. panel B only contains births from parents who share the same foreign citizenship. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis).
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in this context, as foreign females may look for a partner with similar cultural background 
independent of his actual current citizenship.80  
Panel B breaks down the all-foreign parents sample by their time of residence in Germany. 
There is some evidence that the time spent in Germany affects the parents’ level of sex selection, 
although the sex ratio differences are not statistically significant. The Balkan countries on 
aggregate closely fluctuate around a ratio of 1.08. For Kosovars, who represent the largest both-
parents-foreign group with over 20,000 births, the sex ratio at birth moves down from 1.100 with 
residence less than eight years to 1.088 with residence longer than eight years (see table 4.10 in 
the appendix). These are all strongly biased ratios, but the sample differences are too closely 
positioned to be statistically significant.  
In summary, intra-generational cultural assimilation measured in length of stay seems to have 
no significant effect on gender-selective practices of immigrant groups in Germany. This compares 
to a similar effort by Almond et al. (2013) for Canada, where the authors find that second-
generation immigrants still prefer sons at measurable levels. Our findings suggest that several 
years of residence do not make a substantial difference on how much immigrating parents prefer 
a son over a girl.  
A final analysis specific to Germany examines whether clustering of migrants affects the sex 
ratio at birth. In other words, has the degree of accumulation of a given population group an 
additional reinforcing effect on sex selection? The German birth data provide a geographical split 
along citizenship between all West and East German states (Bundesländer) while excluding Berlin, 
which we exploit for this purpose. This is because, when disregarding its capital, Germany’s 
migration footprint is remarkably divided between West Germany and the former GDR, today’s 
East Germany. With five percent, the population share with migration background in the East is 
much lower than in the West with ca. 20 percent (Federal Statistical Office, 2016). This pattern is 
mirrored in birth statistics: We observe that births by foreign mothers are four times higher in West 
than in East Germany, relative to births by German mothers. The share of our target group of 
Balkan migrants relative to the German number of births per region differs even by a factor of ten 
(2% in the West, 0.2% in the East). Hence, the size and influence of migrant communities differs 
                                                 
80 While not affecting our interpretations, we found it surprising that for a foreign mother, more births are registered 
with a foreign father than with a German father, and for our set of Balkan countries both-parents-foreign births are 
triple as many as only-mother-foreign births. 
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considerably, which might impact their level of son preference and associated sex selection at 
birth.  
The comparison of the West versus East sex ratios at birth per population group lends some 
support for such a hypothesis (see table 4.11 in the appendix). Foreigners collectively display no 
difference between regions, but the target Asian and Balkan immigrants indeed have a higher ratio 
in West Germany, i.e. where they cluster relatively more. The ratio for these two groups is 0.01 
(Balkans), respectively 0.03 (Asians) higher in the West than in the East. However, as birth 
numbers of these groups in East Germany amount only to a few thousand, these small differences 
are not statistically significant. Thus, we may only conclude that a trend indication is observable, 
but a robust pattern cannot be established.81  
Turning to the Swiss birth registries, additional valuable information provided relates to the 
birth parity indication, i.e. we know how many live births a mother has previously had. Similar to 
Abrevaya (2009), we can therefore break down the overall relative sex selection shown per 
population group along birth parity. Table 4.4 reports statistical results, with panel A pooling all 
births in Switzerland since 1990, whereas panel B examines births only since the year 2000. In 
comparison to Swiss birth data in table 4.2 the sample size is reduced since we have not records 
on birth parity for all births. Moreover, given the naturally decreasing birth sample towards higher 
parities, we pool all births after first birth up to fourth parity for a combined “higher parity” sex 
ratio per population group. This ratio hence serves as point of comparison against the respective 
sex ratio at first birth in order to detect deviating sex selection behavior that can be ascribed to 
higher parities.82 In addition, we also present the higher parities individually in the table. 
The ratios reveal that the group of Indian and Chinese immigrants in Switzerland seem to 
engage in substantial sex selection at higher parities. The ratios range from a considerably male-
biased value of 1.16 up to 2.60, and the pooled ratio of all their higher parity births is larger than 
the first parity figure at statistically significant levels. Hence, despite a limited sample we observe 
clear male bias at higher parities among the Asian target migrants.  
                                                 
81 Note that a comparable analysis for Swiss regions cannot be conducted meaningfully as a geographical split of 
births results in too small samples and erratic figures. For example, the sex ratio at birth for 2014, even irrespective 
of parental citizenship, fluctuates between 78.5 and 113.1 on a canton level. 
82 As we focus on the variation of the sex ratio at birth within the same population group but across birth parities, we 
do not compare the sex ratios to an “unbiased” baseline outside of the given population group. Doing so would conflate 
the parity effect with the between-population-group effect, whereas here we aim to isolate the parity effect.  
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For Swiss citizens, higher-parity births are actually less likely to be boys. The large sample 
allows very precise estimation, and the pattern is nearly linear as parity increases even though the 
absolute changes are rather small. Abrevaya (2009) explains a very similar outcome for white U.S. 
citizens with the fact that higher-parity births are “more common among women with lower 
socioeconomic status and lower-quality prenatal care” (p. 11), which are more prone to harm male 
fetuses. Hence, we refrain from linking this trend directly to any kind of parental gender preference 
among Swiss. For all foreign mothers, the sex ratio at birth displays a U-shaped pattern, i.e. it 
decreases after the first birth, but rises again substantially for the fourth birth.  
The sample with five Balkan immigration groups yields very similar results, such that higher 
parities on aggregate are less likely to be sons than the first birth. The more granular picture along 
individual parities shows a more male-biased ratio for the first child, followed by rather balanced 
sex ratios for the second and third child, yet a spiking ratio for the fourth child, which is 
significantly higher than at first parity in both panels. Considering Macedonian immigrants as 
example (results are given in table 4.12 in the appendix), we see a particularly strong gender 
imbalance at birth for fourth parity. Among the 1,100 births registered in Switzerland for that 
parity and citizenship, there are only 501 girls, which leads to a sex ratio of 1.20. All results are 
nearly identical for our two time periods reported.  
In addition, we are interested whether the full legalization of abortion in Switzerland in 2002 
impacted the sex ratio at birth. To this end, we split Swiss birth records in periods 1990-2002 and 
2003-2014 and compared the ratios per population group. Again we find no consistent difference 
in the birth statistics. The total ratio of all births (Swiss and foreigners) slightly increased from 
1.053 (1990-2002) to 1.059 (2003-2014), but the ratio for Balkan migrants actually decreased from 
1.065 to 1.055 whereas Chinese and Asians rose from 1.066 to 1.087. Hence the liberalization of 
abortions in Switzerland had no clear impact on the extent of prenatal sex selection. With this in 
mind, we decide to keep the pooled sample from 1990-2014 as preferred dataset, since the larger 
number of births allows for more precise and reliable interpretations.  
 
 196 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Sex Ratio at Birth in Switzerland along Mother's Citizenship and Birth Parity
SRB Sample Size SRB Sample Size SRB Sample Size SRB Sample Size SRB Sample Size
Mother's Citizenship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Full sample (1990-2014)
Swiss 1.059 501,265 1.053 651,344 1.055 447,379 1.048 154,391 1.049 49,574
All Foreign 1.064 288,897 1.053 293,735 1.050** 211,543 1.050 62,131 1.090** 20,061
5 Balkan Countries 1.080 32,311 1.048 39,374 1.030*** 25,440 1.055 10,036 1.148** 3,898
China and India 1.044 4,231 1.157*** 2,765 1.145** 2,351 1.148 378 2.600*** 36
Panel B: Millenium sample (2000-2014)
Swiss 1.062 263,407 1.059 338,969 1.058 237,377 1.063 77,777 1.053 23,815
All Foreign 1.062 184,330 1.055 181,316 1.055 133,786 1.049 37,190 1.069 10,340
5 Balkan Countries 1.083 20,629 1.045 23,242 1.033** 16,038 1.044 5,663 1.177** 1,541
China and India 1.032 3,259 1.186*** 1,939 1.193** 1,691 1.110 230 1.571 18
Higher Parities
(2nd - 4th Birth)1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth 4th Birth
Notes: Uneven cells report the share of male over female births along mother's citizenship by birth parity (number of previous births plus 1 per mother). Even columns indicate the total number of 
births per given birth parity and citizenship. 5 Balkan Countries includes Yugoslavia until 1993. Due to missing entries on birth parity the totals are smaller than the comparable figures in table 
4.2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level as calculated via a z-test that measures the difference between the nth birth and the first birth. Source: Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office (BFS).
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Overall, data for Switzerland confirm what previous literature has concluded on gender 
preferences of immigrant groups in relation to birth parity (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond et al., 2013; 
Dubuc & Coleman, 2007; González, 2014). Similar to Germany the detailed perspective for 
Switzerland provides evidence of sex selection and missing women among selected immigrant 
groups.83 However, the phenomenon appears to be confined to few distinct cases and small in 
absolute numbers. We now estimate how many women seem to be really missing at birth. 
Estimates of Missing Women at Birth  
In the spirit of the counterfactual exercise by Sen (1990), we aim in this section to quantify 
how many more women should actually exist in Germany and Switzerland if all parents would 
behave according to an “unbiased” reference sex ratio at birth. Before discussing the results, two 
remarks seem appropriate. First, we restrict our estimate of missing women to the number of 
females “missing” at birth. The literature correctly points at the necessity to observe female death 
rates throughout a woman’s lifetime, since additional factors may also cause an anomalously high 
number of missing girls during childhood and adolescence, as well as adulthood and old age 
(Anderson & Ray, 2010, 2015; Milazzo, 2012). However, this is primarily a concern in less 
developed countries, and we hope to capture nearly all missing women in Germany and 
Switzerland at the point of birth. We recognize that we might not provide a full picture of excess 
female death rates, but the existence of additional systematically missing women after birth seems 
unlikely.  
Second, the debate on the correct reference sex ratio at birth is far from settled (Bongaarts 
& Guilmoto, 2015; Klasen & Wink, 2003; Sen, 1992), so that consequently we decide to employ 
three alternative estimation methods for quantifying missing girls. The first and preferred method 
is to simply take the observed sex ratio at birth of natives (i.e. Germans in Germany, and Swiss in 
Switzerland) as reference. We believe this is an intuitive approach, while it also seems 
conceptually sensible. Both countries are far from displaying systematic female discrimination in 
terms of gender selection at birth. Therefore, instead of calculating a somewhat arbitrary average 
of sex ratios at birth in Western countries, we feel more comfortable with taking directly the native 
                                                 
83 We also employed a second dimension in the data, namely age of the mother, which has been associated with the 
degree of son preference Verropoulou and Tsimbos (2010); Lin et al. (2014). However, our results for Switzerland 
are not supportive of any consistent link between those two variables.  
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ratio of our respective “host” countries. Also, Germans in Germany, and Swiss in Switzerland have 
each more than one million births recorded in our sample, which provides by itself a highly reliable 
reference rate.  
Nonetheless, we also indicate a second estimate based on the fixed global sex ratio at birth 
of 1.059 proposed by Coale (1991), and we adopt an alternative approach developed by Klasen 
and Wink (2003). The latter estimate an individual expected sex ratio at birth per country through 
a regression in which they link life expectancy to the sex ratio at birth. We apply their regression 
coefficients and, using life expectancy data from the World Development Indicators, estimate an 
expected sex ratio at birth per country. The expected sex ratio at birth for a pool of countries (i.e., 
the highlighted five Balkan countries, as well as China and India combined) is an average of the 
individual ratios weighted by their number of births recorded in Germany, respectively 
Switzerland84.  
Results are given in table 4.5, where the observed actual sex ratio at birth is contrasted to 
each of the three reference rates, which yields the estimated number of missing girls. The number 
should be read as women who should exist in addition to all born females in these two countries 
in the time period of 2003 to 2014 in Germany, respectively 1990 to 2014 in Switzerland. Three 
findings stand out. First of all, the all-foreign group, i.e. immigrants per se, does not lead to women 
missing at birth in Germany and/or Switzerland. The sex ratio at birth of all foreigners is only 
marginally higher than the ratio of natives, and any calculation is very sensitive to the choice of 
reference rate. The counterfactual rates based on the method of Coale or Klasen and Wink indicate 
no excess female deaths, while the native reference rate does suggest it, but at minimum levels. 
This outcome is not surprising given the heterogeneity of immigrating foreigners. Most migrated 
from culturally similar neighboring Western and Central European countries and thus show no son 
preference, while others come from very different regions including those known for sex-selective 
practices.  
Inspection of immigrant groups from our target countries (which are known for son 
preference) yields strikingly different results. All our estimates for the highlighted Balkan 
                                                 
84 See the Appendix for a detailed methodology description. Klasen and Wink (2003) originally use as data source for 
life expectancy the UN Demographic Yearbook. However, this is unsuitable for our purpose, s ince our target set of 
Balkan countries are not included. Also, while an important contribution to the literature, we disregard Anderson and 
Ray (2010) as alternative estimation method, since they solely focus on China, India, and Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
play a negligible role as sources of immigration to Germany and Switzerland.  
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countries, and in five out of six cases also for the China/India sample, indicate an issue of missing 
women.85 Independent of the estimation method employed, the numbers are remarkably stable: In 
Germany, there are systematically at least 1,000 women missing from the five Balkan countries, 
which is equivalent to two percent of all female births from that population group. For the Asian 
sample, there are in absolute numbers more missing girls in Switzerland (ca. 80) than in Germany 
(ca. 40), even though German birth records indicate around three times more births from Chinese 
and Indian mothers. The estimates are consequently due to the substantially more skewed sex ratio 
at birth of these Asians in Switzerland, which translates into a higher relative shares of Asian 
missing women in Switzerland than in Germany.  
Finally, comparing results between estimation methods reaffirms that the reference rate of 
native citizens appears as the most plausible and useful here. This becomes particularly evident 
when reading the missing girls totals in panel C. The negatively signed results for the “all foreign” 
group based on the approach by Coale or Klasen and Wink suggest that there are actually too many 
girls born by immigrants in Germany and Switzerland. This would in return imply a daughter 
preference in three out of four cases among all foreigners. We think that this sign switch is 
implausible and due to an imprecise reference rate. The native ratio at birth as reference is the only 
method which yields a very small number of missing girls from immigrant groups, which seems 
reasonable given the high level of gender equality in Germany and Switzerland in international 
comparison. In any case, with these fluctuating estimates depending on the reference rate, it is all 
the more noteworthy how consistent all estimates are for missing girls from the five Balkan 
countries as well as from China and India. These two samples are always estimated to cause 
between 1,100 and 1,600 missing girls in Germany and Switzerland combined over the respective 
time periods, independent of the reference rate. Thus, while a small number in absolute terms, 
these selected immigrant groups display an issue of missing girls also in Central Europe, which is 
unfortunately highly robust. In contrast, all foreigners collectively do not cause a missing girls 
phenomenon as shown through our range of data analyses.  
                                                 
85 See also table. 4.13 in the appendix for more detailed results on missing women per population group.  
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Table 4.5: Estimates of "Missing Women" at Birth in Germany and Switzerland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mother's Citizenship
Actual Sex 
Ratio
Reference 
Sex Ratio
Missing 
Women
% missing 
births
Reference 
Sex Ratio
Missing 
Women
% missing 
births
Reference 
Sex Ratio
Missing 
Women
% missing 
births
Panel A: Germany (2003-2014)
5 Balkan Countries 1.077 1.053 1,269 2.23% 1.059 958 1.68% 1.055 1,164 2.04%
China and India 1.057 1.053 39 0.35% 1.059 -20 -0.19% 1.053 42 0.39%
All Foreign 1.055 1.053 1,339 0.19% 1.059 -2,381 -0.34% 1.057 -1,375 -0.20%
Panel B: Switzerland (1990-2014)
5 Balkan Countries 1.061 1.055 205 0.54% 1.059 75 0.20% 1.055 202 0.53%
China and India 1.080 1.055 81 2.30% 1.059 69 1.95% 1.053 89 2.51%
All Foreign 1.059 1.055 1,026 0.32% 1.059 -64 -0.02% 1.057 397 0.12%
Panel C: Totals Germany and Switzerland
5 Balkan Countries 1,474 1.55% 1,033 1.09% 1,366 1.44%
China and India 120 0.82% 49 0.33% 131 0.90%
All Foreign 2,365 0.23% -2,445 -0.24% -977 -0.10%
Native Ratio Coale's (1991) method 
Klasen and Wink's 
(2003) method
Notes: Expected sex ratio based on Klasen and Wink's (2003) method are the authors' own calculations based on the regression equation in table 2, column 1 from ibid. Hereby, All Foreign uses the life expectancy from the World 
Bank for "Europe and Central Asia" as proxy. 5 Balkan Countries in Panel B (Switzerland) includes Yugoslavia until 1993, but Yugoslavia is not included in the weighted expected sex ratio at birth for Klasen and Wink's (2003) 
method for the 5 Balkan Countries due to missing data on life expectancy at birth in Yugoslavia. % missing births is arrived at by dividing  the number of Missing Women by the actual number of female births reported. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis); Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS); World Development Indicators (World Bank).
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Micro-Evidence on Underlying Reasons for Sex Selection at Birth in Germany 
In this section we employ German household survey data to analyze potential underlying 
reasons for the diverging sex ratios at birth that we documented based on census data. In other 
words, we test the explanatory power of a set of socio-economic and demographic variables for the 
varying sex ratios at birth of different population groups (entire sample, the all-foreign group, and 
a Balkan and Asian target group). One appealing feature of the German socio-economic panel study 
(SOEP) for examining this question lies in the fact that the overall sex ratio at birth per population 
group is reasonably in line with our results from census data: The entire sample representing the 
population in Germany has a ratio of 1.048, the all-foreign group is slightly higher 1.055, and the 
target migration group reports a distinctly greater ratio of 1.092. As described earlier, we employ 
only the SOEP as the sample size for the comparable Swiss household survey is too small. Our first 
regression analysis consists of the following OLS equation: 
(4.1) Proportion of Male Childreni = β0 + β1 Migrationi + β3 Xi + εi 
where i designates individual households, and Migrationi is a vector of two dummies whether the 
individual has a general migration background (all-foreign) and/or originates from our highlighted 
Balkan and Asian countries. Xi denotes the described additional socio-economic determinants that 
have been proposed in the literature (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond et al., 2013; Gavalas et al., 2015; 
Kim & Song, 2007) and have a reasonable response rate in our household survey. These are 
monthly gross income, level of religiosity, extent of health issues, and education measured as level 
of schooling; finally εi is the heteroscedasticity-robust error term. The dependent variable measures 
the share of male children in a household, which ranges from zero (no sons, only daughters) to one 
(only sons, no daughters). The objective of this approach is to examine whether our regressors are 
able to explain the overall children gender composition in a household, respectively to identify 
variables that increase the proportion of sons.86 The advantage of this analysis lies in a larger 
sample size, as we can include all households with at least one child, and in examining a linear data 
distribution that complements our second, dichotomous regression analysis.  
The second model is based on a categorical outcome variable P, which takes the value of 1 if 
the newborn at indicated parity is a boy, and 0 if it is a girl. Its probabilities are modeled in the 
following logit equation: 
                                                 
86 We also estimated a fractional logit model where results are qualitatively identical, but with larger coefficients i n 
absolute terms. 
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(4.2)         Pi,n (boy = 1) = λ (β0 + β1 Migrationi + β2 Previous Child Femalei,n + β3 Xi) , 
where the logit function λ at the right hand side, in addition to the two regressors already 
introduced for equation (4.1), now employs the dummy Previous Child Female which is coded 1 
if any of the previous children in the household are female at given parity, and 0 otherwise 87; n 
denotes the given birth parity. We hence examine whether our variables are able to explain if the 
sex of a child per parity is male, and if so, we are interested in the effect indicated by the β 
coefficients. The equations are estimated using robust standard errors, and we will report 
coefficients as odds ratios for the dependent variable being male instead of female.88  
Our procedure for both equations is as follows: We begin by analyzing whether being foreign 
per se has a significant impact on the children gender composition, respectively the likelihood of 
having a boy birth. Specifically, in Panel A we take a broad perspective and include a migration 
background dummy that takes the value of 1 for all-foreign individuals not born in Germany, 
whereas in Panel B the migration dummy marks only the immigrant sub-sample from our target 
Balkan and Asian countries. Panel C includes two dummies, i.e. one all-foreign dummy and one 
target-group dummy, and in Panel D we test whether within all foreigners the target Balkan and 
Asian migrants have a differential effect.  
Table 4.6 presents results for these four main specifications. Inspection of columns one and 
two for the proportion of male children indicates a clear differentiation of effects depending on the 
migration group. The all-foreign sample and the target sample carry opposite signs, which are kept  
throughout all specifications, and even if the overall explanatory power of the model is weak. Being 
a foreigner per se tends to decrease the share of sons in a household, whereas a migration 
background from the target Balkan and Asian countries leads to a higher proportion of male 
children. The significant results in panel C suggest that the all-foreign sample reduces the 
proportion of male children by two percentages points, whereas migration background from target 
countries increases it by six percentage points. Also when looking only at foreigners in panel D, 
the target countries maintain a differential effect towards more sons. None of the additional socio-
                                                 
87 Conceptually, it would also be interesting for third and fourth parity births to employ a dummy on whether all of the 
previous children in the household are female. Such a case, however, is too rare in our sample for meaningful analyses.  
88 In the appendix (tables 4.14 and 4.15) we report the regular coefficients of the logit equations. We also experimented 
with linear probability models which yielded nearly identical results in terms of sign and significance of coefficients 
as well as overall model fit. However, due to the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable we prefer to report 
results from logit models. 
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economic variables have a meaningful effect, hence we are unable to identify further determinants 
for a male bias. 
Moving on to the logit results in columns three to ten, we find that the likelihood of a boy 
birth is more affected by the sex of existing children than by a person’s migration background, but 
with changing coefficient signs. The existence of daughters has a significant positive impact on the 
likelihood of the next child being male, but for second parity only, i.e. when the first child born 
was a girl. Here, the odds ratios indicate that a boy birth is seven percentage points more likely 
when the first child was a girl, an effect that remains constant (though no longer significant) if we 
consider only foreign migrants in panel D. However, the likelihood of a son actually decreases on 
average for third and fourth births among households in Germany if there have been girls among 
the older siblings. These higher parity estimates might be somewhat erratic due to finite sample 
sizes at higher parities, but we also conclude that evidence for sex selection at birth is not 
consistently found in our household survey.  
Next, we have a closer look at the two migration dummies employed, where we focus on 
second and third parities. We find again that only for the target migration countries the odds ratios 
are higher than one in nearly all specifications (10 out of 12 in panels B through D), i.e. male-
biasing. In contrast, the odds ratio of the all-foreign migration dummy indicates a decreasing boy-
birth likelihood throughout all specifications in panels A and C. While the associated standard 
errors are generally large so that only selected dummies are significant, we nevertheless interpret 
this sign switch depending on the migration dummy as reaffirming evidence for sex selection 
among certain immigrant groups only. This is also consistent with the census findings from birth 
registries, which were not irregular among all foreigners in Germany combined, but substantially 
biased for our target group. We see a similar link between this sub-sample of Balkan/Asian groups 
and sex selection displayed here in the SOEP household survey, whereas immigrants overall show 
an inconspicuous pattern – in our survey data even a higher girl-birth likelihood.  
Lastly, our additional controls have in general again no material impact on boy-birth 
likelihood. Religiosity is the only variable whose odds ratio is consistently below one for our full 
sample in panels A through C. Estimates suggest that a higher level of religious belief, measured 
via frequency of church respectively temple visits, decreases the odds for a male child. This likely 
reflects a general refusal to abort any child independent of gender preference, an attitude which is 
common among more religious people. In panel D, however, we observe a switch for religiosity 
from lower to higher boy-birth likelihood after the first birth. This could suggest that the frequency 
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Table 4.6: Regressions on Proportion of Male Children (OLS), and Boy-Birth Log-likelihood per Parity (Logit, Odds Ratios Shown) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Full sample with migration background dummy 
Migration Background -0.02 -0.02 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.81 0.96 0.82 0.75 0.37
(0.01)** (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.05)* (0.16) (0.08) (0.30) (0.10)** (0.22)*
Previous Child Female n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.07 1.07 0.82 0.93 0.75 1.45
(0.04)* (0.07) (0.07)*** (0.14) (0.11)** (0.58)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.34 0.68 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.70 0.01 0.21
Panel B: Full sample with dummy for migration background from target countries
Migration Background from Target Countries 0.04 0.12 0.91 0.71 1.04 4.69 1.04 0.99 0.53 0.78
(0.03) (0.15) (0.17) (0.48) (0.22) (5.11) (0.28) (1.45) (0.22) (0.84)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.07 1.07 0.82 0.93 0.75 1.45
(0.04)* (0.07) (0.05)*** (0.14) (0.11)** (0.58)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.63 0.65 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.75 0.05 0.37
Panel C: Full sample with two migration background dummies 
Migration Background -0.02 -0.03 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.74 0.96 0.81 0.77 0.41
(0.01)*** (0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.05)* (0.15) (0.08) (0.31) (0.11)* (0.24)
Migration Background from Target Countries 0.06 0.15 0.94 0.72 1.13 6.24 1.08 1.21 0.64 0.90
(0.03)* (0.15) (0.18) (0.50) (0.24) (6.92)* (0.31) (1.83) (0.28) (0.65)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.07 1.07 0.82 0.93 0.74 1.40
(0.04)* (0.08) (0.05)*** (0.14) (0.11)** (0.57)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.61 0.76 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.30
Panel D: All Foreign sub-sample
Migration Background from Target Countries 0.06 0.20 0.96 0.95 1.17 6.68 0.96 2.02 0.67
(0.03)* (0.15) (0.19) (0.67) (0.25) (7.27)* (0.28) (2.53) (0.32)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.06 1.19 0.69 4.78 0.69
(0.11) (0.49) (0.12)** (6.53) (0.22)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no
Sample Size 2,209 172 2,209 172 1,640 107 693 31 275
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.85 0.79 0.64 0.39 0.12 0.84 0.43
insufficient 
sample size
Proportion of Male Children 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth 4th Birth
Notes: In columns 1 and 2 the OLS coefficients are reported, where the dependent variable is the share of male children in a household, ranging from 0 (no children are male, all female) to 1 (all children are male, no females). In columns 3 to 10 a logit 
model estimates the boy-birth likelihood per parity indicated. The coefficient from the logit model is reported for the indicated independent variable along with the robust standard error in parentheses. Migration Background denotes whether the individual is 
born outside of Germany; Migration Background from Target Countries denotes whether the individual is born in Yugoslavia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, India, or China. Previous Child Female denotes as dummy whether 
any of the previous children in the household are female. The dependent variable is a dummy whether the child at given birth parity in a household is male (=1) or female (=0). Even columns include the following controls: Monthly gross household income 
in EUR in logs; the level of religiosity as measured by frequency of church/mosque/temple visits; health  issues, which measures the subjective extent of general sickness and lack of health; and the level of schooling. See the appendix for detailed variable 
description. The sample comprises singular data from 1984-2013; in case of several data entries by the same household individual over different years only the most recent data are used. The number of births deviates from the sample size at higher parities 
since less and less parents report a second, third, or fourth child. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) .
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of religious activities has a different effect among migration groups than among the general German 
population, probably because migrants tend to follow a different religion. A differential effect of 
religious affiliation on son preference has previously been documented in a study on Korea (Kim 
& Song, 2007). Unfortunately, the data here do not allow a further break-down along religious 
affiliation due to poor response rates, but among the all-foreign group the level of religiosity rather 
increases the odds of a male child after first birth. In any case, this variable is never estimated 
precisely enough in our equations to reach significance levels, so that conclusions remain somewhat 
speculative.  
Overall the explanatory power of the model is quite limited, which is somewhat in line with 
our expectations. It mirrors the earlier finding that variations of the sex ratio at birth between groups 
are small. In particular for the first child estimates are likely to be obtained by chance. As we expect 
parents with gender preferences to display a corresponding deliberate behavior, if any, towards 
later births (for the first birth many might just “give it a try” for a son), this outcome is plausible.  
Increasing evidence for son preference towards higher parities has previously been documented 
among immigrant groups (Almond et al., 2013; Dubuc & Coleman, 2007). A further statistical 
reason for insignificant findings is simply due to the limited sample size, especially for second and 
third births: due to poor response rates for the control variables, the theoretically available number 
of birth observations decreases by around 80 percent, and for panel D, by even more than 90 
percent. The sample for fourth parity is small in any case, as only few households actually have 
four children. This also forces us to omit estimates for the full specification at fourth birth in panel 
D, as there would be only twelve observations.  
Finally, we examine the explanatory power of our socio-economic regressors for our target 
migrants from the Balkans and Asia only. The objective is to identify potential reasons why these 
groups maintain sex selection practices in Germany, in spite of living in a very different socio-
economic environment than in their home countries. Is that phenomenon due to “cultural heritage” 
only, or can we identify additional variables that affect the odds of having a male versus a female 
child? We again estimate an OLS model for the proportion of male children per household in panel 
A, as well as a logit model for the boy-birth likelihood per given parity in panels B through D. The 
empirical work is impeded due to a strongly reduced sample, as we only look at survey respondents 
from our highlighted countries, i.e. a further subset of panel D in table 4.6. For this reason, we 
cannot include all regressors simultaneously, and we cannot conduct estimates for fourth parity 
births. 
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Table 4.7 summarizes results for these target immigration groups. In line with previous 
findings, we cannot identify significant determinants for the odds of having a male child. This 
suggests again that observable household characteristics cannot explain the variations of the sex of 
the child. If anything, religiosity appears to be most suitable for explaining boy-birth likelihoods. 
The regressor is significant in two out of three cases, and we are able to reaffirm in panels B through 
D the switch in the odds ratio from less to more than one after first parity, which we found in table 
4.6 for the all-foreign group as well. 
For parents who migrated from the Balkans, China, or India, religiosity favors the likelihood for a 
girl at first birth parity. However, for the second child, each additional level of religiosity increases 
the odds for a male child by 2.4 times. Furthermore, the dummy indicating whether older female 
siblings exist carries the expected sign, but has a significant effect only at second parity. This is in 
line with what Abrevaya (2009) reports for Chinese and Indian mothers in California. In our case, 
given that the first child was a girl, the odds for the second child being a boy increase by about two 
times. Our remaining explanatory variables employed are erratic. Income levels seem to increase 
boy birth likelihood but never significantly, and the level of health as well as the level of schooling 
of an individual yield no consistent picture either. All OLS results in panel A similarly yield no 
statistical evidence. In summary, the micro level analyses based on the German socio-economic 
panel study showed the difficulty to establish robust patterns between socio-economic respectively 
demographic variables, and the sex of a child. We interpret this mostly as a lack of systematic 
prenatal female discrimination that would be salient enough for statistical significance. In other 
words, we find no evidence for sex selection in households in Germany, i.e. a newborn being a boy 
or a girl results overall from a biological and random process, even for migrant sub-groups. In 
addition, the limited number of observations represent a considerable empirical challenge.  
Nonetheless, three further findings stand out from the OLS and logit estimates. First, existing 
female siblings tend to matter. If the first child is a girl, the odds for a male birth at second parity 
always increase, though for higher parities the effects from existing female siblings become smaller 
or even turn negative. Second, if there is any sex selection, it is associated only with selected 
migrant groups, which is consistent with our earlier findings from birth registries. 
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Dependent Variable:
Boy-birth likelihood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Proportion of Male Children
Monthly Income 0.07
(0.04)
Religiosity -0.03
(0.05)
Health Issues -0.02
(0.03)
Level of Schooling 0.03
(0.10)
Sample Size 60 60 108 20
R-Squared 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
Panel B: First birth
Monthly Income 1.19
(0.30)
Religiosity 0.42
(0.20)*
Health Issues 1.21
(0.20)
Level of Schooling 1.41
(0.64)
Sample Size 60 60 108 20
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.03
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.51 0.07 0.24 0.46
Panel C: Second birth
Monthly Income 1.17
(0.36)
Religiosity 2.42
(0.90)**
Health Issues 0.97
(0.17)
Level of Schooling 2.11
(0.97)*
Previous Child Female 2.04
(0.87)*
Sample Size 51 51 92 15 92
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.59 0.02 0.88 0.10 0.09
Panel D: Third birth
Monthly Income 1.32
(0.54)
Religiosity 1.84
(0.99)
Health Issues 1.06
(0.25)
Level of Schooling 0.33
(0.54)
Previous Child Female 1.35
(0.87)
Sample Size 25 25 54 8 54
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.49 0.25 0.80 0.50 0.64
Table 4.7: Regressions on Proportion of Male Children (OLS), and Boy-birth Log-likelihood per 
Parity (Logit, Odds Ratios Shown) for Target Migration Groups 
Notes: In panel A OLS coefficients are reported, where the dependent variable is the share of male children in a household, 
ranging from 0 (no children are male, all female) to 1 (all children are male, no females). In panels B through D a logit model 
estimates the boy-birth likelihood per parity indicated. Reported is the coefficient from a logit model for the indicated independent 
variable along with the robust standard error in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy whether the child at given birth
parity in a household of the migration target countries (Yugoslavia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, 
India, China) is male (=1) or female (=0). Previous Child Female denotes as dummy whether any of the previous children in the
household are female. The regressors are: Monthly gross household income in EUR in logs; the level of religiosity as measured by
frequency of church/mosque/temple visits; health issues, which measures the subjective extent of general sickness and lack of
health; and the level of schooling. See the appendix for detailed variable description. The sample comprises singular data from 
1984-2013; in case of several data entries by the same household individual over different years only the most recent data are used. 
Due to the limited sample size not all regressors can be included simultaneously. Sign Switch for Girl-birth Likelihood denotes 
that when employing the girl-birth likelihood instead of the boy-birth likelihood as outcome variable, the respective regressor 
switches signs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP).
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Specifically, the target migration sample of Balkan and Asian origin is more likely to have male 
children, but migrants altogether in Germany (the all-foreign group) do not share this pattern. Third, 
the level of religiosity appears to be the only socio-economic factor with some explanatory power, 
which is closely related to findings by Almond et al. (2013). However, the specific effect of that 
variable effect depends on the sample. For the total sample, more religiosity leads on average to a 
lower boy-birth likelihood, which we explain with the tendency among more religious people to 
oppose abortion. Religiosity among migrants, however, leads to higher odds of having a son, both 
for all foreigners collectively and for our target migration sub-sample. We believe this is due to the 
different meaning of religiosity for the average German versus the migrant population,  which leads 
to divergent behavior regarding sex selection practices and probably overall son preference. 
IV. 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even in the 21st century discrimination of women remains a central issue (Barcellos et al., 
2014; Duflo, 2005), which is not only confined to the developing world. For Europe, prenatal 
excess female mortality continues to be a reality in certain Balkan countries, and large migration 
waves from that region could have the potential to disseminate gender selection practices further 
across the continent. The objective of this chapter has been to examine if migrants, who moved to 
Germany and Switzerland and who originate in particular from Balkan and Asian countries that are 
known for son preference, display biased sex ratios at birth also in the new environment. In a 
“forensic” approach and using different micro data sources, we systematically compared those 
target migrants to all migrants collectively as well as to the native population. As second step, we 
attempted to identify underlying motives for gender selection with a focus on socio-economic 
determinants.  
We screened abortion statistics and birth registry data in Germany and Switzerland to 
examine sex ratios at birth along maternal citizenship. Empirical results indicate that mothers from 
the target Balkan and Asian countries tend to maintain an overly high sex ratio in their new 
environment, as compared to native Germans, respectively Swiss. In contrast, the sex ratio at birth 
of immigrants collectively is only marginally higher than the native population. Hence, Central 
Europe is not broadly importing the missing women phenomenon, but there is evidence that 
foreigners from selected countries and regions continue to have biased sex ratios at birth. 
Birth data for Germany allowed us to further examine effects from cultural adaptation. 
However, neither the citizenship of the father, i.e. the distinction if he is German versus from the 
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same country as the mother, nor the parental length of stay in Germany at the point of birth 
materially affect the level of sex selection. The Swiss data provided additional information on birth 
parity, which revealed that Indian and Chinese migrants appear to engage in significant sex 
selection at higher parities, whereas Balkan migrants displayed a strongly elevated sex ratio only 
at fourth parity. Considering three different reference rates of the sex ratio at birth, we consistently 
estimated around 1,500 missing girls from the Balkan and Asian immigrant groups in Germany 
(2003-2014) and Switzerland (1990-2014) combined. Hence while we identified prenatal gender 
selection among distinct immigrant groups, the impact in absolute perspective is rather small.  
We also attempted to identify potential underlying reasons for sex selection at birth, by 
employing the Germany SOEP household survey. It contains information on sex and parity of each 
newborn as well as demographic and socio-economic indicators, though the sample of foreign 
respondents is limited. Overall findings showed the difficulty to establish robust patterns between 
socio-economic respectively demographic variables, and the sex of a child. This confirms census 
data results which have not yielded evidence for broad systematic gender selection either. The 
gender of children of households in Germany is above all determined by nature, i.e. through a 
random outcome, even for migrant sub-groups. Nevertheless, our regressions suggest that 
composition of previous parities tends to matter, as the boy-birth likelihood always increases 
significantly if the first child was a girl. We also observe that any prenatal female discrimination is 
associated with the selected Balkan and Asian households in Germany, and not with foreigners 
collectively. This mirrors the aggregate findings from national birth registries. Finally, out of our 
socio-economic determinants only religiosity comes close to being significant, but the direction of 
the effect depends on the sample examined. Among all households, more intense religious beliefs 
decrease sex selection, which might be due to a general opposition to abortion among more 
religious people. For foreigners, however, more religiosity leads to a higher male bias at birth.   
We propose future research to refine the explanatory analyses for gender preferences, which 
for selected groups seems to persist independent of the geographical environment. Likewise, a more 
longitudinal perspective could help in the understanding of the level of son preference over time. 
Policy makers would benefit from enhanced knowledge on the pace of adjustment of the sex ratio 
at birth towards “normal” levels. Given the global crises together with unfavorable fertility rates 
and demographic trends in Central Europe, migration will most likely continue to be a key socio-
economic variable in the future. We aimed to contribute to an informed debate on its consequences 
for gender inequality at birth by analyzing the relatively rich set of existing migration data from 
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previous decades. These might also be indicative for gauging the future migration impact on son 
preference, too. While unexpected trends may change the picture, we currently find effects of pre-
natal sex selection to remain small and thus the need for action to be limited.  
 
 
IV. 6. APPENDIX 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 4.8: Descriptives for the German socio economic panel study (SOEP)
(1) (2) (3)
Averages (unless otherwise indicated) Total Sample All Foreign 
Target Migration 
Sample
1
Sample Size (at least One Child) 18,706 2,209 108
Sample Size (at least Two Children) 13,035 1,640 87
Sample Size (at least Three Children) 4,672 693 49
Sample Size (at least Four Children) 1,490 275 22
Number of Children 1.71 1.80 1.94
Sex Ratio at Birth: First Child 1.08 1.04 1.08
Sex Ratio at Birth: Second Child 1.00 0.93 1.18
Sex Ratio at Birth: Third Child 1.04 1.02 1.33
Sex Ratio at Birth: Fourth Child 1.11 0.90 0.83
Log Average Monthly Income 7.39 7.33 6.95
Religiosity 2.11 2.15 2.08
Health Issues 2.65 2.58 2.79
Level of Schooling 2.06 2.09 1.90
Notes: 1 Target Migration Sample includes all respondents who indicate as country of birth Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, China, or India. The sex ratio at birth is calculated as total male births over 
total female births per parity given. Log Average Monthly Income is the gross monthly income in EUR reported per 
household. Religiosity refers to the frequency of church/temple visits on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Health issues is 
the subjective individual's health situation on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). Level of schooling is the highest school 
education achieved on a scale from 1 (lower secondary school) to 5 (high school graduation with general qualification for 
university entrance). Source: German socio economic panel study (SOEP).
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Panel A: Parental Citizenship
Mother's Citizenship
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
German 1.053 4,045,343 n/a n/a
All Foreign 1.055 519,639 1.054 557,772
5 Balkan Countries 1.073 21,567 1.079 65,513
China and India 1.048 8,978 1.045 11,273
Kosovar 1.082 7,722 1.092 20,181
Montenegrin 1.061 4,690 1.080 17,930
Macedonian 1.035 2,656 1.084 12,611
Albanian 1.206 1,352 1.034 1,479
Bosnian 1.058 5,147 1.060 13,312
Chinese 0.987 5,216 1.052 4,897
Indian 1.140 3,762 1.040 6,376
Panel B: Time of residence in Germany
Mother's Citizenship
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
Sex Ratio 
at Birth Sample Size
German n/a n/a n/a n/a
All Foreign 1.051 303,585 1.058 254,187
5 Balkan Countries 1.080 40,887 1.078 24,626
China and India 1.030 3,175 1.051 8,098
Kosovar 1.088 12,895 1.100 7,286
Montenegrin 1.082 9,959 1.076 7,971
Macedonian 1.094 8,598 1.062 4,013
Albanian 0.949 651 1.107 828
Bosnian 1.064 8,784 1.053 4,528
Chinese 0.993 1,152 1.070 3,745
Indian 1.052 2,023 1.034 4,353
Father German
Residence for at least 8 Years Residence for less than 8 Years
Both Parents Foreign
Appendix Table 4.10: Detailed Sex Ratio at Birth in Germany along Parental Citizenship 
and Time of Residence in Germany
Notes: Each cell reports the fraction of male over female births along mother's citizenship. In panel A, both parents foreign indicate that the father carries 
same citizenship as the mother, whose citizenship is given in the very left column. Panel B is a detailed breakdown of the two columns at the right of panel 
A, i.e. panel B only contains births from parents who share the same foreign citizenship. Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (Destatis).
Appendix Table 4.11: Federal Birth Data in West and East Germany along Citizenship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's Citizenship Native All Foreign
5 Balkan 
Countries China and India
Panel A: West Germany (2003-2014)
Total number of births 5,355,309 1,279,692 110,039 18,882
Sex ratio at birth 1.054 1.056 1.077 1.058
Panel B: East Germany (2003-2014)
Total number of births 1,135,770 58,227 2,397 1,693
Sex ratio at birth 1.050 1.056 1.066 1.025
Difference 0.004 — 0.011 0.033
Notes: The citizenship in columns refers to the mother's citizenship reported at the time of the child's birth. The sex ratio at birth is the ratio of male over 
female births. West Germany comprises all West German states (Bundesländer), and East Germany all East German states. Berlin is excluded from both 
samples, which yields a reduction of the total number of births of East and West together, compared to Germany totals. 
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Background Information on the Reference Sex Ratio at Birth based on  
Klasen and Wink (2003): 
Klasen and Wink (2003), building on Klasen (1994), propose a “variable” sex ratio at birth, 
arguing that a secular upward trend in the sex ratio at birth in rich countries requires rejection of a 
“stable” sex ratio at birth. “Whenever better health and nutrition lower the rates of spontaneous 
abortions and miscarriages and reduce the incidence of stillbirths, the sex ratio at birth increases” 
(ibid., p. 269). As people in more developed countries also enjoy higher life expectancies, they 
conduct a regression of the observed sex ratio at birth on the life expectancy in a country. Hereby 
the sample with observed sex ratios at birth consists of countries which have complete birth 
registration data, at least 5,000 births per year, and no evidence of sex-selective abortion.  
Then, using the estimated regression coefficients, they calculate an expected “unbiased” sex ratio 
at birth per country that is now associated with the respective average life expectancy. Hence, in 
addition to biological factors, the authors also consider the individual state of development per 
country, proxied by the life expectancy, which influences the sex ratio at birth. As data source for 
life expectancy and the observed sex ratio at birth they use the UN Demographic Yearbook. 
Generally, the expected “unbiased” sex ratio at birth by Klasen and Wink (2003) for countries 
with excess female mortality (e.g., China, India) are below the ratio for Coale (1991), leading to a 
higher estimated number of “missing women”.  
For our purposes, we adopt the regression coefficients estimated by Klasen and Wink (2003), 
consisting of the constant = 0.991, and the beta for life expectancy = 0.00087. By taking life 
expectancy data from the World Development Indicators, we the estimate an expected sex ratio at 
birth for each country in our sample. For combined migration groups, e.g. the group of Indian and 
Chinese mothers together, we take an average of the individual country results weighted by the 
actual number of births in Germany and Switzerland. For the all-foreign group, we proxy the 
average life expectancy of all migrants by employing the aggregate World Bank life expectancy 
value for “Europe and Central Asia”, yielding an expected sex ratio at birth of 1.057. 
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Appendix Table 4.14: Boy-Birth Log-likelihood Regressions (Logit, Regular Coefficients Shown)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Full sample with migration background dummy 
Migration Background -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 -0.04 -0.20 -0.29 -0.98
(0.04) (0.16) (0.05)* (0.20) (0.08) (0.37) (0.13)** (0.57)*
Previous Child Female n/a n/a 0.06 0.06 -0.20 -0.07 -0.30 0.37
(0.04)* (0.07) (0.07)*** (0.15) (0.14)** (0.40)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.34 0.68 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.70 0.01 0.27
Panel B: Full sample with dummy for migration background from target countries
Migration Background from Target Countries -0.09 -0.34 0.04 1.54 0.04 -0.01 -0.64 -1.08
(0.19) (0.67) (0.21) (1.09) (0.28) (1.47) (0.42) (0.84)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a 0.06 0.07 -0.20 -0.08 -0.30 0.30
(0.04)* (0.07) (0.07)*** (0.15) (0.14)** (0.41)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.63 0.65 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.75 0.05 0.37
Panel C: Full sample with two migration background dummies 
Migration Background -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.30 -0.04 -0.21 -0.26 -0.90
(0.05) (0.16) (0.05)* (0.21) (0.08) (0.38) (0.14)* (0.59)
Migration Background from Target Countries -0.06 -0.33 0.13 1.83 0.08 0.19 -0.45 -0.71
(0.19) (0.69) (0.21) (1.11)* (0.28) (1.51) (0.43) (0.65)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a 0.06 0.07 -0.20 -0.07 -0.30 0.34
(0.04)* (0.07) (0.07)*** (0.15) (0.14)** (0.40)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sample Size 18,706 4,776 13,035 3,205 4,672 900 1,490 214
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.61 0.76 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.30
Panel D: All Foreign sub-sample
Migration Background from Target Countries -0.04 -0.05 0.16 1.90 -0.04 0.71 -0.40
(0.20) (0.70) (0.22) (1.09)* (0.30) (1.25) (0.47)
Previous Child Female n/a n/a 0.06 0.18 -0.37 1.57 -0.36
(0.10) (0.41) (0.18)** (1.36) (0.32)
Additional Controls no yes no yes no yes no
Sample Size 2,209 172 1,640 107 693 31 275
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.85 0.79 0.64 0.39 0.12 0.84 0.43
1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth 4th Birth
insuffi-
cient 
sample 
size
Notes: Reported is the coefficient from a logit model for the indicated independent variable along with the robust standard error in parentheses. Migration Background denotes whether 
the individual is born outside of Germany; Migration Background from Target Countries denotes whether the individual is born in Yugoslavia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Kosovo, India, or China. Previous Child Female denotes as dummy whether any of the previous children in the household are female. The dependent variable is a dummy 
whether the child at given birth parity in a household is male (=1) or female (=0). Even columns include the following controls: Monthly gross household income in EUR in logs; the level 
of religiosity as measured by frequency of church/mosque/temple visits; health  issues, which measures the subjective extent of general sickness and lack of health; and the level of 
schooling. See the appendix for detailed variable description. The sample comprises singular data from 1984-2013; in case of several data entries by the same household individual over 
different years only the most recent data are used. The number of births deviates from the sample size at higher parities since less and less parents report a second, third, or fourth child. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) .
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Dependent Variable:
Boy-birth likelihood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: First birth
Monthly Income 0.18
(0.25)
Religiosity -0.86
(0.47)*
Health Issues 0.19
(0.17)
Level of Schooling 0.34
(0.46)
Sample Size 60 60 108 20
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.51 0.07 0.24 0.46
Panel B: Second birth
Previous Child Female 0.71
(0.43)*
Monthly Income 0.16
(0.30)
Religiosity 0.88
(0.37)**
Health Issues -0.03
(0.18)
Level of Schooling 0.75
(0.46)*
Sample Size 92 51 51 92 15
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.09 0.59 0.02 0.88 0.10
Panel C: Third birth
Previous Child Female 0.30
(0.64)
Monthly Income 0.28
(0.41)
Religiosity 0.61
(0.54)
Health Issues 0.06
(0.24)
Level of Schooling -1.10
(1.63)
Sample Size 54 25 25 49 54
Wald Chi-Square (p-value) 0.64 0.49 0.25 0.80 0.50
Appendix Table 4.15: Boy-birth Log-likelihood Regressions for Target Migration Groups 
(Logit, Regular Coefficients Shown)
Notes: Reported is the coefficient from a logit model for the indicated independent variable along with the robust standard error in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy whether the child at given birth parity in a household of the migration target
countries (Yugoslavia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, India, China) is male (=1) or female (=0). 
Previous Child Female denotes as dummy whether any of the previous children in the household are female. The regressors are: 
Monthly gross household income in EUR in logs; the level of religiosity as measured by frequency of church/mosque/temple visits;
health issues, which measures the subjective extent of general sickness and lack of health; and the level of schooling. See the 
appendix for detailed variable description. The sample comprises singular data from 1984-2013; in case of several data entries by 
the same household individual over different years only the most recent data are used. Due to the limited sample size not all
regressors can be included simultaneously. Sign Switch for Girl-birth Likelihood denotes that when employing the girl-birth 
likelihood instead of the boy-birth likelihood as outcome variable, the respective regressor switches signs. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).
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V. General Conclusion and Research Outlook 
V. 1. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INEQUALITY 
Inequality is a central theme in economics, and it continues to have outstanding importance 
in public discussions around the globe. This dissertation was set out to explore distinct aspects of 
inequality, namely of inequality in income and gender, and two factors were salient for motivating 
this research focus.  
On the one hand, in spite of declining poverty rates in absolute levels, there is evidence that 
income inequality in the world is growing (Milanovic 2009; 2011). In a recent study, Oxfam (2016) 
claimed that the richest one percent now have more wealth than the rest of the world combined, 
and 62 people own the same as half the world. Are variables which are typically associated with 
development and believed to affect economic growth also responsible for this trend? In other 
words, do determinants for development cause at the same time larger income inequalities? 
Consequences for national income distribution from changes in variables associated with 
development, such as trade integration or institutional quality, are subject to ongoing controversies. 
While effects for the overall inequality in a country have been examined, more granular analyses 
of the changes in the underlying income distribution are rare. It is essential, however, to know if a 
certain development determinant affects only, say the richest ten percent in a country, or the entire 
population.  
On the other hand, broad consensus arose that inequalities between individuals also have an 
impact on economic development when the inequalizing feature is not personal income, but other 
individual characteristics. Discriminating behavior towards women, for example, may not only be 
morally unjustified, but also causes direct negative economic effects. Hence, working towards 
equality of opportunities between genders, and removing obstacles that prevent women from 
reaching their full economic potential will be positive for women’s individual freedom, and for the 
economic development of a nation. But many sides of gender inequality are still poorly understood, 
especially when considering the issue from an economic angle. Is there an underlying economic 
rationale why in many parts of the world girls receive less education than boys? What might be 
economic reasons for families to desire a son rather than a daughter; and if families are immersed 
in a new socio-economic environment, does this affect their sex selection behavior? Examining 
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such questions in order to learn more about gender inequality comprise the second major motivation 
for our work.  
The scale of both debates, inequality in income and in gender, is extensive and multifaceted. 
In the introductory chapter, we documented the voluminous income inequality research and 
discussed its importance for economics throughout time. We also pointed at the strong renewed 
interest it receives at present. Gender inequality is a younger theme in economics, but has also 
gained immense traction towards its high relevance today in academia as well as policy-making. 
Hence, our contribution aims to advance the economic development literature by providing new 
perspectives not only on income inequality, but also on two aspects of gender inequality. 
V. 2. SYNTHESIS OF DISSERTATION FINDINGS 
For synthesizing our main findings, interpreting them, and linking them to the literature, we 
revisit in this conclusion each of the three research questions of this book as addressed in detail in 
the respective chapter. Chapter 2 covered an aspect of income inequality by seeking to answer: 
What are the effects of fundamental development factors on different income groups? We advanced 
the related literature with this empirical approach by going beyond analyses of average income 
levels or overall inequality in a country, so that observed aggregate inequality changes can be 
pinpointed to specific income groups. This work was also the first to examine all key growth 
regressors more systematically, and regressions were estimated for several time periods and in 
various specifications for additional robustness. 
We examined effects in an explorative manner through a set of cross-country growth 
regressions. The dataset was newly constructed for 138 countries over 30 years by combining 
income distribution data from the World Income Inequality Database with average income levels 
from the Penn World Tables. Consequently, we were able to analyze effects on different income 
groups and systematically examined the lowest quintile, the median, the average, the top quintile, 
and the top decile of the income distribution. Focusing on the development factors geography, trade 
integration, and institutional quality, and applying the established instruments for the latter two in 
order to ensure causal interpretation, the empirical estimates of the five income groups over six 
five-year periods yielded a number of interesting findings.  
The point estimates generally confirm the related literature results for average income levels, 
but there are indeed substantial differential effects of the variables on low versus high income 
groups. The impact of geography (distance from the equator) clearly discriminates between income 
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groups, as its coefficients strongly decrease from bottom to top incomes. The variable even 
switches signs in many cases once we passed the mean income, suggesting that the rich – in contrast 
to the poor – actually benefit from equator proximity.  In fact, we showed that for geography the 
point estimates for the top incomes lie generally outside the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
poorest income. While the variable tends to lose significance at conventional levels when 
controlling for trade and institutional quality, the coefficient dynamics are very robust. In an 
alternative specification where we measured geographical conditions by the prevalence of malaria, 
the point estimates turned statistically significant and again keep the observed pattern. 
Trade integration, measured as the share of exports and imports combined of national GDP 
and instrumented with Frankel and Romer’s (1999) constructed trade shares, displays negative 
effects for all income levels. Yet, the granular perspective revealed that the coefficient values for 
rich incomes turn out to be higher in (absolute) size and significance levels as compared to the poor 
incomes. This suggests an equalizing effect of trade for different income levels within a country, 
as the rich are comparatively worse affected than the poor. We also noted that trade adds nearly no 
explanatory power to the model, so that the overall association between trade volumes and income 
levels is rather weak.  
Institutional quality, the third fundamental factor for development we examined, is 
instrumented in our main specification following the approach of Hall and Jones (1999) using 
language data. The variable displays positive and highly significant values for all incomes, i.e. 
better institutions are beneficial for all income groups. It also increases the explanatory power of 
the model substantially. When comparing income groups, we noted an increasing coefficient from 
bottom to top, such that the effect on top income groups is on average 20 percent higher than for 
the bottom income groups. We confirmed these results when using settler mortality data based on 
the work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) as alternative instrument.  
Overall, coefficient trends move evenly across income groups so that results for median and 
average income groups are close to a linear interpolation of top and bottom incomes. Our results 
are consistent over time but the explanatory power of the empirical analysis increases for lower 
incomes. A range of econometric tests confirmed the model’s overall validity and we controlled 
our results for a number of additional variables. These indicate that world regions have a sizeable 
effect on the results. In addition, the variables health and human capital, the latter using lagged 
values as instrument, enter significantly but do not alter the described patterns of the fundamental 
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development factors. In particular our estimates provided no direct support for the hypothesis that 
human capital is a more basic source for growth than institutions.  
In chapter 2 we analyzed for the first time simultaneously the set of variables that are widely 
thought to matter most for development. For average income levels, the findings closely confirm 
results by Rodrik (2004). More importantly, our study provides an alternative perspective compared 
to the conclusions suggested for different income groups by Dollar et al. (2002; 2013; 2014). These 
papers generally do not find robust association between growth variables and the income 
differences of rich versus poor groups. They have taken a narrower approach by examining rather 
detailed variables, while not employing all fundamental development variables simultaneously. We 
hope to offer a more systematic picture of the impact of variables that matter most for development. 
Indeed we learned that geographic conditions are an important variable preventing higher income 
equality, and institutions also rather harm a more equal distribution of incomes. Larger trade 
volumes, in contrast, have the potential to support income convergence. What we do have in 
common with related studies is the consistency of empirical findings over time. This suggests that 
the estimates’ stability over different time periods gives no occasion to assume that effects 
substantially change depending on, say, the decade under investigation. As far as data availability 
allows researchers to go back in time, no time period warrants special attention. 
Higher trade integration is often perceived skeptically, as especially the poor are thought to 
be the “globalization losers” suffering from foreign competition as discussed in chapter 1. Our 
conclusions from this chapter, which are strictly based on empirics i.e. on what the data speak, 
propose rather the opposite. Based on the numerous estimations conducted, a plausible 
interpretation of coefficients suggests that in a more open economy the poor are less marginalized 
than before. There are some indications that the rich, however, may face perhaps for the first time 
real competition in so far monopoly-like structures from which they had previously benefitted. 
Nonetheless, we would not go that far as to interpret the trade estimates as unconditional advocacy 
of “tearing down the borders”. Our study is limited to econometric modeling, hence the cross-
country regressions generally disregard more granular, country-specific circumstances that need to 
be taken into consideration when discussing trade policies.  
The discriminating effects of geographic conditions entail even stronger implications. 
Addressing the inequalizing consequences of this exogenously given variable arguably comes with 
no conceivable downside. We documented that geographic conditions seem to be related to disease 
exposure: Rich income groups are not really affected by hot, tropical climate conditions close to 
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the equator, while effects for the poor are dramatic. Higher mortality rates and lower productivity 
due to poor health likely in such an environment contribute to a widening income gap of the poor 
vis-à-vis the rich. Thus, policies targeted at creating a more level playing field in terms of accessible 
and improved public health and disease control should have a sizeable impact in curbing the 
discriminating effects of geography. International health organizations have increased their efforts 
in order to help developing countries, but many government leaders still have considerably more 
options to implement better health conditions. Ameliorations in sanitary conditions and higher 
vaccination coverage in geographically disadvantaged regions, for instance, might be a less 
“visible” success for policy-makers, but our results lend support to the conclusion that these would 
in fact benefit the poor. 
Chapter 3 then shifted the research focus to gender inequality and sought to answer: Does 
marriage age affect educational gender inequality? This question contributed to the strand of 
literature which relates cultural customs and traditions to gender gaps in education, but which has 
not provided international evidence on effects of age of marriage on educational achievements. We 
also incorporated in our empirical strategy the notion that causality goes from marriage age to 
education, and offered several ways for mitigating endogeneity issues.  
The economic conceptualization originated in the observation that women get married at 
young age in many countries, and on average also at a younger age than men, i.e. we observe a 
spousal age gap around the world. Simultaneously marriage age shows robust correlation patterns 
with education levels. We developed a simple economic framework on how a woman’s timing of 
marriage affects her education. Societal expectations of marriage age signal the timing for child-
rearing, as marriage is widely regarded as the primary and still the socially most accepted institution 
for conceiving children. Anticipated family offspring affects future female labor force 
participation, since due to deeply rooted societal conventions, wives tend to be responsible for 
raising children. Men are generally not affected by such family planning. This split of gender roles 
lowers the economic incentive only for female education, because the educational pay-off for 
women in the labor market is negatively affected by child-rearing. The timing of marriage itself is 
related to exogenous socio-cultural customs, which crucially influence individual decisions on 
marriage. The earlier a woman is expected to get married, the shorter her anticipated pay-off to 
educational investments such that educational investments are lower for younger marriage age than 
for older marriage age. We thus hypothesized that for countries where women get married younger, 
their achieved level of education is likely to be lower. 
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The theoretical considerations were found to hold in our empirical analyses. To this end, we 
built a global panel data set from 1980-2010 and examined the effects of marriage age on different 
measures of educational achievement. The results yielded that the female age at marriage has a 
theory-consistent and highly significant effect on female education: Each year of marriage 
postponement for women is associated with a three percentage points higher female completion 
rate in secondary schooling, and to about three weeks, or 13 percent longer female tertiary 
education. Recognizing the substantial likelihood to have biased results due to endogeneity issues, 
we employ fixed effects and different instrumentation strategies: For our core specification we 
instrument the culture-induced domestic female marriage age with a weighted average of the 
marriage age in adjacent countries. Alternative instruments established in the literature also confirm 
the findings though not on consistently significant levels. 
In a second step, we investigated the effects of spousal age gaps, i.e. the female relative to 
the male marriage age, and obtained even stronger results. Each additional year between wife and 
husband, i.e. an increase of the spousal age gap by one year, reduces the female secondary 
schooling completion rate by 10 percentage points and the time women spend at university by one 
month. Finally, we employed a quasi difference-in-difference strategy to isolate the differences 
between women and men regarding marriage age and educational achievement, i.e. we specifically 
examine spousal age gap effects on educational gaps. The methodological rationale was to 
eliminate potential confounding factors that affect the level of educational achievements jointly for 
women and men as we focus only on gender differences. The results were again reaffirming. In 
summary, there is clear evidence that spousal age gaps affect female education significantly more 
negatively than male education. 
For a number of refinement analyses, we moved from a panel analysis to the most recent 
cross-section for better data availability. There we found that also gender parity in literacy is 
significantly negatively affected by younger female marriage age, respectively a larger spousal age 
gap, whereas a measure of primary schooling attainment and the quality of education are not. We 
documented inter-generational effects of marriage age as well, i.e. the marriage age pattern of the 
parental generation also influences the children’s educational gender inequality. Furthermore, 
marriage age impacts even more aspects of female discrimination, namely the rate of teenage 
pregnancies and female participation in politics. We regard this as corroborating the hypothesis 
that the causal link from marriage age to educational gender inequality is no accidental empirical 
finding, but part of a broader robust pattern. Finally we provided strong empirical evidence that 
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marriage age and conventional measures of gender discrimination do not act as substitutes, i.e. the 
effects cannot be closely replicated by employing commonly used variables of gender 
discrimination instead of marriage age. 
These findings of chapter 3 added to the gender inequality research an international macro 
perspective on the relationship between marriage age and gender gaps in education. The 
methodology was also among the few in the related literature that offers a set of approaches to 
address endogeneity issues. Finally, this chapter to our knowledge was the first to examine the 
impact of other “regular” gender discrimination variables, i.e. we tackle omitted variable bias and 
document that marriage age is no substitute to conventional measures of gender discrimination. 
Our core findings confirm the literature consensus of a positive relationship between marriage age 
and levels of education. It also reaffirms the causal link between female marriage age and female 
education that could already be documented on a micro level (Field & Ambrus, 2008; Maertens, 
2013). Finally, results from the quasi diff-in-diff specifications employed provided rare evidence 
that female education is significantly more negatively affected by marriage age than male 
education.   
The marriage age in a country is highly dependent on cultural customs and traditions, but it 
can also be altered by imposing minimum marriage age legislation. Child and teenage marriage is 
nowadays outlawed or highly restricted in most countries of the world, which recognizes the fact 
that for the development of young people, in particular of females, such marriage timing is harmful. 
Our research lends further support to that notion by providing a new economic explanation on why 
early female marriage has a negative impact on female education. Informing societies about this 
economic link needs to be made a priority in order to address educational gender inequality 
successfully, since powerful forces against marriage age regulations represent an ongoing 
challenge. Recently, a ruling by the Turkish Constitutional Court stirred a heated debate, as an 
existing law punishing sexual acts with children under 15 years old was annulled (The Guardian, 
2016). Human rights activists now fear this may make child marriage more acceptable again in 
Turkey, a country that is simultaneously negotiating European Union membership. This reflects 
that female marriage age is an issue not only for the least developed nations, but for basically all 
societies around the globe. 
Finally, chapter 4 examined gender inequality at birth, a second aspect of gender inequality, 
by asking: Does Central Europe import the missing women phenomenon? For answering this 
research question, we focused on sex selection at birth and we selected Germany and Switzerland 
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as two cases studies, which appear suitable due to their large migration influx over recent years. 
Thus we set out to analyze whether different migrant groups, especially from Balkan and Asian 
countries that are known for strong son preference, also engage in sex selection at birth in their new 
environment. This analysis extends the literature on missing women at birth among migrant groups. 
Specifically, it examined for the first time effects in Central Europe and conducted a detailed 
analysis of Balkan immigrants, who are not only known to engage in sex-selective practices in their 
countries of origin, but also belong to the same major race as people in Central Europe such that 
biological reasons for different sex ratios at birth can arguably be well mitigated. The analysis of 
potential socio-economic reasons for sex selection at birth based on household surveys has also not 
been performed similarly in the literature before. 
To answer this complex question empirically, we resorted to three different micro data 
sources. We began by investigating national abortion statistics. These alone could not provide 
conclusive evidence, but left room for conjectures on how sex selective abortion may exist in 
Germany and Switzerland based on three major observations: the large absolute number of 
abortions in each country reflects a general societal acceptance that could facilitate (discrete) sex 
selection, modern medical sex determination techniques allow for a time window to abort within 
legal boundaries, and a significant share of abortions happens only after two children or more, 
suggesting deliberate family (and therefore potentially gender) planning. 
For more direct and conclusive evidence, we looked in a second step into several years of 
national birth registries, going back until 1990 for Switzerland, respectively until 2003 for 
Germany. Empirical results on the share of newborn males versus females indicated that mothers 
from the target Balkan and Asian countries, in contrast to native Germans respectively Swiss, tend 
to maintain a high sex selection at birth in their new environment. The sex ratios at birth of these 
target groups reach up to 1.08 and above, which cannot be reconciled with biological explanations. 
However, the same target foreign population groups display between-country fluctuations of their 
average sex ratio at birth, which somewhat challenges the consistency of results. In any case, the 
sex ratio at birth of foreigners collectively is in contrast only marginally higher than the native 
population. Hence, we found that the missing women phenomenon is partly imported to Central 
Europe, since foreigners from selected countries continue to engage in sex selection at birth, but at 
modest levels in absolute terms.  
We then inspected further country-specific variables provided in the birth data in order to 
better understand some of the associated sociodemographic dynamics. The German data indirectly 
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provide information on the time parents with (both) foreign citizenship have been resident in the 
country, i.e. we know for how many years migrants have been exposed to a new and arguably more 
gender-equal sociocultural environment. Yet we found no significant effects from such cultural 
assimilation on gender-selective practices of immigrant groups in Germany. In addition, there are 
no substantial differences in sex selection behavior depending if both parents share the same foreign 
citizenship, or if the father is German. The Swiss birth registries allowed for an examination of sex 
selection along birth parities. These indicate a skewed ratio at statistically significant levels for all 
higher parity births among the target Asian parents, whereas for Balkan migrants the sex ratio at 
higher parities is overall not elevated, except spiking ratios at fourth birth.   
The final analysis based on birth data estimated the number of missing women at birth, i.e. 
how many more women should actually exist in Germany and Switzerland if no parents would 
practice sex selection at birth. Bearing in mind the ongoing debate over a correct “unbiased” 
reference sex ratio at birth, we quantified the missing women at birth using three alternative 
counterfactuals. The results indicated on the one hand that migrants overall do not lead to missing 
women, since the sex ratio at birth of all foreigners is nearly in line with that of natives. On the 
other hand, gender selection at birth of the target Balkan and Asian countries translates into missing 
women that amount to 1,100-1,600 girls in Germany and Switzerland combined over the respective 
time periods, independent of the counterfactual applied.  
In the last section of chapter 4, we explored underlying reasons for the gender inequality at 
birth. Focusing on socio-economic determinants, we tested the explanatory power of a set of 
variables for the boy-birth likelihood in a household. As data source we employed the German 
socio-economic panel study (SOEP) alone, as the sample size for the comparable Swiss household 
survey turned out to be too small. Overall findings provided no evidence for systematic patterns 
between socio-economic determinants and sex selection. This outcome mirrors results from 
national birth data, which have not yielded evidence for collective sex selection practices either. 
The gender of children in households in Germany is above all determined by nature, i.e. through a 
random outcome. Nevertheless, our regressions suggested that the sex of older siblings tends to 
matter, as the boy-birth likelihood raises significantly if the first child was a girl. Balkan, Chinese 
and Indian immigrants also increase the odds for a boy, whereas immigrants collectively do not. 
This is also consistent with the findings from national birth registries. Finally, out of our socio-
economic determinants only religiosity came close to being significant, but with diverging effects 
depending on the group under examination. Among all households in Germany, higher religious 
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beliefs decrease son likelihood, which might be due to a general opposition vis-à-vis abortion 
among more religious people. For foreigners only, however, more religiosity leads to a higher boy-
birth likelihood.  
The documented distortions of sex ratios at birth among selected migrant groups and the 
resulting quantification of missing women at birth is closely in line with related findings in other 
Western countries (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond & Edlund, 2013; Dubuc & Coleman, 2007; González, 
2014). In addition to Asian migrants, we were able to identify similar effects for migrants from the 
Balkans as well. Still, with the absolute level of female discrimination at birth turning out to be 
small we consequently lack robust associations between any socio-economic variables and the boy-
birth likelihood. In short, we show that there is no systematic prenatal gender inequality in Central 
Europe.  
While the record migration influx of 2015 seems to remain a singular peak, there are good 
reasons to believe that Central Europe will continue to attract migrants in the coming years and 
decades. Apart from humanitarian crises due to war and conflict that cause people to migrate, the 
economic power of countries like Germany and Switzerland together with their unfavorable 
demographic structure and resulting need for external migration represent further and persistent 
factors. With regards to migrants, their countries of origin tend to be more and more unpredictable. 
While five years ago few people would have seen Syrians as the main migration group coming to 
Germany, recent reports note a sharp migration increase of Chechens and other Caucasian 
population groups (Bidder & Reimann, 2016). If this trend stabilizes such that a larger Caucasian 
community develops in Central Europe, it would be highly interesting to examine also their levels 
of son preference and sex selection behavior. This is because the Caucasus region is yet another 
part of the world whose societies have been found to display substantially male-biased sex ratios 
at birth (Guilmoto & Duthé, 2013). For now, however, our conclusion suggests that female 
discrimination in the form of “imported” prenatal gender inequality does not represent a significant 
issue in Central Europe. 
V. 3. RESEARCH OUTLOOK 
This dissertation offers a number of potential links for future research endeavors. Our 
granular analysis in chapter 2 on income inequality was characterized by a strong empirical focus, 
i.e. we “let the data speak”. Unanswered questions remain regarding an economic theory that might 
be able to explain what we see in the data. Such a theoretical explanation would ideally encapsulate 
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all empirical aspects observed in order to consider the interdependencies between the fundamental 
development variables we employed. Yet, the construction of a model that is able to link the data 
findings with economic theory for certain sub-aspects would also be welcome, and perhaps more 
feasible as starting point. For instance, while the economic literature on trade is truly rich, future 
contributions on why trade affects different income groups the way we observed it would be a step 
forward in the inequality literature. 
Moreover, our results identified the important role of the state of public health for elevating 
poor income levels. For building on these findings, an investigation on which public health 
measures are most beneficial, respectively which ones have a more or less differentiating impact 
for different income groups would be valuable. Such empirical work would potentially generate 
better insights when moving to a regional level with similarly developed countries, where one may 
then compare different health strategies. An alternative would be micro-studies using individual 
data. These could be also analyzed within a country by comparing for instance the effect of health 
policies on different income levels for different states or districts. Our work in chapter 2 operates 
rather on the aggregate level, offering a set of new directions for the “inclusive growth” literature 
level. We hope future research may take up individual elements for further analysis. 
Our modest contribution in chapter 3 on educational gender inequality also leaves a number 
of questions open for additional research. While it provides support for having and strictly 
enforcing a minimum marriage age requirement as well as compulsory schooling in order to 
mitigate the most adverse consequences, further policy recommendations based on our findings are 
difficult to draw. The cross-country perspective naturally limits the degree of specificity we can 
have at hand when discussing our findings in a national policy framework. As a further point and 
applicable to all instrumental variable estimates, the methodological approach rests on a set of 
assumptions that cannot be conclusively proven. The reader also needs to “believe” to a certain 
degree in the explanation we propose for isolating the causal effects. While we aimed to provide a 
careful argument for our instruments chosen, we cannot disprove all potential doubts. 
 Ideally, follow-up studies would access micro level data from various regions to track 
married couples with different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, and thus obtain a more 
granular understanding of individual education dynamics. These may also apply alternative 
methods for resolving endogeneity concerns, as successfully shown among others by Field & 
Ambrus (2008). One valuable source might be the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which 
collect a number of these variables and have been exploited for related purposes (Garenne, 2014; 
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Westoff, 2003). In addition, these data contain unmarried individuals which could also allow more 
refined analyses. In this dissertation, we decided to follow a macro data approach in order to 
complement the number of already existing micro studies, and more importantly, in order to exploit 
a data source containing a substantially higher number of countries (the DHS survey is limited to 
ca. 60 countries and excludes e.g. China, whereas we analyze up to 130 countries). Moreover, we 
have not found an identification strategy based on micro data that would solve the causality issues 
between the marriage age and education per se more convincingly than our suggested approach. 
Hence we believe that also a macro data analysis as presented here merits consideration, but more 
individual and geographically focused data sets may provide more specific policy 
recommendations. 
Another point of departure is based on the conjecture that the relationship between marriage 
age and education does not follow a strictly linear pattern, but includes some sort of life-cycle 
aspect as well. In other words, extrapolating the positive association we found much further would 
lead to an implausible outcome for very old marriage ages, namely extraordinary high education 
levels. Hence, there needs to be a point in life after which the marginal benefit from delaying 
marriage gradually decreases. This is a complex issue which we did not examine in depth with the 
methodological framework at hand, and which requires more explicit integration of literature 
strands on life-cycle theories. Lastly, the analyses always considered only the first marriage, yet 
with divorce rates globally increasing the significance of the first marriage (including the associated 
age at which groom and bride marry) may alter.  
One of the questions remaining open from chapter 4, which is also recurrently raised in the 
literature, refers to the sustainability of son preference and sex selection over the long term. Put 
differently, does the extent of sex selection at birth among “affected” population groups decrease 
over time, and if so when? Our proxy variable of cultural assimilation in Germany yielded no 
conclusive evidence, which mirrors findings of related studies. Researchers have difficulties to 
investigate this issue further as the data are in general unsuitable, providing an intra-generational 
perspective only. But it would be most interesting to learn more about the next generation(s) of, 
say Asian or Balkan immigrants. Do we still find measurable differences in the sex ratio at birth of 
their children? Can we perhaps even identify variables that are associated with a more rapid 
decrease in son preference? This would also help understand if the phenomenon is transient when 
brought by immigrants and consequently, how much policy makers and other involved groups 
should be concerned with it. Every girl that is not born only because the parents think it has the 
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“wrong” gender is an unacceptable case, but knowing whether this form of gender inequality lasts 
over generations would be a key insight to better comprehend and tackle the issue. 
Furthermore, our household survey analysis suffered from poor response rates and resulting 
low sample size. We would welcome a similar effort using a different data set that could be able to 
resolve these issues and thus provide higher statistical reliability. Identifying what affects the level 
of son preference among migrant groups, other than culture, remains a key element of the research 
agenda in this field, and we could only offer some initial evidence. 
The different chapters in summary demonstrate that inequality may take quite different forms. 
Yet we find many points of contact, and consequently the interconnectedness of different types of 
inequality should be kept in mind. Findings by the International Monetary Fund, for instance, 
indicate that countries with higher income inequality also tend to have larger gender gaps in health, 
education, labor market participation, etc. (Gonzales, Jain-Chandra, Kochhar, Newiak, & 
Zeinullayev, 2015). Singular economic perspectives may help disentangle this multifaceted topic, 
and a scientific approach may also provide a more factual view in this often emotionally led 
discourse.  
Nonetheless, when striving to better manage global inequalities holistically, the 
interdependencies of its singular dimensions need to be better understood. We recognize that, with 
our approach, potential inequality “spillovers” to other parts of economy and society cannot be 
captured adequately. We treated the different inequality aspects rather in isolation, which was 
essential for methodology and overall feasibility purposes, and which is a scientific simplification 
and abstraction shared with many other contributions. Therefore we hope that this dissertation, 
whose findings could be all based on empirical evidence, offered valuable new perspectives on 
inequality in income and gender for its readers. 
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